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Abstract 
 
This systematic review summarises the evidence for an attentional bias in Post-traumatic Stress 
Disorder (PTSD) and specifically explores the extent to which the findings are dependent on 
methodology. A systematic search strategy was used to identify published literature, which was 
then  subjected  to  analysis  of  quality  using  a  rating  scale  that  was  created  by  modifying  a 
published scale for rating methodological quality. This allowed for critical discussion of the 
papers  included.  Research  indicates  that  the  most  commonly  used  paradigm  for  measuring 
attentional bias in PTSD is the modified Stroop task, although other paradigms such as the dot-
probe paradigm have also been utilised. Overall there is good evidence to support the view that 
PTSD  is  associated  with  an  attentional  bias  for  trauma-related  words  on  a  Stroop  task. 
Methodological issues are discussed and recommendations for future research are made.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
8 
1. Introduction 
Symptoms of Post-traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD), like hypervigilence, have been attributed 
to an attentional bias to threat stimuli. If this is the case, then attentional bias could be a further 
target for treatment of PTSD. However, more needs to be understood about the phenomenon of 
attentional bias in PTSD. This paper systematically reviews evidence from studies that have 
recruited individuals with PTSD from adult populations to determine to what extent the findings 
of attentional bias in PTSD are dependent on methodology.  
 
1.1 Clinical Characteristics and Prevalence of PTSD 
Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is an anxiety disorder (DSM-IV: American Psychiatric 
Association, 1994); its symptoms are clustered within intrusion, hyperarousal and avoidance 
following exposure to a traumatic event. The traumatic event is perceived as frightening and 
threatening to the life or physical integrity of the self or others. PTSD can be diagnosed when 
criteria A-F are satisfied within DSM-IV (Appendix 1.2). Symptoms must have been present for 
at least one month in duration and have had an adverse impact on daily functioning.  
 
Epidemiological studies on PTSD in the United States show a lifetime prevalence rate of 5–10% 
and a current prevalence of 1–5% in adult populations (Breslau et al., 1998; Kessler, Chiu, 
Demler, Merikangas, & Walters, 2005; Kessler, Sonnega, Bromet, Hughes, & Nelson, 1995; 
Resnick, Kilpatrick, Dansky, Saunders, & Best, 1993). Until recently, large national surveys on 
PTSD  in  Europe  have  been  relatively  scarce.  However,  a  large  study  on  the  general  adult 
population in the Netherlands suggested that 52.2% of the population reported at least one 
stressful  event  throughout  their  life  and  an  estimated  3.8%  of  the  population  had  PTSD 
(Bronner et al., 2009). 
 
1.2 Conceptual Models of PTSD  
The symptoms of PTSD are most usefully conceptualised in terms of Lang’s (1977, 1979) Bio-
informational Processing Theory (Foa, Steketee, & Rothbaum, 1989). This is an early, single    
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representation, information processing model based on the notion that memory can be thought 
of as a network involving thousands of nodes with a dense set of interconnections between 
them.  In  single  representation  theories,  memory  consists  of  a  pattern  of  interconnections 
between nodes (Brewin, 2005). The Bio-informational Processing theory maintains that fear-
relevant stimuli are stored in semantic fear networks. According to Lang (1979), fear networks 
contain three related types of information: (1) information about the traumatic event, such as 
sights and sounds; (2) information about the person’s emotional and physiological response to 
the event; and (3) information concerning the individual’s interpretation of the degree of threat. 
Therefore,  Lang  (1979)  proposed  that  fear  information  is  stored  in  memory  in  a  particular 
integrative  way  which  can  facilitate  cognitive,  motor  and  psychophysiological  responding.  
Lang, Levin, Millar & Kozak (1983) proposed that patients with anxiety disorders have a stable 
fear network which can be readily activated when matched to elements in the environment.   
Lang et al., (1983) further posited that less prominent fear-relevant stimuli, like trauma words, 
can activate the fear network in people with anxiety disorders because other elements of the 
network are likely to be active e.g. psychophysiological responses.  For patients with PTSD, 
Blanchard, Pallmeyer & Gerardi (1982) suggested that symptoms, like intrusive memories, are 
triggered  by  a  fear  response  to  degraded  peripheral  threat  cues  which  is  facilitated  by  an 
attentional bias. 
 
The Bio-informational Processing Theory (Lang, 1977) has been developed to account for how 
a significant traumatic event can violate a person’s previously held basic concept of safety. This 
Emotional Processing Theory (Foa & Rothbaum, 1998) suggests ways in which a traumatic 
memory can lead to a structure in memory that is different from one that is created for an 
everyday frightening experience (Brewin, 2005). One such mechanism involved large numbers 
of  potent  stimulus-danger  interconnections  being  formed  between  nodes,  so  that  their 
connections to each other became much stronger than their connections to non-trauma-related 
nodes (Brewin, 2005). Although network theories are helpful in conceptualising PTSD, Brewin 
(2005) highlights that these networks cannot account for the special features of PTSD, such as    
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the  distortion  in  the  sense  of  time  and  why  some  traumatic  memories  take  the  form  of 
flashbacks whilst others appear like normal memories.  
 
In contrast to fear network theories (that a traumatic memory is an ordinary memory that has a 
particular  structure;  i.e.  stronger  interconnections),  it  has  been  suggested  that  traumatic 
memories are represented in a fundamentally distinct way (Brewin & Holmes, 2003).  Here, 
symptoms  of  PSTD  such  as  flashbacks  and  re-experiencing  occur  when  trauma  memories 
become dissociated from the memory system for everyday memory.  
 
Dual  Representation  Theory  (Brewin,  Dalgleish,  &  Joseph,  1996)  is  one  such  theory  that 
suggests  that  traumatic  memories  are  stored  in  a  fundamentally  different  way  to  ordinary 
memories.  Here,  two  memory  systems  are  thought  to  work  in  parallel,  but  one  may  take 
precedence over the other in different circumstances. The Verbally Accessible Memory (VAM) 
system involves the conscious storage of narrative memories of the trauma. The information 
stored  in  the  VAM  system  can  be  consciously  accessed  when  required.    The  Situationally 
Accessible  Memory  (SAM)  system  involves  implicit  (unconscious)  processing.  The  SAM 
system  processes  information  from  lower  level  perceptions  of  the  traumatic  scene,  such  as 
sights and sounds which were too briefly attended to in order for them to be contained in the 
VAM system. Flashbacks are thought to represent the operation of SAM system in that they are 
triggered involuntarily by situational reminders of the trauma (Brewin, & Holmes, 2003).  
 
1.3 Attentional Bias 
Attentional bias is a phenomenon where an individual redirects attentional resources to the most 
salient task with resultant disruption of other ongoing cognitive activities (Mogg & Bradley, 
1998). Attentional bias is believed to be important in the development and maintenance of 
PTSD because chronic over-arousal to mild threat stimuli can occur when attention is constantly 
biased  to  such  stimuli  (Brewin,  2005).  Attentional  bias  is  frequently  measured  using  the 
modified  Stroop  task  in  which  participants  are  instructed  to  colour-name  words  which  are    
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emotionally laden. This task is based on the hypothesis that longer response latencies indicate 
attentional  resources  being  preferentially  allocated  to  the  meaning  of  the  word  and  thus, 
interfering with the task of colour-naming (Johnson & Hasher, 1987).  Although attentional bias 
is thought to be an important characteristic of PTSD (Brewin, 2005), different methods have 
been used to measure this construct leaving the key question of, to what extent do findings 
depend on methods used.  
 
1.4 Aim 
To  conduct  a  systematic  literature  search  to  identify  the  experimental  paradigms  used  to 
measure attentional bias in PTSD and to determine to what extent the findings are dependent on 
methods. 
 
1.5 Research Questions 
1.  Does the evidence suggest there is an attentional bias in PTSD? 
2.  Is the evidence for attentional bias dependent on methods? 
 
2.0 Methods 
Insert Figure 1.1 
 
A systematic literature review was conducted (see Figure 1.1).  The search covered the period, 
between 1980 and 2008 because PTSD was first included in DSM third edition in 1980. The 
following computerised databases were searched: MEDLINE (1950 to October 2008 week 4), 
EMBASE (1980 to 2008 week 43), PSYCHINFO (1967 to October 2008 week 4); CINAHL 
(1982 to October 2008 week 4); PUBMED, COCHRANE LIBRARY and BRITISH NURSING 
INDEX & ARCHIVE (1985 to October 2008). 
 
The  search  used  the  following  key  words  [POST  TRAUMATIC  STRESS  DISORDER]  or 
[PTSD]  and  [ATTENTIONAL  BIAS]  or  [COGNITIVE  BIAS]  or  [INFORMATION    
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PROCESS*].  Article  titles  were  initially  reviewed  and  articles  with  no  reference  to  the 
systematic review topic were excluded. A second reviewer (EW) independently screened the 
article titles. If no consensus was found between the second reviewer and the author, online 
abstracts were obtained and reviewed. Online abstracts were obtained for all articles that seemed 
relevant based on the title. Abstracts were reviewed by the author and independently by the 
second reviewer to establish if the article met the inclusion criteria described below. Reprints of 
potentially eligible articles were obtained.  A hand search of all references of included journal 
articles  were  searched  to  identify  further  relevant  articles.    Additionally,  the  Journal  of 
Traumatic Stress, Biological Psychiatry, Journal of Anxiety Disorders and Journal of Abnormal 
Psychology were manually searched.  
 
2.1 Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria 
Studies were included if they investigated attentional bias in adult populations with PTSD. Only 
studies which investigated PTSD caused by trauma in adulthood were eligible. Studies which 
included lifelong trauma, other psychiatric disorders or physical problems (like chronic pain) 
were not eligible.  Exclusion criteria therefore included: (1) child/adolescent population studied; 
(2) attentional bias not measured; (3) studies that investigated the neuropsychology of PTSD in 
general; (4) case reports and (5) dissertation abstracts.  
 
2.2 Data Extraction 
Data  extracted  from  each  paper  included:  clinical,  demographic  and  methodological 
information.  Two  reviewers  independently  rated  the  methodological  quality  of  each  article 
according to strict quality criteria (Appendix 1.3).  The quality criteria were based on Cook & 
Campbell’s (1979) (taken from Ellis, Landany, Krengal, & Schult, 1996) article in which threats 
to the validity of designs were identified. These criteria were modified to be appropriate for 
studies on attentional bias and PTSD. The proportion of agreement between the independent 
raters for rating the quality of each paper was 100%.  
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3.0 Results 
From the electronic database search a total of 71 papers were identified and from the hand 
search, a further 9 papers were identified. On examination of the full-text, 13 papers from the 
electronic database search, and one paper from the hand search met full inclusion and exclusion 
criteria (Table 1.1). A total of 66 papers (Appendix 1.4 and 1.5) were excluded.  The studies are 
reported  here  according  to  the  research  questions  of  the  current  systematic  review  and  the 
results are discussed with regard to methodologies employed. 
Insert Table 1.1 
 
3.1 Does the evidence suggest there is an attentional bias in PTSD? 
The modified Stroop task has been used to investigate attentional bias in trauma victims of 
crime (Paunovic, Lundh, & Ost, 2002), combat (Constans, McCloskey, Vasterling, & Brailey, 
2004; Vrana, Roodman, & Beckham, 1995; McNally, English, & Lipke, 1993; McNally, Kaspi, 
Riemann, & Zeitlin, 1990), motor vehicle accidents (Bryant, & Harvey, 1995), rape (Cassiday, 
McNally, & Zeitlin, 1992; Foa, Feske, Murdock, Kozak, & McNally, 1991) and ferry disaster 
(Thrasher, Dalgleish, & Yule, 1994).  
 
Combat trauma (i.e. veteran studies) has been studied most frequently using the modified Stroop 
task.  McNally et al., (1990) compared Vietnam veterans with and without PTSD and found that 
in comparison to veterans without PTSD, those with PTSD took longer to colour-name trauma 
words than they did to colour-name neutral, positive and obsessive-compulsive disorder (OCD) 
words. In this study, the PTSD group compared to the non-PTSD group were significantly 
younger [t(28) = 3.10, p<0.004], had fewer years of education [t(28) = 2.11, p<0.04] and scored 
significantly higher [t(24) = 9.63, p<0.001] on the Mississippi Scale for Combat-related PTSD 
(Mississippi Scale: Keane, Caddell, & Taylor, 1988). The Mississippi scale is a validated tool 
for diagnosing PTSD. Additional analysis revealed that Stroop interference for any word type 
did not correlate significantly with either age or years of education. Thus, selective processing    
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of PTSD words was not attributed to the PTSD group being younger or less educated than the 
group without PTSD. Stroop interference for PTSD words was found to correlate significantly 
with  the  Mississippi  Scale  scores  [r(24)  =  0.64,  p<0.001]  and  remained  significant  when 
controlling for the extent of combat exposure [r(18) = 0.59, p<0.01], suggesting that the Stroop 
interference was related to PTSD, not the trauma. Participants also completed the Profile of 
Mood  States  (POMS:  McNair,  Lorr,  &  Droppleman,  1971)  from  which  scores  for  tension, 
depression, anger, fatigue, confusion and vigour can be derived. All except ‘vigour’ correlated 
significantly with interference for the PTSD scores suggesting that selective processing of threat 
words is strongly related to emotional disturbance. However, these scores were not treated as 
covariates in the  primary  analysis  comparing  Stroop  interference scores for those  with  and 
without PTSD, making it difficult to draw firm conclusions.  
 
McNally et al., (1993) repeated their 1990 study, modifying only the size of the card used to 
present the stimulus words used in the Stroop task. Here, a consecutive sample of 24 male 
inpatients at a treatment unit for PTSD completed the same Stroop task.  Results were consistent 
with the previous study; participants with PTSD exhibited Stroop interference for trauma words 
and no interference for positive, negative, or neutral words, or words related to other anxiety 
disorders.  Given  that  their  participants  were  veterans  in  an  inpatient  treatment  centre,  it  is 
difficult  to  generalise  their  findings.  Also,  potential  confounders  were  not  considered  in 
analyses,  such  as  substance  misuse,  extent  of  combat  exposure  and  co-morbid  psychiatric 
problems. These factors therefore reduced the quality of the study. 
 
Vrana et al., (1995) built on previous research by investigating whether response latencies on 
the Stroop differed between veterans with and without PTSD on trauma words with three levels 
of specificity: (1) Vietnam specific words, (2) Vietnam-general words and (3) Watts-Emotion 
words which were general negative words. The findings were consistent with previous studies 
in that the PTSD group took longer to colour-name all types of trauma words.  The analysis 
comparing  differences  in  response  latencies  between  the  PTSD  and  non-PTSD  groups  was    
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repeated controlling for depression, anxiety, and psychiatric medication, and the same findings 
were reported. However, the sample size for this additional analyses was small (PTSD group 
n=9, non-PTSD group n=14). Also, like McNally et al’s., (1990, 1993) studies, there was no 
non-veteran  control  group.  The  quality  of  this  study  is  reduced  due  to  the  lack  of  clarity 
regarding the extent to which the veterans were exposed to combat.  
 
More  recently,  Constans  et  al.,  (2004)  conducted  a  large  cohort  study  investigating  an 
attentional  bias  suppression  effect  in  veterans  with  PTSD    The  suppression  effect  is  a 
phenomenon  whereby  an  individual  can  inhibit  an  attentional  bias  under  certain  contextual 
conditions (Mathews & Sebastian, 1993). In this study, veterans completed computerised Stroop 
tasks consisting of social threat, combat-related and neutral words. The sample was divided into 
four  groups  and  each  group,  except  the  control  group,  was  given  an  instruction  prior  to 
completing the Stroop task. Prior to starting the stroop task, the first group were told they would 
be required to watch a short combat video, the second group were told they would have to give 
a  two  minute  speech,  and  the  third  group  were  told  they  would  be  given  $10  once  they 
completed the Stroop task. The fourth group (control) were given no instructions. The groups 
did not differ in age, depression severity, PTSD severity or social anxiety level. The findings 
suggested  that  attentional  bias  was  suppressed  when  the  participants  were  faced  with  the 
prospect  of  being  exposed  to a  mildly  threatening  event  after the  Stroop task.  The authors 
concluded that suppression effects may be secondary to either (1) a process in which attention is 
prioritised  and  awarded  to  the  most  potent  threat,  or  (2)  a  process  in  which  an  upcoming 
stressful event leads to the narrowing of attentional focus, such that peripheral cues, like word 
meaning, are ignored. As expected, the control group did have longer response latencies for 
trauma-related words. Interestingly, the authors found little support for the prediction that the 
suppression effect would be strongest when the post-Stroop event matched the word content on 
the Stroop task. This study had reduced quality because it did not consider the extent to which 
the  veterans  were  exposed  to  combat,  and  therefore  the  findings  of  the  study  may  not  be 
generalisable to other single event traumas.    
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Two studies (Cassiday et al., 1992; Foa et al., 1991) that investigated Stroop interference in 
victims of rape found that those with PTSD took longer to colour-name rape-related words 
compared to neutral and negative words which were not rape-related. Individuals who had not 
been raped showed no difference in response latencies for any word type.  For rape victims 
without PTSD, the findings were less consistent. One study (Cassiday et al., 1992) found that 
these individuals took longer to colour-name rape-related words, although another study (Foa et 
al., 1991) did not report any Stroop interference. However, the latter study (Foa et al., 1991) 
scored less in terms of quality and therefore the findings of the former study (Cassiday et al., 
1992) may be more reliable. 
 
Thrasher et al., (1994) investigated whether attentional bias was present in individuals who had 
survived a man-made disaster, based on a nosological debate at the time (e.g. Davidson & Foa, 
1991)  regarding whether or not PTSD should be considered different in survivors of man-made 
disasters compared with PTSD resulting from rape and combat exposure. Participants of a ferry 
disaster were grouped by PTSD symptom severity as assessed using the Revised Impact of 
Events Scale (IES: Horowitz, Wilner, & Alvares, 1979) and a control group was matched to the 
PTSD  groups by  age,  sex  and  verbal  IQ  as  measured  by  the  National  Adult  Reading Test 
(NART: Nelson, 1982). All participants completed the modified Stroop task which consisted of 
(1) semantically-unrelated neutral words, (2) semantically-related neutral words, (3) positive 
emotional words, (4) threat words and (5) disaster-related words. The findings were consistent 
with previous studies looking at attentional bias in rape victims and veterans; those with high 
PTSD  symptomatology  (i.e.  >40  PTSD  symptoms  on  the  IES)  took  significantly  longer  to 
colour-name disaster words compared with general threat, neutral and positive words. The low 
PTSD  group  (i.e.  <39  PTSD  symptoms  on  the  IES)  and  the  controls  showed  no  Stroop 
interference  for  threat  words  or  disaster  words.    This  study  had  a  high  quality  score  as  it 
benefitted from controlling for potential confounding variables, like substance abuse, and was 
based on a single event trauma. However, diagnosis of PTSD was made using a self-report 
measure and may not be an accurate measure of the presence of PTSD symptoms.     
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Bryant  and  Harvey  (1995)  used  a  computerised  Stroop  task  to  compare  attentional  bias  in 
individuals with PTSD and those with a simple phobia. The task consisted of four types of 
words: (1) strong threat, (2) mild threat, (3) positive and (4) neutral. All participants had been 
involved in a motor vehicle accident (MVA) and the groups did not differ significantly on age, 
time since MVA, severity of MVA or vocabulary score as measured by the vocabulary subtest 
of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale – Revised (WAIS-R: Wechsler, 1981). The findings 
were consistent with previous studies which found that individuals with PTSD display Stroop 
interference for threat related stimuli. Specifically, the PTSD group took longer to colour-name 
strong  and  mild  threat  words  compared  to  positive  and  neutral  words,  but  there  was  no 
difference between strong and mild threat words. The Stroop interference effect was not found 
for the simple phobia group supporting the theory that Stroop interference for threat-related 
words is associated with PTSD symptomatology. However, this study did not have non-PTSD 
trauma group, which would have helped clarify the reported finding that attentional bias is a 
feature of PTSD. 
 
The  studies  described  so  far  demonstrate  a  supraliminal  (words  remain  exposed  until  the 
participant correctly colour-names them) Stroop interference for trauma words in individuals 
with  PTSD.  However,  Cassiday  et  al.,  (1992)  commented  that  the  use  of  computerised 
supraliminal  Stroop  tasks  may  mean  that  individuals  ruminate  about  the  meaning  of  threat 
words,  or  use  avoidance  strategies  in  response  to  such  words.  Indeed,  one  study  found 
subliminal trauma-specific interference in PTSD and suggested that pre-attentive processing of 
threatening information may occur in PTSD (Harvey, Bryant, & Rapee, 1996). Paunovic et al., 
(2002)  investigated  whether  individuals  with  PTSD  compared  to  a  matched  control  group 
displayed  a  pre-attentive  bias  on  subliminally  and  supraliminally  presented  words.  A 
computerised  Stroop  task  was  used  to  present  words  supraliminally,  that  is,  words  were 
presented until participants successfully colour-named each word. In the subliminal condition, 
words were presented for 17ms and then replaced with a string (mask) of either Xs or Os until 
the individual successfully colour-named the mask. It was hypothesised that previous findings    
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of  Stroop  interference  occurring  in  individuals  with  PTSD  would  be  replicated,  and  that 
individuals would display Stroop interference for subliminally presented words compared with 
controls.    The  findings  suggested  that  the  PTSD  group  did  display  Stroop  interference  for 
supraliminally  presented  trauma  words  compared  with  controls.  However,  no  Stroop 
interference was apparent in the subliminal condition, suggesting pre-attentive processing was 
not present. Unfortunately, the participants with PTSD in this study were part of a treatment 
study of Cognitive-Behavioural Therapy (CBT) for acute PTSD with the mean duration of their 
disorder being 6.7 weeks (SD = 2.31), and therefore the PTSD symptoms may have been too 
short-lived to cause an absolute attentional bias towards threat-related words.  
Although the modified Stroop task is the most frequently used paradigm, doubts have been 
raised as to whether the task constitutes a measure of attentional bias to threat stimuli because a 
similar degree of interference has been found for positive words (McNally, Riemann, Louro, 
Lukach, & Kim, 1992). Bryant and Harvey (1997) failed to find greater attentional allocation in 
individuals with PTSD when using the dot-probe paradigm; however, this study did not use 
trauma-relevant  stimuli.  Elsesser,  Sartory  &  Tackenberg,  (2004)  also  used  the  dot-probe 
paradigm to assess whether an attentional bias to trauma-pictures was present in individuals 
with chronic PTSD and recent trauma victims. Including a measure of heart rate (HR), the 
researchers  found  that  both  groups  had  increased  HR  reactions  to  trauma-pictures.  Neither 
groups showed shortened reaction times whenever the probe appeared in place of the trauma 
picture, nor did they show avoidance, thus suggesting that neither group showed an attentional 
bias for trauma pictures. However, the extent of attentional bias did vary with HR reaction to 
trauma pictures. For the chronic PTSD group, increased HR occurred when individuals directed 
their attention towards the trauma-picture, and furthermore, the higher the HR reaction, the 
more  unpleasant  the  trauma-picture  was  rated.  Given  this,  the  authors  suggested  that  the 
attentional bias evident in some participants was due to the emotional impact of the picture 
rather than the cognitive impact.  
    
 
 
19 
Other, less used paradigms have also been employed to investigate whether or not an attentional 
bias  is  present  in  individuals  with  PTSD.  Using  a  sentence  priming  paradigm,  Weinstein, 
Lillywhite, & Nutt, (1996) found evidence for a general interference when a trauma sentence 
was followed by a trauma word. However, because the same phenomenon was evident in the 
control group, it was concluded that there was little evidence for a selective bias in the PTSD 
group. In contrast, Michael, Ehlers, & Halligan, (2005) used a word stem completion task and 
found that assault survivors with PTSD showed enhanced priming for trauma-related words 
compared  with  assault  survivors  without  PTSD.    Using  a  visual  search task  with  a  lexical 
decision component, Pineles, Shipherd, Welch, & Yovel, (2007) found that attentional biases in 
individuals  with  PTSD  was  due  to  attentional  interference  (difficulty  disengaging  from  the 
threat-related stimuli) as opposed to  attentional facilitation (being drawn to the threat-related 
stimuli). This study therefore offered support to studies using the modified Stroop task.  
 
In summary, eight out of fourteen papers (57%) scored more than 10 points on the quality rating 
scale. The maximum score that could have been achieved was 17, however, no paper achieved 
this score. The highest score was 12 and this was awarded to a paper (Cassiday et al., 1992) 
investigating attentional bias and PTSD in rape victims. This study used a computerised Stroop 
task in which the trauma words were rated for ‘stressfulness’ by rape victims who did not 
participate in the study. This study also benefitted from having three groups: rape victims with 
PTSD, rape victims without PTSD and a non-victimised control group.   
 
Overall, the evidence suggests that an attentional bias does exist in PTSD, and although the 
modified Stroop task is the most commonly used measure of attentional bias, other paradigms 
have provided confirmatory evidence. Given that other, disparate paradigms have been used to 
investigate attentional bias in PTSD, the remainder of this systematic review will focus on 
studies which employed the modified Stroop task. 
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3.2 Is the evidence for attentional bias dependent on methodology? 
Questions have been raised regarding the methodologies employed, specifically with regard to 
the modified Stroop task. The most pertinent issues concern (1) the method for delivering the 
Stroop task, (2) types of words included and, (3) how the stimulus words were chosen. For all 
studies, it is also necessary to consider whether or not potentially confounding variables have 
been controlled for.   
Insert Table 1.2 
 
 
3.2.1 Method for delivering the Stroop task 
Of the nine studies using the modified Stroop task, four presented the task manually using 
words printed on cards, and five administered the task using a computer (Table 1.2).  Doubts 
have been raised regarding the reliability of using manual presentations for the Stroop task as all 
four studies displayed all the trauma words on one card. By doing this, it is difficult to rule out 
the possibility that rumination is taking place and consequently confounding the results. All five 
studies which used a computerised Stroop task presented their words individually and randomly. 
One study (Cassiday et al., 1992) which explicitly explored the issue of rumination compared 
Stroop interference for high threat words using a random and blocked format of presentation. 
The  authors  found  no  significant  difference  in  the  degree  of  interference,  suggesting  that 
rumination does not contribute to the Stroop effect. However, one cannot rule out the possibility 
that  participants  ruminate  about  threat  words  whilst  other  neutral  or  positive  stimuli  are 
presented. Based on this conclusion, Paunovic et al., (2002) used supraliminal and subliminal 
presentations  of  the  Stroop  task  and  found  that  participants  with  PTSD  exhibited  Stroop 
interference for trauma words which were presented supraliminally but not subliminally. Both 
studies  (Paunovic  et  al.,  2002;  Cassiday  et  al.,  1992)  demonstrated  high  levels  of  quality, 
suggesting that their results were reliable. 
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Using a computer to administer a Stroop task therefore affords the researchers flexibility to 
manipulate the experimental paradigm. This is a luxury that cannot be achieved using manual 
presentations  of  the  Stroop  task.  Computerised  administration  has  also  allowed  for  greater 
accuracy in recording reaction times and errors.  
 
3.2.2 Types of words included in the Stroop task 
Of  the  four  manual  Stroop  task  studies,  two  (McNally  et  al.,  1990;  Vrana  et  al.,  1995) 
administered a task in which the participants had to rate how stressful they found each word. 
The purpose of such a task was to test whether or not the emotionality of the words included 
had an impact on the findings. The ‘emotionality hypothesis’ states that the magnitude of a 
word’s personal significance determines its capacity to delay colour-naming in a Stroop task 
(Martin, Williams, & Clark, 1991). McNally et al., (1990) reported results that were inconsistent 
with the emotionality hypothesis because: (1) participants displayed greater interference for 
threat  words  than  for  positive  words,  (2)  general  emotionality  was  not  correlated  with 
interference, and (3) the control group did not exhibit interference for positive words even 
though they rated them as being ‘highly emotional’. However, the results do not completely 
refute the emotionality hypothesis as the PTSD words were given higher emotionality ratings 
than the positive words, therefore it is unclear whether the positive words would have produced 
the same interference as the PTSD words if they had the same emotionality value.  Vrana et al., 
(1995) did not include positive words in their Stroop task leaving it difficult to conclude if the 
results were due to the effects of threat, or emotionality. However, this study did reveal a free 
recall  and  recognition  advantage  for  the  emotion  words.  Specifically,  there  was  greater 
recognition  accuracy  for  the  Watts-emotion  (negative  words)  and  Vietnam  general  words 
compared to the Vietnam specific words for both the PTSD and non-PTSD group. McNally et 
al., (1993) did not include a measure of how stressful participants found the words, therefore, 
the results are inconclusive with regards to whether the Stroop interference for trauma words, 
exhibited by the PTSD group, were due to the effects of the trauma words, or because of the 
effect of emotionality. Also, the latter study (McNally et al., 1993) had reduced methodological    
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quality compared to the former study (Vrana et al., 1995). Thrasher et al., (1994), did include 
positive words and found no Stroop interference for positive words in participants with PTSD. 
In addition, this study reported a large effect size for the finding that participants with ‘high’ 
PTSD symptomatology had longer latencies for disaster related words compared to positive 
words. No such differences were found for the ‘low’ PTSD symptomatology group. Therefore, 
it is clear that it is essential to include positive words in order to control for the potentially 
confounding effects of emotionality. 
 
Of the five computerised Stroop task studies, only one study (Cassiday et al., 1992) found 
Stroop interference for positive words. Cassiday et al., (1992) reported that participants with 
PTSD exhibited longer response latencies for positive words compared to neutral words, thus 
lending support to the emotionality hypothesis (Martin et al., 1991). However, most of the 
positive words used in their study reflected interpersonal themes, and therefore may have been 
perceived as trauma-related by the participants who in this study, were rape victims. Bryant, & 
Harvey, (1995) did not find evidence for Stroop interference for positive words, suggesting the 
interference displayed for threat words was associated with the threat content of the words 
rather than emotionality. Paunovic et al., (2002) did not find a specific Stroop interference effect 
for trauma words relative to positive words, which suggested the trauma words may not have 
been threatening enough. However, in this study, the words were not rated for their level of 
threat by the participants. 
 
Although the evidence is not conclusive, it does suggest that the important factor in selecting 
words concerns the level of threat trauma words pose to the participants. The emotionality 
hypothesis is also an issue that has to be considered when measuring attentional bias. Therefore, 
it is essential that positive and negative words are included in paradigms so the effects of threat 
and emotionality can be differentiated. 
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3.2.3 Method of choosing stimulus words for modified Stroop paradigms  
The evidence seems to suggest that it is important that the words selected for the threat category 
of Stroop tasks are indeed perceived as threatening to the participant. If these words are not 
perceived as threatening, it is possible that no Stroop interference will be found. The most 
sensible method for selecting trauma words was demonstrated by studies in which pools of 
trauma words were created and then rated by victims of trauma who did not participate in the 
study (Foa et al., 1991; Cassiday et al., 1992; Bryant & Harvey, 1995).  Other studies (McNally 
et al., 1991; McNally et al., 1993; Vrana et al., 1995; Constans et al., 2004) used words from 
previous research. One study (Paunovic et al., 2002) stated that the first author selected the 
trauma words, however the process for doing so was not clearly explained and consequently not 
replicable.  
 
3.2.4 Controlling for potentially confounding variables. 
 
Insert Table 1.3 
Table 1.3 displays the confounding variables that each study controlled for. Of the fourteen 
studies included in this review, only two studies stated they excluded individuals who were 
colour blind (Thrasher et al., 1994; Cassiday et al., 1992); four studies excluded individuals 
with  current  and  previous  psychiatric  illness  (Cassiday  et  al.,  1992;  Paunovic  et  al.,  2002; 
Constans et al., 2004; Michael et al., 2005); three studies excluded individuals with substance 
misuse problems (Paunovic et al., 2002; Constans et al., 2004; Michael et al., 2005) and only 
one study explicitly stated that previous head injury was part of the exclusion criteria (Bryant & 
Harvey, 1997).   
Five studies controlled for depression in their analysis (Thrasher et al., 1994; Constans et al., 
2004;  Weinstein  et  al.,  1996;  Elsesser  et  al.,  2004;  Michael  et  al.,  2005);  and  five  studies 
controlled for time since the traumatic event (Cassiday et al., 1992; Bryant & Harvey, 1995; 
Bryant & Harvey, 1997; Elsesser et al, 2004; Michael et al., 2005).     
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4.0 Discussion 
There are three key issues that arise from this systematic review: the limitations of the current 
research,  whether  or  not  attentional  bias  is  an  automatic  or  strategic  process,  and  the 
implications for clinical practice and future research. 
4.1 Limitations of current research 
The most commonly used paradigm to investigate attentional bias in PTSD is the Stroop task. 
Nine  of  the  14  papers  included  in  this  review  used  this  task.  All  (100%)  of  these  papers 
provided evidence that an attentional bias to threat stimuli is a feature of PTSD and is consistent 
with  PTSD  symptomatology.  However,  there  are  methodological  issues  with  these  studies, 
particularly studies employing the Stroop task. Specifically, inconsistency in the types of words 
that were included, level of threat words evoke, and method for presenting the words. The 
higher rated studies seem to suggest that words should be rated for level of threat by victims of 
trauma (who do not participate in the study) and matched by frequency and word length to 
positive, neutral and negative words in order to consider the emotionality hypothesis. When 
delivering a Stroop task, it seems that words should be presented randomly to participants in 
order to reduce rumination effects. However, it is not clear whether or not rumination on trauma 
words persists when neutral and positive words are presented and therefore future research is 
necessary. 
The most common population studied was the veteran population (i.e. 43% of studies and 40% 
of  Stroop  studies).  These  findings  may  not  generalise  to  the  wider  population  given  the 
reportedly higher incidences of substance misuse and psychiatric illness compared with the 
general population (Wagner, Harris, Federman, Dai, Luna, & Humphreys, 2007). Another issue 
with this population regards the lack of clarity as to the degree of trauma these veterans were 
exposed to. Two (McNally et al., 1990; Vrana et al., 1995) of the four Stroop studies using a 
veteran population considered this potential confounder by using the Combat Exposure Scale 
(CES: Keane, Fairbank, Caddell, Zimering, Taylor, & Mora, 1989). Although CES scores were 
only obtained for 7/15 participants with PTSD, the correlation remained significant between    
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PTSD  severity  and  Stroop  interference  for  PTSD  words  when  CES  was  controlled  for, 
suggesting that combat exposure per se was not impacting on the degree of attentional bias. 
Vrana et al., (1995) also used the CES but failed to control for this measure in their analysis. 
Therefore it is difficult to conclude whether or not their findings support those of McNally et 
al., (1990). Given that the Vietnam War may have been considered unpopular by some members 
of the public,  perhaps Vietnam veterans had difficulty adjusting to social situations following 
the war and as such, justified being in treatment for PTSD as means of coping with negative 
views.  
Recruitment  itself  appears  to  give  rise  to  methodological  difficulties.  All  Veteran  studies 
(Pineles  et  al.,  2007;  Weinstein  et  al.,  1996;  Constans  et  al,  2004;  McNally  et  al.,  1990; 
McNally et al., 1993; Vrana et al., 1995) recruited their samples from centres treating veterans 
with PTSD. It is difficult to conclude therefore whether these samples are representative of the 
general PTSD population as these participants had opted in for treatment. Likewise, the victims 
of rape in one study (Foa et al., 1991) were recruited from a group of victims undergoing 
investigations into psychopathological responses to rape. In this study, it was not clear what 
these ‘investigations’ entailed, leaving it difficult to ascertain the homogeneity of the sample.  
A related issue is whether or not the participants had received treatment for PTSD. One study 
(Cassiday  et  al.,  1992)  reported  that  some  of  the  participants  in  their  sample  had  received 
‘supported psychotherapy’. Although they do not clarify what this was, or who provided it, they 
stated the psychotherapy was neither cognitive nor behavioural. It is imperative that the authors 
make it clear if participants have received treatment for PTSD and described the nature of the 
therapy. According to Dual Representation Theory (Brewin et al., 1996), treatment of PTSD 
involves  integrating  trauma  memories  into  the  individual’s  autobiographical  memory.  If 
treatment  has  been  provided  to  individuals  with  PTSD,  they  may  be  displaying  Stroop 
interference to a lesser extent. Indeed, one study (Paunovic et al., 2002) recruited participants 
from a treatment study of Cognitive Behavioural Therapy (CBT) for acute PTSD but failed to 
clarify what stage these participants were at in their treatment.     
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Co-morbid mood disorders also play a confounding role in attentional bias paradigms. Indeed 
depression severity has been consistently reported as significantly correlating with processing 
speed (McDermott & Ebmeier, 2009). Many of the studies included in this review conducted 
measures of mood, however, psychiatric history was not consistently reported and psychiatric 
medication was only controlled for in one study (Vrana et al., 1995) and formed part of the 
exclusion criteria in another (Constans et al., 2004).  
Another issue is whether or not studies should include a control group consisting of individuals 
who have experienced the same type of trauma as the PTSD group, but without suffering from 
PTSD. By having this non-PTSD trauma control group in addition to a healthy control group, it 
may allow the investigator to identify what the specific characteristics of PTSD are, and be able 
to conclude whether or not the presence of an attentional bias is a feature of PTSD, or whether it 
is caused by merely experiencing a traumatic event.  
There appears to be inconsistency in the assessment tools used for diagnosing PTSD in the 
sample of studies reviewed. Similarly, a variety of measures have been used for assessing PTSD 
symptom severity.  In particular, five of the six Veteran studies (McNally et al., 1990; McNally 
et al., 1993; Vrana et al., 1995; Constans et al., 2004; Pineles et al., 2007) used measures of 
PTSD that are specific to individuals who have been involved in combat. Given the specificity 
of  these  tools,  it  is  again  questionable  to  what  extent  the  findings  in  these  studies  are 
generalisable to the wider PTSD population.  
4.2 Attentional bias: Automatic or under strategic processing? 
The  way  people  process  information  has  generally  been  viewed  as  involving  two  broad 
classifications  of  processes:  automatic  and  strategic.  Automatic  processes  have  traditionally 
been defined as those that occur without conscious effort, are involuntary, and capacity free 
(i.e., do not require additional resources that would detract from performance on a concurrent 
task).  By  way  of  contrast,  strategic  processing  has  been  defined  as  involving  conscious-
controlled effort, and being capacity limited in nature (Posner & Snyder, 1975). However, there    
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is debate as to whether these are mutually exclusive, as many of the symptoms of PTSD are 
involuntary but not necessarily capacity free. That is, the presence of PTSD symptoms can 
detract attention from concurrent tasks (Buckley, Blanchard, & Neill, 2000).  
 
Subliminal  Stroop  paradigms  (e.g.  Paunovic  et  al.,  2002)  investigated  whether  or  not 
preconscious processing of threat stimuli is present in individuals with PTSD. Specifically, the 
authors investigated whether or not cognitive fear structures were easily primed for individuals 
with  PTSD.  It  was  hypothesised  that  preconscious  processing  is  evidence  of  automatic 
processing of threat stimuli and also evidence that cognitive fear structures can be primed.   
Paunovic et al., (2002) did not find any evidence for pre-attentive processing, suggesting that 
automatic processing was not a feature of PTSD. One explanation for this finding relates to the 
acute nature of PTSD symptoms. Perhaps the PTSD symptoms were too short-lived to cause an 
absolute attentional bias to trauma-related information. Indeed, the trauma network may become 
more generalised over time, and as such, the trauma words for this study were not sensitive to 
the varying types of crime reported by this sample. This notion that the trauma-network can 
become more generalised over time is supported by a study (Foa et al., 1991) which found only 
a specific supraliminal Stroop interference effect in rape victims with PTSD within a year of 
their assault, while another study (Cassiday et al., 1992) found a more generalised PTSD effect 
in individuals with PTSD who were tested an average of nine years or more after their assault. 
Nevertheless,  the findings of  Paunovic et al’s., (2002) study were consistent with a review of 
the literature which found that attentional bias for threat stimuli occurs at the post-recognition 
stages of information processing (Buckley et al., 2000). 
 
Further support for attentional bias being characterised by strategic processing comes from a 
study  (Constans  et  al.,  2004)  which  investigated  whether  or  not  attentional  bias  could  be 
suppressed in individuals with PTSD. Findings suggested that attentional bias could be inhibited 
when the individuals with PTSD anticipated exposure to a threatening event. This suppression 
effect was not evident when participants were offered a financial reward on completion of the    
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task.  According  to  information  processing  models,  attentional  priority  is  given  to  the  most 
threatening incoming information, whilst lesser threats are ignored while the more threatening 
information is being processed (Mathews & MacIntosh, 1998). This therefore, would suggest 
that attentional bias is under strategic control.  
4.3 Implications for clinical practice and future research 
The literature suggests that attentional bias is a feature of PTSD. Given that it can be readily 
measured using paradigms, like the modified Stroop task, clinicians may be able to utilise such 
paradigms to gather a more comprehensive clinical understanding of an individuals difficulties. 
It is essential however to develop word sets that are sensitive and specific to types of traumas in 
order for use in these paradigms. Further research is necessary to develop such resources.  
Finally, this review included papers which investigated attentional bias in individuals who had 
experienced trauma in adulthood. Van der Kolk (2003) has suggested that trauma in childhood 
has significant effects on brain development due to heightened exposure to the stress hormone 
cortisol. Future studies of attentional bias in PTSD should consider investigating the differences 
in repeated exposure to trauma across the lifespan, and complex PTSD, compared to single 
event traumas,.  
5.0 Limitations of review 
Papers included in this review were rated using a modified quality rating scale. It needs to be 
acknowledged that although a paper may have scored low on this rating scale, this may not be 
an accurate reflection of the actual methodological quality. This is because papers may well 
have considered important ‘threats to validity’ but not reported this in their paper due to other 
factors, such a word limit as stipulated by the publishing journal. 
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6.0 Conclusions 
The evidence suggests that attentional bias to threat stimuli on a Stroop task is a feature of 
PTSD in adults. However, there are several methodological concerns. The design of paradigms 
used to measure attentional bias can be criticised on the basis of how stimuli used in attentional 
bias tasks are created and presented. It is important that the ‘emotionality hypothesis’ is taken 
into  account  in  the  design  but  few  studies  do  this.    Few  studies  account  for  potentially 
confounding variables such as IQ, age, psychiatric illness, mood disorders, trauma history, time 
since  trauma  and  trauma  severity.  Some  samples  studied  are  not  representative  of  the 
population, limiting the generalisability of the findings. Finally the quality of the studies may 
not be reflected in the quality rating score systems used. This highlights a difficulty in selecting 
appropriate quality rating scales in this area. Future papers which aim to systematically review 
experimental  paradigms  would  benefit  from  creating  quality  rating  scales  from  the  papers 
included. 
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Figure 1.1: Flowchart of article selection process        
 
Electronic Search Strategy 
 
Databases: 
Medline; Embase; PsychINFO; CINAHL; 
British Nursing Index Cochrane & Pubmed 
 
(“Post traumatic stress disorder” or 
“PTSD”) AND (“Attentional bias” or 
“Cognitive Bias” or “Information Process*) 
 
Limits: 
Journal articles 
English language 
Adult population 
1980-October 2008 
Included Papers investigating 
attentional bias in an adult population 
with PTSD.  
Excluded Papers: 
 
1)  Childhood/adolescent trauma 
2)  Attentional bias not measured 
3)  Neuropsychology of PTSD 
4)  Intervention studies 
5)  Dissertations 
6)  Include other co-morbid physical 
problem 
7)  Review papers 
71 Papers 
13 Papers from electronic 
search 
 
1 Paper from hand search 
58 Papers from electronic 
search 
 
8 Papers from hand search 
Total Papers Included: 
 
 
  14 Papers 
Hand search: 
1)  Reference sections of review 
papers 
2)  Journal of Traumatic stress, 
Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 
Journal of Abnormal Psychology 
and Biological Psychiatry 
 (2000-2008) 
  
9 Papers  
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t
 
a
l
.
,
 
(
2
0
0
2
)
 
1
1
 
C
A
P
S
 
C
o
m
p
u
t
e
r
i
s
e
d
 
S
t
r
o
o
p
 
t
a
s
k
 
 
3
9
/
3
9
 
C
a
s
e
:
 
P
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
n
t
s
 
i
n
 
a
 
t
r
e
a
t
m
e
n
t
 
s
t
u
d
y
 
f
o
r
 
C
B
T
 
f
o
r
 
a
c
u
t
e
 
P
T
S
D
 
C
o
n
t
r
o
l
:
 
r
a
n
d
o
m
l
y
 
s
e
l
e
c
t
e
d
 
f
r
o
m
 
c
o
m
m
u
n
i
t
y
 
 
T
h
r
a
s
h
e
r
 
e
t
 
a
l
.
,
 
(
1
9
9
4
)
 
1
1
 
C
l
i
n
i
c
a
l
 
i
n
t
e
r
v
i
e
w
 
a
n
d
 
R
e
v
i
s
e
d
 
I
m
p
a
c
t
 
o
f
 
E
v
e
n
t
s
 
S
c
a
l
e
 
(
I
E
S
)
 
S
t
r
o
o
p
 
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
e
d
 
m
a
n
u
a
l
l
y
 
o
n
 
c
a
r
d
s
 
*
1
3
/
2
0
a
/
1
2
b
 
C
a
s
e
:
 
F
e
r
r
y
 
d
i
s
a
s
t
e
r
 
s
u
r
v
i
v
o
r
s
 
r
e
c
r
u
i
t
e
d
 
t
h
r
o
u
g
h
 
r
e
t
r
o
s
p
e
c
t
i
v
e
 
r
e
v
i
e
w
 
o
f
 
m
e
d
i
c
a
l
 
n
o
t
e
s
 
C
o
n
t
r
o
l
a
:
 
F
e
r
r
y
 
d
i
s
a
s
t
e
r
 
s
u
r
v
i
v
o
r
s
 
r
e
c
r
u
i
t
e
d
 
t
h
r
o
u
g
h
 
r
e
t
r
o
s
p
e
c
t
i
v
e
 
r
e
v
i
e
w
 
o
f
 
m
e
d
i
c
a
l
 
n
o
t
e
s
 
C
o
n
t
r
o
l
b
:
 
R
a
n
d
o
m
l
y
 
r
e
c
r
u
i
t
e
d
 
f
r
o
m
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
m
m
u
n
i
t
y
 
 
M
i
c
h
a
e
l
 
e
t
 
a
l
.
,
 
(
2
0
0
5
)
 
 
1
1
 
P
D
S
 
W
o
r
d
-
s
t
e
m
 
c
o
m
p
l
e
t
i
o
n
 
t
a
s
k
 
2
6
/
4
3
 
A
l
l
 
p
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
n
t
s
 
r
e
c
r
u
i
t
e
d
 
f
r
o
m
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
m
m
u
n
i
t
y
 
t
h
r
o
u
g
h
 
a
d
v
e
r
t
i
s
e
m
e
n
t
s
 
a
n
d
 
a
 
V
i
c
t
i
m
 
S
u
p
p
o
r
t
 
C
h
a
r
i
t
y
.
 
 
B
r
y
a
n
t
 
&
 
H
a
r
v
e
y
 
(
1
9
9
5
)
 
1
0
 
P
T
S
D
-
I
 
a
n
d
 
I
E
S
 
C
o
m
p
u
t
e
r
i
s
e
d
 
S
t
r
o
o
p
 
t
a
s
k
 
*
1
5
/
1
5
/
1
5
 
A
l
l
 
g
r
o
u
p
s
 
r
e
c
r
u
i
t
e
d
 
f
r
o
m
 
b
o
t
h
 
(
a
l
t
h
o
u
g
h
 
n
o
t
 
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
e
d
)
 
a
n
 
o
u
t
p
a
t
i
e
n
t
 
P
T
S
D
 
c
l
i
n
i
c
 
a
n
d
 
v
o
l
u
n
t
e
e
r
 
m
e
d
i
c
a
l
 
o
u
t
p
a
t
i
e
n
t
 
c
l
i
n
i
c
.
 
 
B
r
y
a
n
t
 
&
 
H
a
r
v
e
y
 
(
1
9
9
7
)
 
 
1
0
 
P
T
S
D
-
I
 
C
o
m
p
u
t
e
r
i
s
e
d
 
d
o
t
-
p
r
o
b
e
 
t
a
s
k
 
 
*
1
5
/
1
5
/
1
5
 
A
l
l
 
g
r
o
u
p
s
:
 
O
u
t
p
a
t
i
e
n
t
s
 
a
t
t
e
n
d
i
n
g
 
a
 
P
T
S
D
 
c
l
i
n
i
c
  
 
 
 
3
2
 
V
r
a
n
a
 
e
t
 
a
l
.
,
 
(
1
9
9
5
)
 
1
0
 
S
C
I
D
 
(
D
S
M
-
I
I
I
-
R
)
 
&
 
M
i
s
s
i
s
s
i
p
p
i
 
S
c
a
l
e
 
f
o
r
 
C
o
m
b
a
t
-
R
e
l
a
t
e
d
 
P
T
S
D
 
 
S
t
r
o
o
p
 
t
a
s
k
 
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
e
d
 
m
a
n
u
a
l
l
y
 
o
n
 
c
a
r
d
s
 
 
4
2
/
1
5
 
C
a
s
e
:
 
O
u
t
p
a
t
i
e
n
t
s
 
a
t
t
e
n
d
i
n
g
 
P
T
S
D
 
c
l
i
n
i
c
 
f
o
r
 
v
e
t
e
r
a
n
s
.
 
C
o
n
t
r
o
l
:
 
r
e
c
r
u
i
t
e
d
 
f
r
o
m
 
l
o
c
a
l
 
v
e
t
e
r
a
n
s
 
g
r
o
u
p
 
F
o
a
 
e
t
 
a
l
.
,
 
(
1
9
9
1
)
 
9
 
S
C
I
D
 
(
D
S
M
-
I
I
I
-
R
)
 
C
o
m
p
u
t
e
r
i
s
e
d
 
S
t
r
o
o
p
 
t
a
s
k
 
*
1
5
/
1
3
/
1
6
 
C
a
s
e
:
 
P
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
n
t
s
 
i
n
 
a
 
s
t
u
d
y
 
o
f
 
p
s
y
c
h
o
p
a
t
h
o
l
o
g
i
c
a
l
 
r
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
s
 
t
o
 
r
a
p
e
.
 
C
o
n
t
r
o
l
:
 
R
a
p
e
 
v
i
c
t
i
m
s
 
w
i
t
h
o
u
t
 
P
T
S
D
 
C
o
n
t
r
o
l
:
 
n
o
n
-
t
r
a
u
m
a
t
i
s
e
d
 
i
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
s
 
r
e
c
r
u
i
t
e
d
 
f
r
o
m
 
c
o
m
m
u
n
i
t
y
 
 
P
i
n
e
l
e
s
 
e
t
 
a
l
.
,
 
(
2
0
0
7
)
 
8
 
P
T
S
D
 
C
h
e
c
k
l
i
s
t
 
(
P
C
L
)
 
V
i
s
u
a
l
 
s
e
a
r
c
h
 
t
a
s
k
 
w
i
t
h
 
l
e
x
i
c
a
l
 
d
e
c
i
s
i
o
n
 
c
o
m
p
o
n
e
n
t
 
 
3
0
/
2
7
 
A
l
l
 
r
e
c
r
u
i
t
e
d
 
f
r
o
m
 
a
 
V
e
t
e
r
a
n
s
 
H
o
s
p
i
t
a
l
 
M
c
N
a
l
l
y
 
e
t
 
a
l
.
,
 
(
1
9
9
0
)
 
7
 
S
C
I
D
 
(
D
S
M
-
I
I
I
-
R
)
 
&
 
M
i
s
s
i
s
s
i
p
p
i
 
S
c
a
l
e
 
f
o
r
 
C
o
m
b
a
t
-
R
e
l
a
t
e
d
 
P
T
S
D
 
 
S
t
r
o
o
p
 
t
a
s
k
 
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
e
d
 
m
a
n
u
a
l
l
y
 
o
n
 
c
a
r
d
s
 
1
5
/
1
5
 
C
a
s
e
:
 
V
o
l
u
n
t
e
e
r
s
 
a
t
 
a
 
S
t
r
e
s
s
 
D
i
s
o
r
d
e
r
 
T
r
e
a
t
m
e
n
t
 
U
n
i
t
 
f
o
r
 
V
e
t
e
r
a
n
s
 
C
o
n
t
r
o
l
:
 
V
i
e
t
n
a
m
 
c
o
m
b
a
t
 
v
e
t
e
r
a
n
s
 
 
W
e
i
n
s
t
e
i
n
 
e
t
 
a
l
.
,
 
(
1
9
9
6
)
 
7
 
C
o
m
p
u
t
e
r
i
s
e
d
 
C
l
i
n
i
c
i
a
n
 
A
d
m
i
n
i
s
t
e
r
e
d
 
P
T
S
D
 
S
c
a
l
e
-
1
 
 
 
S
e
n
t
e
n
c
e
 
p
r
i
m
i
n
g
 
t
a
s
k
 
1
5
/
1
5
 
C
a
s
e
:
 
O
u
t
p
a
t
i
e
n
t
s
 
d
u
e
 
t
o
 
s
t
a
r
t
 
g
r
o
u
p
 
t
h
e
r
a
p
y
 
f
o
r
 
P
T
S
D
 
C
o
n
t
r
o
l
:
 
a
d
m
i
n
i
s
t
r
a
t
i
v
e
 
s
t
a
f
f
 
a
t
 
s
i
t
e
 
o
f
 
r
e
s
e
a
r
c
h
 
M
c
N
a
l
l
y
 
e
t
 
a
l
.
,
 
(
1
9
9
3
)
 
7
 
C
l
i
n
i
c
a
l
 
i
n
t
e
r
v
i
e
w
 
a
n
d
 
M
i
s
s
i
s
s
i
p
p
i
 
S
c
a
l
e
 
f
o
r
 
C
o
m
b
a
t
-
R
e
l
a
t
e
d
 
P
T
S
D
 
 
S
t
r
o
o
p
 
t
a
s
k
 
m
a
n
u
a
l
l
y
 
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
e
d
 
o
n
 
c
a
r
d
s
 
*
*
2
4
 
C
o
n
s
e
c
u
t
i
v
e
 
s
a
m
p
l
e
 
P
T
S
D
 
p
a
t
i
e
n
t
s
 
r
e
f
e
r
r
e
d
 
f
o
r
 
p
s
y
c
h
o
l
o
g
i
c
a
l
 
t
e
s
t
i
n
g
 
 
C
o
n
s
t
a
n
s
 
e
t
 
a
l
.
,
 
(
2
0
0
4
)
 
 
7
 
S
C
I
D
 
(
D
S
M
-
I
V
)
 
C
o
m
p
u
t
e
r
i
s
e
d
 
S
t
r
o
o
p
 
t
a
s
k
 
*
*
6
0
 
P
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
n
t
s
 
w
e
r
e
 
t
a
k
i
n
g
 
p
a
r
t
 
i
n
 
a
n
 
o
u
t
p
a
t
i
e
n
t
 
P
T
S
D
 
p
r
o
g
r
a
m
 
a
t
 
a
 
v
e
t
e
r
a
n
’
s
 
m
e
d
i
c
a
l
 
c
e
n
t
r
e
.
 
*
M
o
r
e
 
t
h
a
n
 
o
n
e
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
g
r
o
u
p
 
 
*
*
 
C
o
h
o
r
t
 
s
t
u
d
y 
 
 
 
3
3
 
T
a
b
l
e
 
1
.
2
:
 
I
n
c
l
u
d
e
d
 
s
t
u
d
i
e
s
 
e
m
p
l
o
y
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
 
m
o
d
i
f
i
e
d
 
S
t
r
o
o
p
 
t
a
s
k
 
S
t
r
o
o
p
 
T
y
p
e
 
S
t
u
d
y
 
S
t
i
m
u
l
i
 
M
e
t
h
o
d
 
f
o
r
 
s
e
l
e
c
t
i
n
g
 
w
o
r
d
s
 
S
t
r
o
o
p
 
P
r
o
c
e
d
u
r
e
 
M
a
i
n
 
F
i
n
d
i
n
g
 
a
n
d
 
E
f
f
e
c
t
 
S
i
z
e
 
(
C
o
h
e
n
’
s
 
d
)
 
M
c
N
a
l
l
y
 
e
t
 
a
l
.
,
 
(
1
9
9
0
)
 
F
i
v
e
 
c
a
r
d
s
 
w
e
r
e
 
c
r
e
a
t
e
d
 
c
o
n
t
a
i
n
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
 
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
 
t
y
p
e
s
 
o
f
 
w
o
r
d
s
:
 
n
e
u
t
r
a
l
,
 
p
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
,
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
,
 
O
C
D
 
a
n
d
 
P
T
S
D
 
w
o
r
d
s
.
 
E
a
c
h
 
c
a
r
d
 
h
a
d
 
5
 
i
t
e
m
s
 
w
h
i
c
h
 
w
e
r
e
 
r
e
p
e
a
t
e
d
 
2
0
 
t
i
m
e
s
 
i
n
 
f
o
u
r
 
c
o
l
o
u
r
s
.
 
 
 
C
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
c
a
r
d
 
c
o
n
s
i
s
t
e
d
 
o
f
 
f
i
v
e
 
o
s
 
(
i
.
e
.
 
o
o
o
o
o
)
,
 
n
e
u
t
r
a
l
 
w
o
r
d
s
 
m
a
t
c
h
e
d
 
t
o
 
P
T
S
D
 
w
o
r
d
s
 
b
y
 
s
y
l
l
a
b
l
e
 
l
e
n
g
t
h
 
a
n
d
 
f
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
 
o
f
 
u
s
a
g
e
 
i
n
 
A
m
e
r
i
c
a
n
 
E
n
g
l
i
s
h
.
 
U
n
c
l
e
a
r
 
h
o
w
 
p
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
 
w
o
r
d
s
 
w
e
r
e
 
s
e
l
e
c
t
e
d
 
a
n
d
 
P
T
S
D
 
w
o
r
d
s
 
w
e
r
e
 
r
a
t
e
d
 
a
s
 
‘
h
i
g
h
 
s
t
r
e
s
s
’
 
w
o
r
d
s
 
b
y
 
v
e
t
e
r
a
n
s
 
i
n
 
a
 
p
r
e
v
i
o
u
s
 
s
t
u
d
y
.
 
 
C
a
r
d
s
 
w
e
r
e
 
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
e
d
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
 
o
r
d
e
r
:
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
,
 
n
e
u
t
r
a
l
,
 
p
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
,
 
O
C
D
 
a
n
d
 
P
T
S
D
.
 
T
i
m
e
 
t
o
 
c
o
m
p
l
e
t
e
 
e
a
c
h
 
c
a
r
d
 
w
a
s
 
r
e
c
o
r
d
e
d
 
u
s
i
n
g
 
a
 
s
t
o
p
w
a
t
c
h
.
 
I
m
m
e
d
i
a
t
e
l
y
 
a
f
t
e
r
,
 
p
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
n
t
s
 
r
a
t
e
d
 
e
a
c
h
 
w
o
r
d
 
o
n
 
a
 
7
 
p
o
i
n
t
 
e
m
o
t
i
o
n
a
l
i
t
y
 
s
c
a
l
e
 
f
r
o
m
 
+
3
 
(
v
e
r
y
 
p
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
)
 
t
o
 
-
3
 
(
v
e
r
y
 
n
e
g
a
t
i
v
e
)
.
 
T
h
e
 
P
T
S
D
 
g
r
o
u
p
 
t
o
o
k
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
l
y
 
l
o
n
g
e
r
 
t
o
 
c
o
l
o
u
r
-
n
a
m
e
 
P
T
S
D
 
w
o
r
d
s
 
t
h
a
n
 
t
o
 
c
o
l
o
u
r
-
n
a
m
e
 
n
e
u
t
r
a
l
,
 
O
C
D
 
a
n
d
 
p
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
 
w
o
r
d
s
.
 
(
c
o
h
e
n
’
s
 
d
=
1
.
3
5
)
.
 
N
o
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
s
 
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
 
w
o
r
d
 
t
y
p
e
s
 
w
e
r
e
 
f
o
u
n
d
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
g
r
o
u
p
.
 
 
M
c
N
a
l
l
y
 
e
t
 
a
l
.
,
 
(
1
9
9
3
)
 
 
S
a
m
e
 
a
s
 
a
b
o
v
e
 
S
a
m
e
 
a
s
 
a
b
o
v
e
 
C
a
r
d
s
 
w
e
r
e
 
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
e
d
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
 
o
r
d
e
r
:
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
,
 
n
e
u
t
r
a
l
,
 
p
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
,
 
O
C
D
 
a
n
d
 
P
T
S
D
.
 
T
i
m
e
 
t
o
 
c
o
m
p
l
e
t
e
 
e
a
c
h
 
c
a
r
d
 
w
a
s
 
r
e
c
o
r
d
e
d
 
u
s
i
n
g
 
a
 
s
t
o
p
w
a
t
c
h
 
 
*
I
n
d
i
v
i
d
u
a
l
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
P
T
S
D
 
e
x
h
i
b
i
t
e
d
 
s
t
r
o
o
p
 
i
n
t
e
r
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
 
f
o
r
 
P
T
S
D
 
w
o
r
d
s
 
b
u
t
 
n
o
t
 
f
o
r
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
,
 
O
C
D
,
 
n
e
u
t
r
a
l
 
o
r
 
p
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
 
w
o
r
d
s
.
 
 
M
a
n
u
a
l
 
T
h
r
a
s
h
e
r
 
e
t
 
a
l
.
,
 
(
1
9
9
4
)
 
 
F
i
v
e
 
c
a
r
d
s
 
w
e
r
e
 
c
r
e
a
t
e
d
 
c
o
n
t
a
i
n
i
n
g
 
t
h
e
 
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
 
t
y
p
e
s
 
o
f
 
w
o
r
d
s
:
 
s
e
m
a
n
t
i
c
a
l
l
y
-
u
n
r
e
l
a
t
e
d
 
n
e
u
t
r
a
l
,
 
s
e
m
a
n
t
i
c
a
l
l
y
-
r
e
l
a
t
e
d
 
n
e
u
t
r
a
l
 
(
m
u
s
i
c
a
l
 
i
n
s
t
r
u
m
e
n
t
s
)
,
 
p
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
 
e
m
o
t
i
o
n
a
l
,
 
g
e
n
e
r
a
l
 
t
h
r
e
a
t
 
a
n
d
 
d
i
s
a
s
t
e
r
-
r
e
l
a
t
e
d
 
w
o
r
d
s
.
 
E
a
c
h
 
c
a
r
d
 
c
o
n
t
a
i
n
e
d
 
2
0
 
i
t
e
m
s
.
 
T
h
r
e
a
t
 
a
n
d
 
p
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
 
w
o
r
d
s
 
t
a
k
e
n
 
f
r
o
m
 
a
 
c
o
r
p
o
r
a
 
o
f
 
p
r
e
v
i
o
u
s
l
y
 
p
u
b
l
i
s
h
e
d
 
e
m
o
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
w
o
r
d
s
.
 
U
n
r
e
l
a
t
e
d
 
n
e
u
t
r
a
l
 
w
o
r
d
s
 
t
a
k
e
n
 
f
r
o
m
 
f
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
 
n
o
r
m
s
 
(
F
r
a
n
c
i
s
 
&
 
K
u
e
r
a
,
 
1
9
8
2
)
.
 
F
i
v
e
 
i
n
d
e
p
e
n
d
e
n
t
 
r
a
t
e
r
s
 
c
l
a
s
s
i
f
i
e
d
 
w
o
r
d
s
 
a
s
 
e
m
o
t
i
o
n
a
l
l
y
 
p
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
 
a
n
d
 
n
e
u
t
r
a
l
.
 
T
w
o
 
w
o
r
d
 
g
r
o
u
p
s
 
w
e
r
e
 
m
a
t
c
h
e
d
 
f
o
r
 
f
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
 
a
n
d
 
s
y
l
l
a
b
l
e
 
l
e
n
g
t
h
.
 
S
e
m
a
n
t
i
c
a
l
l
y
-
r
e
l
a
t
e
d
 
n
e
u
t
r
a
l
 
w
o
r
d
s
 
w
e
r
e
 
s
e
l
e
c
t
e
d
 
f
r
o
m
 
B
a
i
l
i
e
 
(
1
9
7
8
)
,
 
d
i
s
a
s
t
e
r
 
w
o
r
d
s
 
w
e
r
e
 
s
e
l
e
c
t
e
d
 
b
y
 
c
l
i
n
i
c
i
a
n
s
 
w
o
r
k
i
n
g
 
w
i
t
h
 
s
u
r
v
i
v
o
r
s
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
f
e
r
r
y
 
d
i
s
a
s
t
e
r
.
 
 
C
a
r
d
s
 
w
e
r
e
 
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
e
d
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
f
o
l
l
o
w
i
n
g
 
o
r
d
e
r
:
 
s
e
m
a
n
t
i
c
a
l
l
y
-
u
n
r
e
l
a
t
e
d
 
n
e
u
t
r
a
l
,
 
s
e
m
a
n
t
i
c
a
l
l
y
-
r
e
l
a
t
e
d
 
n
e
u
t
r
a
l
,
 
p
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
,
 
t
h
r
e
a
t
 
a
n
d
 
d
i
s
a
s
t
e
r
-
r
e
l
a
t
e
d
 
w
o
r
d
s
.
 
T
i
m
e
 
t
o
 
c
o
m
p
l
e
t
e
 
e
a
c
h
 
c
a
r
d
 
w
a
s
 
r
e
c
o
r
d
e
d
 
u
s
i
n
g
 
a
 
s
t
o
p
w
a
t
c
h
.
 
H
i
g
h
 
P
T
S
D
 
s
y
m
p
t
o
m
a
t
o
l
o
g
y
 
g
r
o
u
p
 
h
a
d
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
l
y
 
l
o
n
g
e
r
 
r
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 
l
a
t
e
n
c
i
e
s
 
f
o
r
 
d
i
s
a
s
t
e
r
-
r
e
l
a
t
e
d
 
w
o
r
d
s
 
c
o
m
p
a
r
e
d
 
t
o
 
r
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 
l
a
t
e
n
c
i
e
s
 
f
o
r
 
p
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
 
(
d
 
=
 
0
.
7
4
)
,
 
t
h
r
e
a
t
 
(
d
 
=
 
0
.
2
4
)
,
 
s
e
m
a
n
t
i
c
a
l
l
y
-
u
n
r
e
l
a
t
e
d
 
n
e
u
t
r
a
l
 
(
d
 
=
 
0
.
8
7
)
 
a
n
d
 
s
e
m
a
n
t
i
c
a
l
l
y
-
r
e
l
a
t
e
d
 
n
e
u
t
r
a
l
 
(
d
 
=
 
0
.
9
3
)
 
w
o
r
d
s
.
 
N
o
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
s
 
i
n
 
r
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 
l
a
t
e
n
c
i
e
s
 
w
e
r
e
 
f
o
u
n
d
 
f
o
r
 
t
h
e
 
l
o
w
 
P
T
S
D
 
s
y
m
p
t
o
m
a
t
o
l
o
g
y
 
o
r
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
s
 
g
r
o
u
p
.
  
 
 
 
3
4
 
 
V
r
a
n
a
 
e
t
 
a
l
.
,
 
(
1
9
9
5
)
 
T
h
r
e
e
 
e
m
o
t
i
o
n
 
c
a
r
d
s
 
w
e
r
e
 
c
r
e
a
t
e
d
.
 
E
a
c
h
 
e
m
o
t
i
o
n
 
c
a
r
d
 
h
a
d
 
a
 
c
o
r
r
e
s
p
o
n
d
i
n
g
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
c
a
r
d
 
c
o
n
t
a
i
n
i
n
g
 
n
e
u
t
r
a
l
 
w
o
r
d
s
.
 
O
n
e
 
e
m
o
t
i
o
n
 
c
a
r
d
 
c
o
n
t
a
i
n
e
d
 
1
0
 
V
i
e
t
n
a
m
 
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
 
w
o
r
d
s
,
 
o
n
e
 
c
o
n
t
a
i
n
e
d
 
1
0
 
V
i
e
t
n
a
m
-
g
e
n
e
r
a
l
 
w
o
r
d
s
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
 
t
h
i
r
d
 
(
l
a
b
e
l
l
e
d
 
W
a
t
t
s
-
E
m
o
t
i
o
n
)
 
c
o
n
t
a
i
n
e
d
 
f
i
v
e
 
n
e
g
a
t
i
v
e
 
w
o
r
d
s
.
 
 
T
h
e
 
V
i
e
t
n
a
m
 
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
 
a
n
d
 
V
i
e
t
n
a
m
-
g
e
n
e
r
a
l
 
w
o
r
d
s
 
w
e
r
e
 
t
a
k
e
n
 
f
r
o
m
 
a
 
p
r
e
v
i
o
u
s
 
s
t
u
d
y
 
(
M
c
N
a
l
l
y
,
 
L
u
e
d
k
e
,
 
B
e
s
y
n
e
r
,
 
P
e
t
e
r
s
o
n
,
 
B
o
h
m
,
 
&
 
L
i
p
s
,
 
1
9
8
7
)
.
 
 
T
h
e
 
W
a
t
t
s
-
E
m
o
t
i
o
n
 
c
a
r
d
 
w
a
s
 
u
s
e
d
 
i
n
 
a
 
p
r
e
v
i
o
u
s
 
s
t
u
d
y
 
o
n
 
S
t
r
o
o
p
 
i
n
t
e
r
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
 
i
n
 
s
i
m
p
l
e
 
p
h
o
b
i
a
 
(
W
a
t
t
s
,
 
M
c
K
e
n
n
a
,
 
S
h
a
r
r
o
c
k
,
 
&
 
T
r
e
z
i
s
e
,
 
1
9
8
6
)
.
 
 
T
h
e
 
n
e
u
t
r
a
l
 
w
o
r
d
s
 
o
n
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
r
r
e
s
p
o
n
d
i
n
g
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
c
a
r
d
s
 
w
e
r
e
 
m
a
t
c
h
e
d
 
f
o
r
 
l
e
n
g
t
h
 
a
n
d
 
f
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
 
f
o
r
 
e
a
c
h
 
e
m
o
t
i
o
n
 
c
a
r
d
 
a
c
c
o
r
d
i
n
g
 
t
o
 
F
r
a
n
c
i
s
 
&
 
K
u
e
r
a
,
 
(
1
9
8
2
)
.
 
A
l
l
 
s
i
x
 
c
a
r
d
s
 
w
e
r
e
 
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
e
d
 
t
o
 
e
a
c
h
 
p
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
n
t
.
 
A
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
c
a
r
d
 
w
a
s
 
a
l
w
a
y
s
 
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
e
d
 
b
e
f
o
r
e
 
a
n
 
e
m
o
t
i
o
n
 
c
a
r
d
.
 
T
h
e
 
s
i
x
 
p
o
s
s
i
b
l
e
 
o
r
d
e
r
s
 
i
n
 
w
h
i
c
h
 
t
h
e
 
t
h
r
e
e
 
p
a
i
r
s
 
o
f
 
c
a
r
d
s
 
w
e
r
e
 
b
a
l
a
n
c
e
d
 
a
c
r
o
s
s
 
s
u
b
j
e
c
t
s
.
 
A
f
t
e
r
 
c
o
m
p
l
e
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
S
t
r
o
o
p
 
t
a
s
k
,
 
e
a
c
h
 
p
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
n
t
 
w
a
s
 
g
i
v
e
n
 
t
w
o
 
m
i
n
u
t
e
s
 
t
o
 
w
r
i
t
e
 
d
o
w
n
 
a
s
 
m
a
n
y
 
w
o
r
d
s
 
a
s
 
t
h
e
y
 
c
o
u
l
d
 
r
e
m
e
m
b
e
r
 
f
r
o
m
 
t
h
e
 
c
a
r
d
s
.
 
N
e
x
t
,
 
t
h
e
 
s
u
b
j
e
c
t
s
 
w
e
r
e
 
g
i
v
e
n
 
a
 
r
e
c
o
g
n
i
t
i
o
n
 
s
h
e
e
t
 
a
n
d
 
i
n
s
t
r
u
c
t
e
d
 
t
o
 
c
i
r
c
l
e
 
a
l
l
 
w
o
r
d
s
 
w
h
i
c
h
 
w
e
r
e
 
o
n
 
a
n
y
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
c
a
r
d
s
.
 
T
h
e
 
p
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
n
t
s
 
t
h
e
n
 
r
a
t
e
d
 
e
a
c
h
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
w
o
r
d
s
 
o
n
 
a
l
l
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
c
a
r
d
s
 
f
o
r
 
l
e
v
e
l
 
o
f
 
s
t
r
e
s
s
 
(
0
 
=
 
n
o
t
 
s
t
r
e
s
s
f
u
l
 
t
o
 
4
 
=
 
e
x
t
r
e
m
e
l
y
 
s
t
r
e
s
s
f
u
l
)
.
 
 
T
h
e
 
P
T
S
D
 
g
r
o
u
p
 
t
o
o
k
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
l
y
 
l
o
n
g
e
r
 
t
o
 
c
o
l
o
u
r
-
n
a
m
e
 
a
l
l
 
e
m
o
t
i
o
n
 
c
a
r
d
s
 
c
o
m
p
a
r
e
d
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
n
o
-
P
T
S
D
 
g
r
o
u
p
 
(
c
o
h
e
n
’
s
 
d
=
0
.
9
5
)
.
 
C
o
l
o
u
r
-
n
a
m
i
n
g
,
 
f
o
r
 
b
o
t
h
 
g
r
o
u
p
s
,
 
w
a
s
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
l
y
 
s
l
o
w
e
r
 
f
o
r
 
V
i
e
t
n
a
m
 
g
e
n
e
r
a
l
 
w
o
r
d
s
 
t
h
a
n
 
f
o
r
 
V
i
e
t
n
a
m
 
s
p
e
c
i
f
i
c
 
a
n
d
 
W
a
t
t
s
-
E
m
o
t
i
o
n
 
w
o
r
d
s
.
 
T
h
e
 
P
T
S
D
 
g
r
o
u
p
 
r
e
c
a
l
l
e
d
 
a
 
g
r
e
a
t
e
r
 
p
e
r
c
e
n
t
a
g
e
 
o
f
,
 
a
n
d
 
r
e
c
o
g
n
i
s
e
d
 
m
o
r
e
 
e
m
o
t
i
o
n
 
w
o
r
d
s
 
c
o
m
p
a
r
e
d
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
N
o
-
P
T
S
D
 
g
r
o
u
p
.
 
C
o
m
p
u
t
e
r
i
s
e
d
 
F
o
a
 
e
t
 
a
l
.
,
 
(
1
9
9
1
)
 
T
e
n
 
r
a
p
e
-
r
e
l
a
t
e
d
 
w
o
r
d
s
,
 
g
e
n
e
r
a
l
 
t
h
r
e
a
t
 
w
o
r
d
s
,
 
n
e
u
t
r
a
l
 
w
o
r
d
s
 
a
n
d
 
n
o
n
-
w
o
r
d
s
.
 
 
T
o
 
s
e
l
e
c
t
 
t
h
e
 
r
a
p
e
-
r
e
l
a
t
e
d
 
w
o
r
d
s
,
 
4
7
 
r
a
p
e
 
w
o
r
d
s
 
w
e
r
e
 
g
i
v
e
n
 
t
o
 
3
0
 
r
a
p
e
 
v
i
c
t
i
m
s
 
a
n
d
 
3
0
 
n
o
n
-
v
i
c
t
i
m
i
s
e
d
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
s
 
(
n
o
n
e
 
o
f
 
w
h
o
m
 
p
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
t
e
d
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
s
t
u
d
y
)
 
w
h
o
 
w
e
r
e
 
a
s
k
e
d
 
t
o
 
r
a
t
e
 
t
h
e
m
 
b
a
s
e
d
 
o
n
 
t
h
e
i
r
 
d
e
g
r
e
e
 
i
f
 
t
h
r
e
a
t
 
a
n
d
 
f
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
 
o
f
 
u
s
a
g
e
 
(
0
 
=
 
n
o
t
 
v
e
r
y
 
t
h
r
e
a
t
e
n
i
n
g
 
o
r
 
f
r
e
q
u
e
n
t
 
t
o
 
8
 
=
 
v
e
r
y
 
t
h
r
e
a
t
e
n
i
n
g
 
o
r
 
f
r
e
q
u
e
n
t
)
.
 
G
e
n
e
r
a
l
 
t
h
r
e
a
t
 
w
o
r
d
s
 
a
n
d
 
n
e
u
t
r
a
l
 
w
o
r
d
s
 
w
e
r
e
 
t
a
k
e
n
 
f
r
o
m
 
a
 
p
r
e
v
i
o
u
s
 
s
t
u
d
y
 
(
M
c
C
a
r
t
h
y
,
 
F
o
a
,
 
M
u
r
d
o
c
h
,
 
&
 
I
I
i
a
,
 
1
9
9
0
)
.
 
 
N
o
n
-
w
o
r
d
s
 
w
e
r
e
 
c
r
e
a
t
e
d
 
f
r
o
m
 
c
h
a
n
g
i
n
g
 
o
n
e
 
l
e
t
t
e
r
 
i
n
 
t
e
n
 
E
n
g
l
i
s
h
 
w
o
r
d
s
 
(
B
e
c
k
e
r
,
 
1
9
8
0
)
.
 
 
 
W
o
r
d
s
 
w
e
r
e
 
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
i
n
g
 
r
a
n
d
o
m
l
y
 
o
n
 
a
 
c
o
m
p
u
t
e
r
 
s
c
r
e
e
n
.
 
R
e
a
c
t
i
o
n
 
t
i
m
e
s
 
w
e
r
e
 
r
e
c
o
r
d
e
d
 
u
s
i
n
g
 
a
 
m
i
c
r
o
p
h
o
n
e
.
 
A
 
t
o
t
a
l
 
o
f
 
1
2
0
 
t
r
i
a
l
s
 
w
e
r
e
 
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
e
d
 
t
o
 
e
a
c
h
 
p
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
n
t
.
 
T
h
e
 
P
T
S
D
 
g
r
o
u
p
 
t
o
o
k
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
l
y
 
l
o
n
g
e
r
 
t
o
 
c
o
l
o
u
r
-
n
a
m
e
 
r
a
p
e
-
r
e
l
a
t
e
d
 
w
o
r
d
s
 
c
o
m
p
a
r
e
d
 
t
o
 
a
l
l
 
o
t
h
e
r
 
w
o
r
d
 
t
y
p
e
s
 
(
c
o
h
e
n
’
s
 
d
=
0
.
9
)
.
 
R
e
s
p
o
n
s
e
 
l
a
t
e
n
c
i
e
s
 
f
o
r
 
r
a
p
e
 
v
i
c
t
i
m
s
 
w
i
t
h
o
u
t
 
P
T
S
D
 
a
n
d
 
n
o
n
-
v
i
c
t
i
m
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
s
 
d
i
d
 
n
o
t
 
d
i
f
f
e
r
 
a
c
r
o
s
s
 
w
o
r
d
 
t
y
p
e
s
.
  
 
 
 
3
5
 
C
a
s
s
i
d
a
y
 
e
t
 
a
l
.
,
 
(
1
9
9
2
)
 
 
F
o
u
r
 
w
o
r
d
 
c
a
t
e
g
o
r
i
e
s
:
 
h
i
g
h
-
t
h
r
e
a
t
 
w
o
r
d
s
,
 
m
o
d
e
r
a
t
e
-
t
h
r
e
a
t
 
w
o
r
d
s
,
 
p
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
 
w
o
r
d
s
,
 
a
n
d
 
n
e
u
t
r
a
l
 
w
o
r
d
s
.
 
T
o
 
o
b
t
a
i
n
 
h
i
g
h
-
 
a
n
d
 
m
o
d
e
r
a
t
e
-
t
h
r
e
a
t
 
w
o
r
d
s
,
 
t
h
e
r
a
p
i
s
t
s
 
e
x
p
e
r
i
e
n
c
e
d
 
i
n
 
t
r
e
a
t
i
n
g
 
s
e
x
u
a
l
 
a
s
s
a
u
l
t
 
v
i
c
t
i
m
s
 
w
e
r
e
 
a
s
k
e
d
 
t
o
 
g
e
n
e
r
a
t
e
 
a
 
l
i
s
t
 
o
f
 
w
o
r
d
s
.
 
T
h
e
s
e
 
(
5
1
)
 
w
o
r
d
s
 
w
e
r
e
 
r
a
t
e
d
 
o
n
 
a
 
s
t
r
e
s
s
f
u
l
n
e
s
s
 
s
c
a
l
e
 
(
0
-
5
)
 
b
y
 
1
2
 
s
e
x
u
a
l
 
a
s
s
a
u
l
t
 
v
i
c
t
i
m
s
 
w
h
o
 
d
i
d
 
n
o
t
 
p
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
t
e
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
s
t
u
d
y
.
 
T
h
e
 
p
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
 
a
n
d
 
n
e
u
t
r
a
l
 
w
o
r
d
s
 
w
e
r
e
 
t
a
k
e
n
 
f
r
o
m
 
a
 
p
r
e
v
i
o
u
s
 
s
t
u
d
y
 
(
M
c
N
a
l
l
y
 
e
t
 
a
l
.
,
 
1
9
9
0
)
.
 
 
 
2
5
 
w
o
r
d
s
 
f
o
r
 
e
a
c
h
 
c
a
t
e
g
o
r
y
 
w
e
r
e
 
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
e
d
 
u
s
i
n
g
 
a
 
c
o
m
p
u
t
e
r
.
 
T
h
e
r
e
 
w
e
r
e
 
t
w
o
 
t
y
p
e
s
 
o
f
 
w
o
r
d
 
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
a
t
i
o
n
:
 
r
a
n
d
o
m
 
(
w
o
r
d
s
 
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
e
d
 
r
a
n
d
o
m
l
y
)
 
a
n
d
 
b
l
o
c
k
 
f
o
r
m
a
t
 
(
r
a
n
d
o
m
i
s
e
d
 
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
a
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
w
o
r
d
s
 
g
r
o
u
p
e
d
 
b
y
 
c
a
t
e
g
o
r
y
.
 
I
n
 
c
o
n
t
r
a
s
t
 
t
o
 
r
a
p
e
 
v
i
c
t
i
m
s
 
w
i
t
h
o
u
t
 
P
T
S
D
 
a
n
d
 
t
o
 
n
o
n
-
t
r
a
u
m
a
t
i
s
e
d
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
s
,
 
r
a
p
e
 
v
i
c
t
i
m
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
P
T
S
D
 
t
o
o
k
 
l
o
n
g
e
r
 
t
o
 
c
o
l
o
u
r
-
n
a
m
e
 
h
i
g
h
-
t
h
r
e
a
t
 
w
o
r
d
s
 
t
h
a
n
 
m
o
d
e
r
a
t
e
 
t
h
r
e
a
t
,
 
p
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
,
 
a
n
d
 
n
e
u
t
r
a
l
 
w
o
r
d
s
 
(
c
o
h
e
n
’
s
 
d
=
1
.
3
9
)
.
 
 
 
B
r
y
a
n
t
,
 
&
 
H
a
r
v
e
y
,
 
(
1
9
9
5
)
 
F
o
u
r
 
w
o
r
d
 
c
a
t
e
g
o
r
i
e
s
:
 
s
t
r
o
n
g
 
t
h
r
e
a
t
,
 
m
i
l
d
 
t
h
r
e
a
t
,
 
p
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
 
a
n
d
 
n
e
u
t
r
a
l
 
w
o
r
d
s
.
 
 
W
o
r
d
s
 
w
e
r
e
 
a
l
l
o
c
a
t
e
d
 
t
o
 
e
a
c
h
 
c
a
t
e
g
o
r
y
 
o
n
 
t
h
e
 
b
a
s
i
s
 
o
f
 
r
a
t
i
n
g
s
 
o
f
 
e
m
o
t
i
o
n
a
l
i
t
y
 
m
a
d
e
 
b
y
 
3
0
 
M
V
A
 
v
i
c
t
i
m
s
.
 
 
W
o
r
d
s
 
w
e
r
e
 
m
a
t
c
h
e
d
 
f
o
r
 
f
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
 
a
n
d
 
w
o
r
d
 
l
e
n
g
t
h
.
 
 
 
1
2
0
 
i
t
e
m
s
 
w
e
r
e
 
r
a
n
d
o
m
l
y
 
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
e
d
 
t
o
 
p
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
n
t
s
 
o
n
 
a
 
c
o
m
p
u
t
e
r
 
s
c
r
e
e
n
.
 
R
e
a
c
t
i
o
n
 
t
i
m
e
s
 
w
e
r
e
 
r
e
c
o
r
d
e
d
 
u
s
i
n
g
 
a
 
v
o
i
c
e
-
a
c
t
i
v
a
t
e
d
 
m
i
c
r
o
p
h
o
n
e
.
 
T
h
e
 
P
T
S
D
 
g
r
o
u
p
 
t
o
o
k
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
l
y
 
l
o
n
g
e
r
 
t
o
 
c
o
l
o
u
r
-
n
a
m
e
 
s
t
r
o
n
g
 
t
h
r
e
a
t
 
w
o
r
d
s
 
c
o
m
p
a
r
e
d
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
s
i
m
p
l
e
 
p
h
o
b
i
a
 
(
d
 
=
 
0
.
7
6
)
 
a
n
d
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
(
d
 
=
 
1
.
4
4
)
 
g
r
o
u
p
s
.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
3
6
 
 
P
a
u
n
o
v
i
c
 
e
t
 
a
l
.
,
 
(
2
0
0
2
)
 
T
h
r
e
e
 
w
o
r
d
 
c
a
t
e
g
o
r
i
e
s
:
 
t
r
a
u
m
a
-
r
e
l
a
t
e
d
,
 
p
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
 
a
n
d
 
n
e
u
t
r
a
l
.
 
 
2
4
 
w
o
r
d
s
 
f
o
r
 
e
a
c
h
 
c
a
t
e
g
o
r
y
.
 
T
h
e
 
f
i
r
s
t
 
a
u
t
h
o
r
 
c
h
o
s
e
 
t
h
e
 
t
r
a
u
m
a
 
w
o
r
d
s
.
 
T
h
e
 
n
e
u
t
r
a
l
 
a
n
d
 
p
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
 
w
o
r
d
s
 
w
e
r
e
 
m
a
t
c
h
e
d
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
t
r
a
u
m
a
 
w
o
r
d
s
 
b
y
 
w
o
r
d
 
l
e
n
g
t
h
 
a
n
d
 
w
o
r
d
 
f
r
e
q
u
e
n
c
y
.
 
T
h
e
 
2
4
 
w
o
r
d
s
 
i
n
 
e
a
c
h
 
c
a
t
e
g
o
r
y
 
w
e
r
e
 
s
u
b
d
i
v
i
d
e
d
 
i
n
t
o
 
3
 
g
r
o
u
p
s
,
 
A
,
 
B
 
a
n
d
 
C
.
 
E
a
c
h
 
g
r
o
u
p
 
c
o
n
t
a
i
n
e
d
 
e
i
g
h
t
 
t
r
a
u
m
a
,
 
p
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
 
a
n
d
 
n
e
u
t
r
a
l
 
w
o
r
d
s
.
 
G
r
o
u
p
 
A
 
w
a
s
 
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
e
d
 
s
u
p
r
a
l
i
m
i
n
a
l
l
y
,
 
g
r
o
u
p
 
B
 
w
a
s
 
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
e
d
 
s
u
b
l
i
m
i
n
a
l
l
y
 
a
n
d
 
g
r
o
u
p
 
C
 
w
a
s
 
u
s
e
d
 
i
n
 
a
 
t
a
c
h
i
s
t
o
s
c
o
p
i
c
 
i
d
e
n
t
i
f
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
t
a
s
k
.
 
I
n
 
t
h
e
 
s
u
p
r
a
l
i
m
i
n
a
l
 
t
a
s
k
,
 
w
o
r
d
s
 
w
e
r
e
 
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
e
d
 
r
a
n
d
o
m
l
y
 
o
n
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
m
p
u
t
e
r
 
s
c
r
e
e
n
 
a
n
d
 
r
e
a
c
t
i
o
n
 
t
i
m
e
s
 
w
e
r
e
 
r
e
c
o
r
d
e
d
 
w
i
t
h
 
a
 
v
o
i
c
e
-
a
c
t
i
v
a
t
e
d
 
m
i
c
r
o
p
h
o
n
e
.
 
I
n
 
t
h
e
 
s
u
b
l
i
m
i
n
a
l
 
t
a
s
k
,
 
w
o
r
d
s
 
w
e
r
e
 
p
r
e
s
e
n
t
e
d
 
f
o
r
 
1
7
m
s
 
a
n
d
 
t
h
e
n
 
r
e
p
l
a
c
e
d
 
w
i
t
h
 
a
 
m
a
s
k
 
(
o
o
o
o
o
)
.
 
T
h
e
 
m
a
s
k
 
w
a
s
 
t
h
e
 
s
a
m
e
 
c
o
l
o
u
r
 
a
s
 
t
h
e
 
w
o
r
d
 
i
t
 
r
e
p
l
a
c
e
d
 
a
n
d
 
r
e
a
c
t
i
o
n
 
t
i
m
e
 
w
a
s
 
r
e
c
o
r
d
e
d
 
u
s
i
n
g
 
a
 
v
o
i
c
e
 
a
c
t
i
v
a
t
e
d
 
m
i
c
r
o
p
h
o
n
e
.
 
A
 
f
r
e
e
 
r
e
c
a
l
l
 
t
a
s
k
,
 
w
i
t
h
 
a
 
t
i
m
e
 
l
i
m
i
t
 
o
f
 
f
i
v
e
 
m
i
n
u
t
e
s
,
 
w
a
s
 
a
d
m
i
n
i
s
t
e
r
e
d
 
a
t
 
t
h
e
 
e
n
d
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
p
r
o
c
e
d
u
r
e
.
 
 
 
T
h
e
 
P
T
S
D
 
g
r
o
u
p
 
t
o
o
k
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
l
y
 
l
o
n
g
e
r
 
t
o
 
c
o
l
o
u
r
-
n
a
m
e
 
t
r
a
u
m
a
 
(
d
 
=
 
0
.
3
9
)
 
a
n
d
 
p
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
 
w
o
r
d
s
 
(
d
 
=
 
0
.
4
7
)
 
c
o
m
p
a
r
e
d
 
t
o
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
g
r
o
u
p
 
o
n
 
t
h
e
 
s
u
p
r
a
l
i
m
i
n
a
l
 
t
a
s
k
.
 
N
o
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
 
d
i
f
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
s
 
w
e
r
e
 
f
o
u
n
d
 
b
e
t
w
e
e
n
 
g
r
o
u
p
s
 
o
n
 
t
h
e
 
s
u
b
l
i
m
i
n
a
l
 
t
a
s
k
.
 
T
h
e
 
P
T
S
D
 
g
r
o
u
p
 
d
i
d
 
n
o
t
 
s
h
o
w
 
a
n
 
i
m
p
l
i
c
i
t
 
m
e
m
o
r
y
 
b
i
a
s
 
t
o
 
t
r
a
u
m
a
-
r
e
l
a
t
e
d
 
w
o
r
d
s
 
o
n
 
t
h
e
 
t
a
c
h
i
s
t
o
s
c
o
p
i
c
 
t
a
s
k
,
 
b
u
t
 
d
i
d
 
d
i
s
p
l
a
y
 
a
n
 
e
x
p
l
i
c
i
t
 
m
e
m
o
r
y
 
b
i
a
s
 
f
o
r
 
t
r
a
u
m
a
 
w
o
r
d
s
 
c
o
m
p
a
r
e
d
 
t
o
 
p
o
s
i
t
i
v
e
 
(
d
 
=
 
1
.
1
5
)
 
a
n
d
 
n
e
u
t
r
a
l
 
w
o
r
d
s
 
(
d
 
=
 
1
.
4
4
 
)
 
a
n
d
 
c
o
m
p
a
r
e
d
 
w
i
t
h
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
 
g
r
o
u
p
 
(
d
 
=
 
0
.
5
4
)
  
 
 
 
3
7
 
 
C
o
n
s
t
a
n
s
 
e
t
 
a
l
.
,
 
(
2
0
0
4
)
 
T
h
r
e
e
 
w
o
r
d
 
c
a
t
e
g
o
r
i
e
s
:
 
s
o
c
i
a
l
 
t
h
r
e
a
t
,
 
c
o
m
b
a
t
-
r
e
l
a
t
e
d
 
t
h
r
e
a
t
 
a
n
d
 
n
e
u
t
r
a
l
 
w
o
r
d
s
.
 
S
o
c
i
a
l
 
t
h
r
e
a
t
 
a
n
d
 
c
o
m
b
a
t
-
r
e
l
a
t
e
d
 
t
h
r
e
a
t
 
w
o
r
d
s
 
h
a
d
 
b
e
e
n
 
u
s
e
d
 
i
n
 
p
r
e
v
i
o
u
s
 
s
t
u
d
i
e
s
.
 
T
h
e
 
n
e
u
t
r
a
l
 
w
o
r
d
s
 
w
e
r
e
 
s
e
l
e
c
t
e
d
 
b
y
 
t
h
e
 
a
u
t
h
o
r
s
 
a
n
d
 
c
o
m
p
r
i
s
e
d
 
o
f
 
h
o
u
s
e
h
o
l
d
 
f
u
r
n
i
s
h
i
n
g
s
.
 
 
P
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
n
t
s
 
c
o
m
p
l
e
t
e
d
 
t
h
e
 
c
o
m
p
u
t
e
r
i
s
e
d
 
S
t
r
o
o
p
 
t
a
s
k
 
i
n
 
o
n
e
 
o
f
 
t
h
r
e
e
 
c
o
n
d
i
t
i
o
n
s
.
 
T
h
e
 
‘
c
o
m
b
a
t
-
t
h
r
e
a
t
’
 
c
o
n
d
i
t
i
o
n
 
i
n
v
o
l
v
e
d
 
t
h
e
 
p
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
n
t
s
 
b
e
i
n
g
 
t
o
l
d
 
t
h
e
y
 
w
o
u
l
d
 
h
a
v
e
 
t
o
 
w
a
t
c
h
 
a
 
v
i
d
e
o
 
o
f
 
V
i
e
t
n
a
m
 
c
o
m
b
a
t
 
f
o
o
t
a
g
e
 
a
f
t
e
r
 
t
h
e
 
S
t
r
o
o
p
 
t
a
s
k
,
 
t
h
e
 
‘
s
o
c
i
a
l
-
t
h
r
e
a
t
’
 
c
o
n
d
i
t
i
o
n
 
p
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
n
t
s
 
w
e
r
e
 
t
o
l
d
 
t
h
e
y
 
w
o
u
l
d
 
h
a
v
e
 
t
o
 
g
i
v
e
 
a
 
f
i
v
e
 
m
i
n
u
t
e
 
s
p
e
e
c
h
 
a
f
t
e
r
 
t
h
e
 
S
t
r
o
o
p
 
t
a
s
k
,
 
t
h
e
 
p
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
n
t
s
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
‘
r
e
w
a
r
d
’
 
c
o
n
d
i
t
i
o
n
 
w
e
r
e
 
t
o
l
d
 
t
h
e
y
 
w
o
u
l
d
 
r
e
c
e
i
v
e
 
m
o
n
e
t
a
r
y
 
r
e
i
m
b
u
r
s
e
m
e
n
t
 
a
f
t
e
r
 
t
h
e
 
S
t
r
o
o
p
 
t
a
s
k
,
 
a
n
d
 
p
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
n
t
s
 
i
n
 
t
h
e
 
‘
c
o
n
t
r
o
l
’
 
c
o
n
d
i
t
i
o
n
 
w
e
r
e
 
g
i
v
e
n
 
n
o
 
c
o
n
t
e
x
t
u
a
l
 
c
o
n
d
i
t
i
o
n
.
 
 
P
a
r
t
i
c
i
p
a
n
t
s
 
w
i
t
h
 
P
T
S
D
 
w
e
r
e
 
a
b
l
e
 
t
o
 
i
n
h
i
b
i
t
 
t
h
e
 
S
t
r
o
o
p
 
i
n
f
e
r
e
n
c
e
 
e
f
f
e
c
t
 
(
i
.
e
.
 
a
t
t
e
n
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
b
i
a
s
)
 
w
h
e
n
 
p
e
r
f
o
r
m
e
d
 
u
n
d
e
r
 
c
o
n
d
i
t
i
o
n
s
 
i
n
v
o
l
v
i
n
g
 
f
u
t
u
r
e
 
t
h
r
e
a
t
.
 
T
h
e
 
P
T
S
D
 
g
r
o
u
p
 
w
i
t
h
 
n
o
 
c
o
n
d
i
t
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
f
u
t
u
r
e
 
t
h
r
e
a
t
 
t
o
o
k
 
s
i
g
n
i
f
i
c
a
n
t
l
y
 
l
o
n
g
e
r
 
t
o
 
c
o
l
o
u
r
-
n
a
m
e
 
c
o
m
b
a
t
-
r
e
l
a
t
e
d
 
t
h
r
e
a
t
 
w
o
r
d
s
 
c
o
m
p
a
r
e
d
 
t
o
 
n
e
u
t
r
a
l
 
w
o
r
d
s
 
(
d
 
=
 
0
.
4
4
)
.
 
 
*
E
f
f
e
c
t
 
s
i
z
e
 
w
a
s
 
n
o
t
 
r
e
p
o
r
t
e
d
 
a
n
d
 
c
o
u
l
d
 
n
o
t
 
b
e
 
c
a
l
c
u
l
a
t
e
d
 
d
u
e
 
t
o
 
l
a
c
k
 
o
f
 
s
u
f
f
i
c
i
e
n
t
 
d
a
t
a
.
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
3
8
 
T
a
b
l
e
 
1
.
3
:
 
C
o
n
f
o
u
n
d
i
n
g
 
a
n
d
 
e
x
c
l
u
d
e
d
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
 
S
t
u
d
y
 
S
a
m
p
l
e
 
P
a
r
a
d
i
g
m
 
E
x
c
l
u
d
e
d
 
V
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
 
C
o
n
t
r
o
l
l
e
d
 
v
a
r
i
a
b
l
e
s
 
M
e
a
s
u
r
e
s
 
M
c
N
a
l
l
y
 
e
t
 
a
l
.
,
 
(
1
9
9
0
)
 
V
e
t
e
r
a
n
s
 
S
t
r
o
o
p
 
-
 
C
o
m
b
a
t
 
e
x
p
o
s
u
r
e
 
E
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
A
g
e
 
M
o
o
d
 
 
i
M
-
P
T
S
D
 
i
i
C
E
S
 
i
i
i
P
O
M
S
 
 
M
c
N
a
l
l
y
 
e
t
 
a
l
.
,
 
(
1
9
9
3
)
 
 
V
e
t
e
r
a
n
s
 
S
t
r
o
o
p
 
-
 
A
g
e
 
E
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
M
-
P
T
S
D
 
T
h
r
a
s
h
e
r
 
e
t
 
a
l
.
,
 
(
1
9
9
4
)
 
 
F
e
r
r
y
 
d
i
s
a
s
t
e
r
 
s
u
r
v
i
v
o
r
s
 
S
t
r
o
o
p
 
C
o
l
o
u
r
-
b
l
i
n
d
 
I
Q
 
A
g
e
 
S
e
x
 
D
e
p
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
 
A
n
x
i
e
t
y
 
i
v
I
E
S
 
v
P
T
S
D
-
I
 
v
i
N
A
R
T
 
v
i
i
B
D
I
 
v
i
i
i
S
T
A
I
 
 
V
r
a
n
a
 
e
t
 
a
l
.
,
 
(
1
9
9
5
)
 
V
e
t
e
r
a
n
s
 
S
t
r
o
o
p
 
-
 
A
g
e
 
M
o
n
t
h
s
 
i
n
 
c
o
m
b
a
t
 
E
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
P
s
y
c
h
i
a
t
r
i
c
 
m
e
d
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
i
x
S
C
I
D
 
C
E
S
 
M
-
P
T
S
D
 
B
D
I
 
S
T
A
I
 
 
F
o
a
 
e
t
 
a
l
.
,
 
(
1
9
9
1
)
 
R
a
p
e
 
v
i
c
t
i
m
s
 
S
t
r
o
o
p
 
P
s
y
c
h
i
a
t
r
i
c
 
h
i
s
t
o
r
y
 
A
g
e
 
v
e
r
b
a
l
 
I
Q
 
V
o
c
a
b
u
l
a
r
y
 
s
u
b
t
e
s
t
 
o
f
 
W
A
I
S
-
R
 
I
E
S
 
B
D
I
 
S
T
A
I
 
R
a
p
e
 
A
f
t
e
r
m
a
t
h
 
S
y
m
p
t
o
m
 
T
e
s
t
 
 
C
a
s
s
i
d
a
y
 
e
t
 
a
l
.
,
 
(
1
9
9
2
)
 
 
R
a
p
e
 
v
i
c
t
i
m
s
 
S
t
r
o
o
p
 
C
o
l
o
u
r
-
b
l
i
n
d
 
P
s
y
c
h
o
s
i
s
 
F
r
i
e
n
d
/
r
e
l
a
t
i
v
e
 
r
a
p
e
 
v
i
c
t
i
m
 
T
i
m
e
 
s
i
n
c
e
 
t
r
a
u
m
a
 
A
g
e
 
E
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
 
S
C
I
D
 
S
T
A
I
 
B
D
I
 
x
A
S
I
  
 
 
 
3
9
 
x
i
F
N
E
 
I
E
S
 
 
B
r
y
a
n
t
,
 
&
 
H
a
r
v
e
y
,
 
(
1
9
9
5
)
 
M
V
A
 
s
u
r
v
i
v
o
r
s
 
S
t
r
o
o
p
 
-
 
A
g
e
 
S
e
v
e
r
i
t
y
 
o
f
 
P
T
S
D
 
S
e
v
e
r
i
t
y
 
o
f
 
t
r
a
u
m
a
 
T
i
m
e
 
s
i
n
c
e
 
t
r
a
u
m
a
 
V
o
c
a
b
u
l
a
r
y
 
A
n
x
i
e
t
y
 
I
E
S
 
P
T
S
D
-
I
 
S
T
A
I
 
P
a
u
n
o
v
i
c
 
e
t
 
a
l
.
,
 
(
2
0
0
2
)
 
C
r
i
m
e
 
v
i
c
t
i
m
s
 
S
t
r
o
o
p
 
D
e
p
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
 
S
u
b
s
t
a
n
c
e
 
m
i
s
u
s
e
 
B
i
p
o
l
a
r
 
d
i
s
o
r
d
e
r
 
P
s
y
c
h
o
t
i
c
 
d
i
s
o
r
d
e
r
 
A
g
e
 
S
e
x
 
A
n
x
i
e
t
y
 
 
 
B
D
I
 
B
A
I
 
P
S
S
 
I
E
S
 
A
D
I
S
-
I
V
 
C
A
P
S
 
C
o
n
s
t
a
n
s
 
e
t
 
a
l
.
,
 
(
2
0
0
4
)
 
V
e
t
e
r
a
n
s
 
S
t
r
o
o
p
 
B
i
p
o
l
a
r
 
d
i
s
o
r
d
e
r
 
P
s
y
c
h
o
s
i
s
 
N
e
u
r
o
l
e
p
t
i
c
 
m
e
d
i
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
S
u
b
s
t
a
n
c
e
 
m
i
s
u
s
e
 
 
D
e
p
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
 
P
T
S
D
 
s
e
v
e
r
i
t
y
 
A
g
e
 
S
o
c
i
a
l
 
A
n
x
i
e
t
y
 
S
C
I
D
 
B
D
I
 
x
i
i
S
P
A
I
 
x
i
i
i
P
C
L
-
M
 
B
r
y
a
n
t
 
&
 
H
a
r
v
e
y
 
(
1
9
9
7
)
 
M
V
A
 
s
u
r
v
i
v
o
r
s
 
D
o
t
 
p
r
o
b
e
 
 
H
e
a
d
 
i
n
j
u
r
y
 
 
A
g
e
 
T
i
m
e
 
s
i
n
c
e
 
t
r
a
u
m
a
 
S
e
v
e
r
i
t
y
 
o
f
 
t
r
a
u
m
a
 
V
e
r
b
a
l
 
I
Q
 
A
n
x
i
e
t
y
 
 
P
T
S
D
-
I
 
S
T
A
I
 
V
o
c
a
b
u
l
a
r
y
 
s
u
b
t
e
s
t
 
o
f
 
W
A
I
S
-
R
 
W
e
i
n
s
t
e
i
n
 
e
t
 
a
l
.
,
 
(
1
9
9
6
)
 
V
e
t
e
r
a
n
s
 
S
e
n
t
e
n
c
e
 
P
r
i
m
i
n
g
 
-
 
A
g
e
 
E
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
D
e
p
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
 
A
n
x
i
e
t
y
 
 
S
T
A
I
 
B
D
I
 
x
i
v
C
C
-
1
-
R
 
P
i
n
e
l
e
s
 
e
t
 
a
l
.
,
 
(
2
0
0
7
)
 
V
e
t
e
r
a
n
s
 
V
i
s
u
a
l
 
s
e
a
r
c
h
 
t
a
s
k
 
w
i
t
h
 
l
e
x
i
c
a
l
 
d
e
c
i
s
i
o
n
 
t
a
s
k
 
 
-
 
A
g
e
 
E
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
P
C
L
-
M
  
 
 
 
4
0
 
E
l
s
e
s
s
e
r
 
e
t
 
a
l
.
,
 
(
2
0
0
4
)
 
V
a
r
i
e
t
y
 
o
f
 
t
r
a
u
m
a
 
v
i
c
t
i
m
s
 
D
o
t
 
p
r
o
b
e
 
-
 
A
g
e
 
T
i
m
e
 
s
i
n
c
e
 
t
r
a
u
m
a
 
A
n
x
i
e
t
y
 
D
e
p
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
 
x
v
D
I
P
S
 
S
T
A
I
 
B
D
I
 
I
E
S
 
 
M
i
c
h
a
e
l
 
e
t
 
a
l
.
,
 
(
2
0
0
5
)
 
V
a
r
i
e
t
y
 
o
f
 
a
s
s
a
u
l
t
 
v
i
c
t
i
m
s
 
W
o
r
d
 
s
t
e
m
 
c
o
m
p
l
e
t
i
o
n
 
 
D
o
m
e
s
t
i
c
 
v
i
o
l
e
n
c
e
 
v
i
c
t
i
m
s
 
H
i
s
t
o
r
y
 
o
f
 
p
s
y
c
h
o
s
i
s
 
s
u
b
s
t
a
n
c
e
 
m
i
s
u
s
e
 
P
o
o
r
 
k
n
o
w
l
e
d
g
e
 
o
f
 
E
n
g
l
i
s
h
 
l
a
n
g
u
a
g
e
 
A
g
e
 
G
e
n
d
e
r
 
E
d
u
c
a
t
i
o
n
 
E
t
h
n
i
c
 
o
r
i
g
i
n
 
A
l
c
o
h
o
l
 
c
o
n
s
u
m
p
t
i
o
n
 
T
y
p
e
 
o
f
 
a
s
s
a
u
l
t
 
S
e
v
e
r
i
t
y
 
o
f
 
a
s
s
a
u
l
t
 
T
i
m
e
 
s
i
n
c
e
 
a
s
s
a
u
l
t
 
P
T
S
D
 
s
y
m
p
t
o
m
 
s
e
v
e
r
i
t
y
 
D
e
p
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
 
A
n
x
i
e
t
y
 
P
D
S
 
B
D
I
 
S
T
A
I
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
i
 
M
i
s
s
i
s
s
i
p
p
i
 
S
c
a
l
e
 
f
o
r
 
C
o
m
b
a
t
-
r
e
l
a
t
e
d
 
P
T
S
D
 
(
K
e
a
n
e
 
e
t
 
a
l
.
,
 
1
9
8
8
)
 
i
i
 
C
o
m
b
a
t
 
E
x
p
o
s
u
r
e
 
S
c
a
l
e
 
(
K
e
a
n
e
 
e
t
 
a
l
.
,
 
1
9
8
9
)
 
i
i
i
 
P
r
o
f
i
l
e
 
o
f
 
M
o
o
d
 
S
t
a
t
e
s
 
(
M
c
N
a
i
r
 
e
t
 
a
l
.
,
 
1
9
7
1
)
 
i
v
 
I
m
p
a
c
t
 
o
f
 
E
v
e
n
t
s
 
S
c
a
l
e
 
(
H
o
r
o
w
i
t
z
 
e
t
 
a
l
.
,
 
1
9
7
9
)
 
v
 
S
e
m
i
-
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
d
 
i
n
t
e
r
v
i
e
w
 
b
a
s
e
d
 
o
n
 
D
S
M
-
I
I
I
-
R
 
c
r
i
t
e
r
i
a
 
f
o
r
 
P
T
S
D
 
v
i
 
N
a
t
i
o
n
a
l
 
A
d
u
l
t
 
R
e
a
d
i
n
g
 
T
e
s
t
 
(
N
e
l
s
o
n
,
 
1
9
8
2
)
 
v
i
i
 
B
e
c
k
 
D
e
p
r
e
s
s
i
o
n
 
I
n
v
e
n
t
o
r
y
(
B
e
c
k
,
 
W
a
r
d
,
 
M
e
n
d
e
l
s
o
h
n
,
 
M
o
c
k
,
 
&
 
E
r
b
a
u
g
h
,
 
1
9
6
1
)
 
v
i
i
i
 
S
t
a
t
e
-
T
r
a
i
t
 
A
n
x
i
e
t
y
 
I
n
v
e
n
t
o
r
y
 
(
S
p
i
e
l
b
e
r
g
e
r
,
 
G
o
r
s
u
c
h
,
 
&
 
L
u
s
h
e
n
e
,
 
1
9
7
0
)
 
i
x
 
S
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
d
 
C
l
i
n
i
c
a
l
 
I
n
t
e
r
v
i
e
w
 
f
o
r
 
D
i
a
g
n
o
s
i
s
 
(
S
p
i
t
z
e
r
,
 
W
i
l
l
i
a
m
s
,
 
G
i
b
b
o
n
,
 
&
 
F
i
r
s
t
,
 
1
9
8
9
)
 
x
 
A
n
x
i
e
t
y
 
S
e
n
s
i
t
i
v
i
t
y
 
I
n
d
e
x
 
(
R
e
i
s
s
,
 
P
e
t
e
r
s
o
n
,
 
G
u
r
s
k
y
,
 
&
 
M
c
N
a
l
l
y
,
 
1
9
8
6
)
 
x
i
 
F
e
a
r
 
o
f
 
N
e
g
a
t
i
v
e
 
E
v
a
l
u
a
t
i
o
n
 
q
u
e
s
t
i
o
n
n
a
i
r
e
 
(
W
a
t
s
o
n
,
 
&
 
F
r
i
e
n
d
,
 
1
9
6
9
)
 
x
i
i
 
S
o
c
i
a
l
 
P
h
o
b
i
a
 
a
n
d
 
A
n
x
i
e
t
y
 
I
n
v
e
n
t
o
r
y
 
(
T
u
r
n
e
r
,
 
B
e
i
d
e
l
,
 
D
a
n
c
u
,
 
&
 
S
t
a
n
l
e
y
,
 
1
9
8
9
)
 
x
i
i
i
 
P
T
S
D
 
c
h
e
c
k
l
i
s
t
 
f
o
r
 
M
i
l
i
t
a
r
y
 
P
e
r
s
o
n
n
e
l
 
(
W
e
a
t
h
e
r
s
,
 
L
i
t
z
,
 
H
e
r
m
a
n
,
 
H
u
s
k
a
,
 
&
 
K
e
a
n
e
,
 
1
9
9
3
)
 
x
i
v
 
C
o
m
p
u
t
e
r
i
s
e
d
 
s
t
r
u
c
t
u
r
e
d
 
c
l
i
n
i
c
a
l
 
i
n
t
e
r
v
i
e
w
 
f
o
r
 
P
T
S
D
 
c
r
i
t
e
r
i
a
 
u
s
i
n
g
 
D
S
M
-
I
I
I
-
R
 
x
v
 
G
e
r
m
a
n
 
v
e
r
s
i
o
n
 
o
f
 
t
h
e
 
A
n
x
i
e
t
y
 
D
i
s
o
r
d
e
r
s
 
I
n
t
e
r
v
i
e
w
 
S
c
h
e
d
u
l
e
 
–
 
R
e
v
i
s
e
d
 
(
D
i
N
a
r
d
o
,
 
&
 
B
a
r
l
o
w
,
 
1
9
8
8
)
 39 
 
References 
American  Psychiatric  Association.  (1994).  Diagnostic  and  Statistical  Manual  of  Mental 
Disorders, (4th ed). Washington. 
 
Bailie, J. M. (1978). The Newnes crossword dictionary. London: Hamlyn. 
 
Becker,  C.  M.  (1980).  Semantic  context  effects  in  visual  word  recognition:  an  analysis  of 
semantic strategies. Memory and Cognition, 8, 493-512. 
 
Beck, A. T.,  Ward, C. H., Mendlsohn, M., Mock, J., & Erbaugh, J. (1961). An inventory for 
measuring depression. Archives of General Psychiatry, 4, 561-571. 
 
Blanchard, E. B., Kolb, L. C., Pallmeyer, T. B., & Gerardi, R. J. (1982). The development of a 
psychophysiological  assessment  procedure  for  post-traumatic  stress  disorder  in  Vietnam 
veterans. Psychiatric Quarterly, 54, 592-606. 
 
Breslau, N., Kessler, R. C., Chilcoat, H. D., Schultz, L. R., Davis, G. C., & Andreski, P. (1998). 
Trauma and posttraumatic stress disorder in the community: The 1996 Detroit Area Survey of 
Trauma. Archives of General Psychiatry, 55, 626–632. 
 
Brewin, C. R. (2005). Encoding and retrieval of traumatic memories. In J. J. Vasterling & C. R. 
Brewin (Eds), Neuropsychology of PTSD: Biological, Cognitive, and Clinical Perspectives (pp. 
131-150). New York: Guilford Press. 
 
Brewin, C. R., & Holmes, E. A. (2003). Psychological theories of posttraumatic stress disorder. 
Clinical Psychology Review, 23, 339-376. 
      
40 
 
Brewin, C. R., Dalgleish, T., & Joseph, S. (1996). A dual representation theory of posttraumatic 
stress disorder. Psychological Review, 103, 670-686. 
 
Bronner, M. B., Peek, N., de Vries, M., Bronner, A. E., Last, B. F., & Grootenhuis, M. A. 
(2009). A community based survey of Posttraumatic Stress Disorder in the Netherlands. Journal 
of Traumatic Stress, 22, 74-78. 
 
Bryant, R. A., & Harvey, A. G. (1995). Processing threatening information in posttraumatic 
stress disorder. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 104(3), 537-541. 
 
Bryant, R. A., & Harvey, A. G. (1997). Attentional bias in posttraumatic stress disorder. Journal 
of traumatic stress, 10(4), 635-644. 
 
Buckley, T. C., Blanchard, E. B., & Neill, W. T. (2000). Information processing and PTSD: a 
review of the empirical literature. Clinical Psychology Review, 20, 1041-1065. 
 
Cassiday, K. L., McNally, R. J., & Zeitlin, S. B. (1992). Cognitive processing of trauma cues in 
rape victims with post-traumatic stress disorder. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 16(3), 283-
295. 
 
Constans,  J.  I.,  McCloskey,  M.  S.,  Vasterling,  J.  J.,  Brailey,  K.,  &  Mathews,  A.  (2004). 
Suppression of attentional bias in PTSD. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 113(2), 315-323. 
 
Cook, T. D., & Campbell, D. T. (1979). Quasi-experimentation: design and analysis issues in 
field settings. Chicago: Rand McNally. 
 
Davidson, J. R. T., & Foa, E. B. (1991). Diagnostic issues in posttraumatic stress disorder: 
considerations for the DSM-IV. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 100, 346-355.      
41 
 
DiNardo, P., & Barlow, D. H. (1988). Anxiety Disorders Interview Schedule – Revised. Albany, 
NY: Center for Stress and Anxiety Disorders. 
 
Ellis, M. V., Ladany, N., Krengel, M., & Schult, D. (1996). Clinical Supervision Research From 
1981 to 1993: A Methodological Critique. Journal of Counselling Psychology, 43(1), 35 – 50. 
 
Elsesser, K., Sartory, G., & Tackenberg, A. (2004). Attention, heart rate, and startle response 
during  exposure  to  trauma-relevant  pictures:  A  comparison  of  recent  trauma  victims  and 
patients with post-traumatic stress disorder. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 113(2), 289-301. 
 
Foa, E. B., Feske, U., Murdock, T. B., Kozak, M. J. & McCarthy, P. R. (1991). Processing of 
threat-related information in rape victims. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 100(2), 156-162. 
 
Foa, E. B., & Rothbaum, B. O. (1998). Treating the trauma of rape: Cognitive-behavioral 
therapy for PTSD. New York: Guilford Press. 
 
Foa, E. B., Steketee, G., & Rothbaum, B. O. (1989). Behavioral/cognitive conceptualisation of 
post-traumatic stress disorder. Behavior Therapy, 20, 155-176. 
 
Francis,  W.  N.,  &  Kucera,  H.  (1982).  Frequency  analysis  of  English  usage.  Lexicon  and 
grammar. Boston, MA: Houghton & Mifflin. 
 
Harvey, A. G., Bryant, R. A., & Rapee, R. M. (1996). Preconscious processing of threat in 
posttraumatic stress disorder. Cognitive Therapy and Research, 20, 613-623. 
 
Horowitz,  M.  J.,  Wilner,  N.,  &  Alvares,  W.  (1979).  Impact  of  events  scale:  a  measure  of 
subjective distress. Psychosomatic Medicine, 41, 207-218.      
42 
 
Johnson,  M.  H.,  &  Hasher,  L.  (1987).  Human  learning  and  memory.  Annual  Review  of 
Psychology, 38, 631-668. 
 
Keane,  T.  M.,  Caddell,  J.  M.,  &  Talyor,  K.  (1988).  Mississippi  scale  for  combat-related 
posttraumatic stress disorder: Three studies in reliability and validity. Journal of Consulting and 
Clinical Psychology, 56, 85-90. 
 
Keane, T. M., Fairbank, J. A., Caddell, J. M., Zimering, R. T., Taylor, K. L., & Mora, C. A. 
(1989). Clinical evaluation of a measure to assess combat exposure. Psychological Assessment: 
A Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 1, 53-55. 
 
Kessler,  R.  C.,  Chiu,  W.  T.,  Demler,  O.,  Merikangas,  K.  R.,  &  Walters,  E.  E.  (2005). 
Prevalence,  severity,  and  comorbidity  of  12-month  DSM-IV  disorders  in  the  National 
Comorbidity Survey Replication. Archives of General Psychiatry, 62, 617–627. 
 
Kessler, R. C., Sonnega, A., Bromet, E., Hughes, M., & Nelson, C. B. (1995). Posttraumatic 
stress disorder in the National Comorbidity Survey. Archives of General Psychiatry, 52, 1048–
1060. 
 
Lang, P. J. (1977). Imagery in therapy: An information processing analysis of fear. Behavior 
Therapy, 8, 862-886. 
 
Lang, P. J. (1979). A bioinformational theory of emotional imagery. Psychophysiology, 16, 495-
512. 
 
Lang, J. P., Levin, D. N., Millar, G. A., & Kozak, M. J. (1983). Fear behaviour, fear imagery, 
and psychophysiology of emotion: The problem of affective response integration. Journal of 
Abnormal Psychology, 92, 276-306      
43 
 
Martin, M., Williams, R., & Clark, D. M. (1991). Does anxiety lead to selective processing of 
threat-related information? Behaviour Research and Therapy, 29, 147-160. 
 
Mathews, A., & MacIntosh, B. (1998). A cognitive model of selective processing in anxiety. 
Cognitive Therapy and Research, 22, 539-560. 
 
Mathews,  A.,  &  Sebastian,  S.  (1993).  Suppression  of  the  emotional  stroop  effects  by  fear 
arousal. Cognition and Emotion, 7, 517-530. 
 
McCarthy, P. R., Foa, E. B., Murdock, T., & IIia, D. (1990). Attentional bias in obsessive-
compulsive disorder: a test using a modified Stroop task. Unpublished manuscript. Medical 
College of Pennsylvania, Department of Psychiatry, Philadelphia. 
 
McDermott,  L.M.,  &  Ebmeier,  K.  P.  (2009).  A  meta-analysis  of  depression  severity  and 
cognitive function. Journal of Affective Disorders, in press. 
 
McNair, D. M., Lorr, M., & Droppleman, C. F. (1971). Manual for the profile of mood states. 
San Diego, CA: Educational and Industrial Testing Services. 
 
McNally, R. J., English, G. E., & Lipke, H. J., (1993). Assessment of intrusive cognition in 
PTSD: Use of the modified Stroop paradigm. Journal of Traumatic Stress, 6, 33-41. 
 
McNally, R.  J., Riemann, B. C., Louro, C. E., Lukach, B. M., & Kim, E. (1992). Cognitive 
processing of emotional information in panic disorder. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 30, 
143-149. 
 
McNally, R. J., Kaspi, S. P., Riemann, B. C., & Zeitlin, S. B. (1990). Selective processing of 
threat cues on posttraumatic stress disorder. Journal of Abnormal Psychology, 99(4), 398-402.      
44 
 
McNally, R. J., Luedke, D. L., Besyner, J. K., Peterson, R. A., Bohm, K., & Lips, O. J. (1987). 
Sensitivity  to  stress-relevant  stimuli  in  posttraumatic  stress  disorder.  Journal  of  Anxiety 
Disorders, 1, 105-116. 
 
Michael, T., Ehlers, A., & Halligan, S. L. (2005). Enhanced priming for trauma-related material 
in posttraumatic stress disorder. Emotion, 5(1), 103-112. 
 
Mogg, K., & Bradley, B .P. (1998). A cognitive-motivational analysis of anxiety. Behaviour 
Research and Therapy, 36, 809-848. 
 
Nelson, H. E. (1982). The National Adult Reading Test (NART). Windsor, UK: NFER-Nelson. 
 
Paunovic, N., Lundh, L. G., & Ost, L. G. (2002). Attentional and memory bias for emotional  
information in crime victims with acute posttraumatic stress disorder. Anxiety Disorders, 16, 
675-692. 
 
Pineles, S. L., Shipherd, J. C., Welch, L. P., & Yovel, I. (2007). The role of attentional biases in 
PTSD: Is it interference or facilitation. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 45, 1903-1913. 
 
Posner, M. I. & Snyder, C. R. R. (1975).  Attention and cognitive control. In R. L. Solso (Ed), 
Information  processing  and  cognition:  The  Loyola  Symposium  (pp.  5585).  Hillside,  NJ: 
Erlbaum. 
 
Reiss, S., Peterson, R. A., Gursky, D. M., & McNally, R. J. (1986). Anxiety sensitivity, anxiety 
frequency and the prediction of fearfulness. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 24, 1-8. 
      
45 
 
Resnick,  H.  S.,  Kilpatrick,  D.  G.,  Dansky,  B.  S.,  Saunders,  B.  E.,  &  Best,  C.  L.  (1993). 
Prevalence  of  civilian  trauma  and  posttraumatic  stress  disorder  in  a  representative  national 
sample of women. Journal of Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 61, 984–991. 
 
Spielberger, C. D., Gorsuch, R. L., & Lushene, R. E. (1970). The State-Trait Anxiety Inventory. 
Palo Alto, CA: Consulting Psychologists Press. 
 
Spitzer, R. L., Williams, J. B., Gibbon, M., & First, M. B. (1989). Structured Clinical Interview 
for DSM-III-R. Biometrics Research Department, New York Psychiatric Institue, New York. 
 
Thrasher, S. M., Dalgleish, T., & Yule, W. (1994). Information processing in post-traumatic 
stress disorder. Behaviour Research and Therapy, 32(2), 247-254. 
 
Turner, S. M., Beidel, D. C., Dancu, C. V., & Stanley, M. A. (1989). An empirically driven 
inventory  to  measure  social  fears  and  anxiety:  the  social  phobia  and  anxiety  inventory. 
Psychological Assessment, 1, 35-40. 
 
Van  der  Kolk,  B.  A.  (2003). The  neurobiology  of  childhood trauma  and  abuse.  Child  and 
Adolescent Psychiatric Clinics of North America, 12(2), 293-317. 
 
Vrana, S. R., Roodman, A., & Beckman, J. C. (1995). Selective processing of trauma-relevant 
words in posttraumatic stress disorder. Journal of Anxiety Disorders, 9(6), 515-530. 
 
Wagner, T. H., Harris, K. M., Federman, B., Dai, L., Luna, Y., & Humphreys, K. (2007). 
Prevalence of substance use disorders among veterans and comparable nonveterans from the 
National Survey on Drug Use and Health. Psychological Services, 4(3), 149-157. 
      
46 
 
Watson,  D.,  &  Friend,  R.  (1969).  Measurement  of  social-evaluative  anxiety.  Journal  of 
Consulting and Clinical Psychology, 33, 448-457. 
 
Watts, F. N., McKenna, F. P., Sharrock, R., & Trezise, L. (1986). Colour-naming of phobia-
related words. British Journal of Psychology, 77, 97-108. 
 
Weathers, F. W., Litz, B. T., Herman, D. S., Huska, J. A., & Keane, T. M. (1993). The PTSD 
Checklist – Reliability, validity and diagnostic utility. Paper presented at the annual meeting of 
the International Society for Traumatic Stress Studies, San Antonio, TX. 
 
Wechsler,  D.  (1981).  Wechsler  Adult  Intelligence  Scale  –  Revised  manual.  New  York: 
Psychological Corporation. 
 
Weinstein, A. M., Lillywhite, N. A., Potokar, J., & Nutt, D. J. (1996). Cognitive processing in 
post-traumatic stress disorder. Anxiety, 2, 130-139. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
      
47 
 
CHAPTER 2 
 
 
MAJOR RESEARCH PROJECT 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Traumatic Brain Injury, Post-traumatic Stress Disorder Symptom Reporting and 
Attentional Bias: Unravelling the Misidentification of Post-traumatic Stress 
Disorder in People with a Traumatic Brain Injury. 
 
 
Written according to guidelines for submission to the British Journal of Psychiatry 
(Notes for contributors Appendix 2.1) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Address for Correspondence: 
 
Division of Community Based Sciences 
Section of Psychological Medicine 
Gartnavel Royal Hospital 
1055 Great Western Road 
Glasgow, G12 0XH 
      
48 
 
Abstract 
Background: Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) can occur following a traumatic event that 
has  led to  moderate to  severe  traumatic  brain  injury  (TBI)  even  when  there is  little  or  no 
memory  for  the  event.  The  incidence  of  PTSD  is  higher  when  diagnosed  by  self-report 
questionnaires compared to structured clinical interview. Previous studies suggest PTSD can be 
misdiagnosed in a significant proportion of cases and the incidence is in fact low. To explore 
this issue further there is a need to not only understand whether there are differences between 
cases that do and do not fulfill symptom criteria for PTSD, but also whether some cases have 
‘partial  PTSD’;  that  is  to  say  they  have  PTSD  symptoms  but  do  not  fulfill  the  DSM-IV 
symptom criteria exactly. 
Aims: The study aims to establish whether an attentional bias to trauma related words exists in 
people  with  TBI  who  report  PTSD  symptoms  and  to  investigate  the  relationship  between 
physiological arousal and attentional bias in people with a TBI reporting PTSD symptoms.  
Method:  Forty-one  participants  with  severe-extremely  severe  TBI  were  recruited  from  the 
community and completed measures of cognitive functioning. Attentional bias was measured 
using a Stroop task in which trauma, negative, neutral and positive words were administered 
randomly.  Physiological  reactivity  (heart  rate)  was  recorded  and  PTSD  ‘caseness’  was 
established using a self-report questionnaire and a clinician-administered structured interview.  
Results: No significant relationship between PTSD symptom severities and attentional bias to 
trauma stimuli was apparent. Those with ‘PTSD’ demonstrated significantly slower reaction 
times to negative words however; this bias was associated with self-report of depression rather 
than  PTSD  symptomatology.  Heart  rate  decreased  throughout  the  interview  and  was  not 
associated with PTSD symptom severities. 
Conclusions: Greater PTSD symptom reporting was not associated with an attentional bias to 
trauma words. Heart rate decreased over the course of the interview, independent of PTSD 
severity and diagnosis. This suggests that ‘partial’ PTSD was not present, and instead those who 
reported PTSD symptoms were curious about the gap in memory caused by amnesia without the 
associated fear response.       
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1. Introduction 
1.1 Definitions and Clinical Characteristics  
Post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD) is an anxiety disorder according to DSM-IV [1], with 
symptoms including intrusion, hyperarousal and avoidance following exposure to a traumatic 
event. Symptoms must have been present for at least one month in duration and have had an 
adverse  impact  on  daily  functioning.    The  traumatic  event  is  perceived  as  frightening  and 
threatening to the life or physical integrity of the self or others. PTSD can be diagnosed when 
criteria A-F are satisfied within DSM-IV (Appendix 1.2).  
 
A traumatic brain injury (TBI) can occur from a penetrating object (an ‘open’ TBI) or from a 
blow to the head, rapid acceleration-deceleration, or severe rotational forces (‘closed’ TBI). A 
TBI typically produces cognitive impairments, and longer lasting memory impairments that are 
clinically defined as Post-traumatic Amnesia (PTA) [2]. TBI severity can be defined by duration 
of PTA, duration of loss of consciousness, abnormalities on a CT scan, or by score range on the 
Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS). Duration of PTA (which begins at the time of injury and includes 
the coma period) correlates well with GCS ratings and both are commonly used to define TBI 
severity [3]. PTA is defined as the length of time after the traumatic event during which the 
individual is (almost) completely unable to store current events in memory [4]. According to the 
clinical definition, the end of PTA is identified by the return of continuous personal memories 
[5].  The literature suggests however, that ‘islands of memory’ or brief periods of apparently 
normal encoding and retrieval during PTA are apparent in approximately one third of mild to 
moderate TBI [6].  
 
1.2 Prevalence Rates 
Early studies suggested that PTSD did not [e.g. 7] and later could not [e.g. 8] co-exist with TBI.  
The latter was based on the premise that PTSD and TBI were ‘mutually incompatible disorders’ 
since  individuals  with  PTSD  do  not  ‘forget’  the  traumatic  event,  whereas  those  who  have 
sustained a mild-severe TBI have no memory for the traumatic event [8]. More recently, there is      
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growing acceptance that PTSD, in principle, can occur after a (severe) TBI [9,10]. Evidence for 
this acceptance comes from a significant number of single case studies [11] and group-based 
studies [e.g. 12], however, the incidence rates for PTSD after TBI vary widely in the literature, 
with rates of 0-56% being reported [9]. 
 
1.3 Mechanisms for PTSD following TBI 
Four potential mechanisms have been identified [10,11] which aim to explain why PTSD and 
TBI can co-occur. Firstly, in mild TBI there is little or no organic amnesia (PTA or retrograde 
amnesia) and as such, the individual has conscious memories for all or part of the traumatic 
event [13]. Secondly, an individual can have conscious memories for part of the traumatic event 
where there are one or more ‘islands’ of memory during PTA in an otherwise amnesic period 
[14].  Thirdly,  the  traumatic  event  can  be  re-experienced  as  an  unconscious/implicit  fear 
response when there is no conscious/explicit memory of the event. These are said to be triggered 
when the individual is exposed to stimuli reminiscent of the event [15]. Finally, PTSD can occur 
when the individual creates ‘pseudomemories’, which are based on what the individual believes 
has happened, or has been told what happened. These ‘pseudomemories’ can occur when the 
individual has little or no memory of the traumatic event and can therefore become a central 
feature in PTSD [11,16]. 
 
1.4 Conceptual Models 
Dual  Representation  Theory  [17]  is  an  information  processing  model  that  suggests  that 
traumatic memories are stored in a fundamentally different way to ordinary memories. Here, 
two memory systems are said to be working in parallel, but one may take precedence over the 
other  at  different  times.  The  Verbally  Accessible  Memory  (VAM)  system  involves  the 
conscious storage of narrative memories of the trauma. The information stored in the VAM 
system can be consciously accessed when required.  The second system, called the Situationally 
Accessible  Memory  (SAM)  system  involves  implicit  (unconscious)  processing.  The  SAM 
system contains information from lower level perceptual processing of the traumatic scene, such      
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as sights and sounds which were too briefly attended to in order for them to be contained in the 
VAM system. Flashbacks are thought to represent the operation of SAM system in that they are 
triggered involuntarily by situational reminders of the trauma [18].  
 
Information processing theorists [17,19] suggest that anxiety disorders, like PTSD, arise from 
the activation of cognitive structures (i.e. the SAM system), concerned with the processing of 
information related to personal threat or danger. These theorists argue that the presentation of 
information represented in cognitive ‘fear’ structures activates it, and evokes a fear response and 
triggers  strategies  of  escape  or  avoidance.  As  such,  it  is  posited  [e.g.  19]  that  anxious 
individuals, including those with PTSD, demonstrate a bias in attention to stimuli represented in 
the  fear  structure,  and  in  turn,  allocate  more  resources  to  the  processing  of  fear-relevant 
information. Therefore, in terms of information processing theories, the symptoms of PTSD are 
conceptualised  as  indicating  the  presence  of  unprocessed  trauma-related  information  in 
memory.  
 
1.5 Proposed Explanations for the Misidentification of PTSD occurring after TBI 
A number of explanations have been proposed to explain the relatively high incidence of PTSD 
after TBI found using self-report questionnaires and relatively low incidence using structured 
clinical interview. Two recent studies propose complimentary explanations for the discrepancy. 
One study [20] suggested that PTSD is misdiagnosed in patients with a severe TBI when using 
self-report  questionnaires  compared  to  structured  clinical  interview.  They  found  PTSD 
‘caseness’ to be 3% using a structured clinical interview and 59% on a self-report questionnaire.  
In concordance with another study [9], this over-diagnosis on the self-report questionnaire was 
attributed to the similarity in symptoms seen in both PTSD and TBI alone.  For example, a 
person  with  a  TBI  may  display  “avoidance”  symptoms  according  to  a  PTSD  diagnostic 
questionnaire however, the person may be ‘avoiding’ a situation as a result of their injury (e.g. 
‘avoiding’ driving because their licence has been revoked).  
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A  further  consideration  is  whether  it  is  appropriate  to  consider  a  continuum  of  PTSD 
symptomatology.  ‘Partial  PTSD’  is  the  notion  whereby  some  individuals  may  fall  short  of 
diagnostic criteria, but suffer from symptoms attributable to PTSD [21]. This means that after 
head injury, PTSD symptom number or severity may fall short of DSM-IV criteria [1], but 
PTSD may nevertheless be present in a milder or partial form.  Hence, differences in diagnostic 
rate of PTSD reported after TBI might be explained by different rates of ‘partial PTSD’ being 
reported as PTSD.  
 
A  recent  study  [22]  considered  whether  the  concept  of  ‘partial  PTSD’  can  explain  the 
discrepancy. The authors hypothesised that self-report of greater PTSD symptom severity would 
be associated with increased heart rate and movement when responding to questions about the 
traumatic event, if ‘partial PTSD’ was an explanation.  They found that self-report of greater 
PTSD symptom severity was not associated with increases in heart rate or movement during 
questions about the traumatic event, and in fact heart rate decreased from baseline in those with 
higher  self-report  scores  for  PTSD.  The  finding  was  therefore  consistent  with  notion  that 
individuals may be curious about the gap left in memory by PTA [20], rather than ‘partial 
PTSD’  being  an  explanation. This  conclusion  may  be  consistent  with  other findings  which 
suggest that curiosity about the gap left in memory by PTA, might be self-reported as intrusive, 
due to a desire to recover lost memory but is not fear provoking [20].   
 
1.6 Role of attentional bias 
Attentional  bias is  believed  to  be  important in the development  and  maintenance  of  PTSD 
because  chronic  over-arousal  to  mild  threat  stimuli  can  occur  when  attention  is  constantly 
directed to such stimuli [23]. Attentional bias is frequently measured using the modified Stroop 
task in which participants are instructed to colour-name emotionally laden words. This task is 
based  on  the  hypothesis  that  longer  response  latencies  indicate  attentional  resources  being 
preferentially allocated to the meaning of the word and thus, interfering with the task of colour-
naming [24].        
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In non-PTSD populations it has been shown that attentional bias is associated with increased 
anxiety [25].  One study [26] found that individuals with high levels of anxiety displayed an 
attentional bias on a Stroop task compared to individuals with low levels of anxiety. Anxiety is 
a psychophysiological state characterised by a number of physiological symptoms including 
muscle tension, twitching and shaking, restlessness, fatigue and heart palpitations [27]. PTSD is 
an anxiety disorder with prominent psychophysiological symptoms including elevated heart rate 
and hyperarousal to threat stimuli [28].  Patients with PTSD are known to have an attentional 
bias to threat stimuli [e.g. 29] and physiological anxiety symptoms. The literature on heart rate 
and PTSD following TBI is scarce. However, one study [30] found that increased heart rate one 
week after severe TBI was predictive of PTSD six months following the traumatic event.  
 
The aim of this study is to investigate the findings of a study described previously [22] which 
suggested that individuals with PTA following a TBI are curious about the amnesic gap. It is 
unclear from this previous study whether or not there was an attentional bias to stimuli which 
may act to remind the individual of the traumatic event, and if indeed the desire to recover lost 
memory is intrusive.  The literature is sparse with regard to this issue.  
 
The present study considers the notion of ‘partial PTSD’ as well as identifying those who are 
PTSD ‘cases’ and will investigate whether or not an attentional bias to trauma-related stimuli 
exists in TBI patients reporting PTSD symptoms. No other study has specifically investigated 
whether or not an attentional bias is related to PTSD symptom severity in patients with TBI. If 
greater PTSD symptom severity is related to an attentional bias for trauma-related stimuli, then 
the disparity between the number of people self-reporting PTSD symptoms after head injury and 
the smaller number diagnosed by structured clinical interview, may reflect ‘partial PTSD’ in the 
former. That is, the self-reported PTSD symptoms are attributable to PTSD and not head injury. 
This will further our understanding as to why PTSD is misidentified in people with TBI. This 
study will subsequently question whether attentional bias might be utilised as an indicator of 
PTSD for this population.  Physiological arousal (heart rate) will also be examined in relation to      
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PTSD severity and attentional bias. If ‘partial PTSD’ is present, then an increase in heart rate is 
expected during the administration of measures of PTSD severity and caseness. 
 
2. Aims & Hypotheses 
2.1 Aims 
1.  To  establish  whether  an  attentional  bias  exists  in  people  with  a  TBI  and  PTSD 
symptoms. 
 
2.  To investigate the relationship between physiological arousal (heart rate) and attentional 
bias in people with a TBI and PTSD symptoms. 
 
2.2 Hypotheses 
1.  People  with  a  higher  frequency  or  severity  of  PTSD  symptoms  have  an 
attentional bias to trauma related stimuli. 
2.  Increased  physiological arousal  is  associated  with  greater  attentional  bias to trauma 
related stimuli. 
3.  H1 is associated with increased physiological arousal (heart rate). 
 
3. Design 
A cohort study, consisting of within group comparisons on an experimental task was employed.   
 
4.  Method 
4.1 Participants 
Participants were recruited from a neuropsychology department of a brain injury rehabilitation 
unit and from a brain injury charity which offers support to individuals with head injuries. 258 
individuals  who  were  discharged  from  the  neuropsychology  department  and  11  individuals 
attending outpatient neuropsychology appointments were invited to take part. Five outpatients 
and twenty-seven discharged patients consented to take part.  Presentations were given to two      
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brain injury charity organisations across Scotland and a total of eleven participants consented to 
take part. A total of 43 participants were included in the study (See Appendix 2.2 for full details 
of recruitment and attrition).  Ethical approval was granted from Lothian and Research Ethics 
Committee (02). 
 
Participants were considered eligible according to the following inclusion and exclusion criteria: 
Inclusion:  - Aged 18 years and over   
    - TBI occurred at least 3 months ago (to meet DSM-IV criteria for PTSD) 
    - TBI occurred in adulthood 
    - Living independently 
    - Moderate and severe TBI as defined by the Glasgow Coma Scale (GCS<13)  
       and/or documented loss of consciousness 
 
Exclusion:  - Currently receiving psychiatric treatment for PTSD 
    - Colour-blind 
 
Participants receiving treatment for any other psychiatric illness were considered on a case-by-
case basis.  
 
4.2 Estimation of required sample size 
When comparing non-TBI PTSD samples with controls, previous studies on attentional bias 
have found a variety of effect sizes, ranging from medium [dot-probe paradigm: 31]) to large 
(modified Stroop task e.g. 32, 33]. The modified Stroop task has only been used once in a 
between-group investigation of attentional bias in individuals with a TBI [34]; however, the 
sample consisted of individuals with Acute Stress Disorder rather than PTSD so data from that 
study may not generalise to PTSD. In the present study efforts were made to increase power by 
rigorous  sample  selection  and  by  incorporating  measures  of  cognition  which  would  be 
controlled for during the analysis.  Therefore, specifying power = 0.8, alpha = 0.05 and f
2 = 0.15      
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(medium effect size), a total sample of 68 participants needed to be recruited to reliably reject 
the null hypothesis when using linear regression for data analysis.   
 
Measures 
4.3.1 Cognitive Measures 
Pre-morbid IQ 
Premorbid intelligence was measured using the Wechsler Adult Reading Test (WTAR) [35]. 
The test consists of a list of 50 irregular words. The participant is instructed to read each aloud 
and is given one point for each correct pronunciation. A standard score can be derived from the 
raw  score  from  which  Performance  IQ,  Verbal  IQ  and  Full-Scale  IQ  can  be  obtained.  
Normative data indicates a mean of 100 and standard deviation of 15. 
 
Executive Function 
The Hayling (Hayling and Brixton Tests) [36] is a measure of executive function and therefore 
is capable of highlighting any frontal lobe damage. The test consists of two subtests, each 
consisting of 15 sentences with the last word omitted. In the first subtest, the participant is 
instructed  to  provide  a  word  which  completes  the  sentence.  The  time  taken  to  respond  is 
converted into a scaled score which provides a measure of response initiation speed. In the 
second  subtest,  the  participant  is  instructed  to  provide  a  word  that  is  unconnected  to  the 
sentence. Response times and errors are recorded and a scaled score is computed to provide a 
measure of suppression ability and thinking time. A total score (1 = impaired to 10 = very 
superior) is calculated by summing the scaled scores for each subtest.  
 
Attentional Bias 
Attentional bias was measured using a modified Stroop task. The Stroop task is a reaction time 
task which requires participants to colour-name congruent and incongruent words. The Stroop 
task was modified to include the following word types: trauma, negative, neutral and positive. 
Fifteen words for each word type were repeated four times in each of the following colours: red,      
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blue, yellow and green (see Appendix 2.3 for details of design). A practise task consisting of the 
numbers one, two, three, four and five were presented randomly in red, blue green and yellow.  
The task was created using computer software (Superlab version 4.0) and was presented on a 
Fujitsu Siemens Laptop Computer. Words were presented randomly, with no same word or 
colour appearing consecutively. Reaction times were recorded using a response box (CEDRUS: 
RB-730 Model)  
 
Information Processing Speed 
The Digit Symbol subtest of the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-III (WAIS-III) [37] was 
used to measure information processing speed. Participants are presented with the numbers one 
to nine. Each number has a corresponding symbol. On a separate grid, the numbers one to nine 
are presented randomly. The participant is instructed to write down the corresponding symbols 
underneath each number within two minutes. The total number of correctly matched symbols 
are totalled giving the raw score. 
 
The  Digit  Symbol  task  has  a  graphomotor  component.  Therefore,  to  control  for  physical 
problems affecting the participant’s ability to complete the task, an additional measure was 
used. The Digit Cancelling subtest of the Adult Memory and Information Processing Battery 
(AMIPB) [38] requires the participant to cross out as many ‘11’s as possible in 30 seconds. The 
total number scored out was then regressed against the Digit Symbol score to obtain a Z score.  
 
Declarative Memory 
The Logical Memory subtest of the Wechsler Memory Scale-III (WMS-III) [39] provided a 
measure of short-term memory retention and recall. Participants are read two short stories and 
asked to repeat them immediately and again after a delay of 30 minutes. The total number of 
elements recalled in each story, for both immediate and delayed conditions are summed to 
provide a raw score. Scaled scores can be obtained, but for the purpose of this study, raw scores 
were used in the analysis.      
58 
 
4.3.2 PTSD Severity and Caseness Measures 
Post-traumatic Diagnostic Scale (PDS) [40] 
The PDS is a self-report questionnaire, based on DSM-IV criteria for PTSD, consisting of 49 
items. Each item is rated for frequency of presence over the past month (0 = not at all/only one 
time, 1 = once a week or less/once in a while, 2 = two to four times a week/half the time, 3 = 
five or more times a week/almost always). Impact on functioning along with duration and onset 
of symptoms are rated. PTSD ‘caseness’ is achieved if criterion B to F are met (‘diagnosis’ by 
PDS symptom number). Criterion A, feeling helpless or terrified during the traumatic event, is 
not considered essential with a TBI population [9].   PTSD ‘caseness’ can also be achieved by 
having a symptom severity score greater than 23 (‘diagnosis’ by PDS symptom severity) [40]. 
Severity scores (ranging from 0 to 51) are obtained by summing the frequency scores. 
 
Clinician Administered PTSD Scale (CAPS) [41] 
The CAPS is a structured clinical interview that includes a measure of previous trauma history.  
It is based on DSM-IV criteria for PTSD. The clinician asks the participant if a symptom has 
been present during the past month using a standard prompt question and rates the frequency 
and intensity on a scale of 0 to 4. A symptom is considered present if the frequency is rated as 1 
and the intensity is rated as 2. A total score is obtained by summing the frequency and intensity 
scores for all 17 symptoms. The range for these scores is 0-136. The clinician also rates the 
impact symptoms have on functioning and overall distress. Caseness is met by fulfilling criteria 
B to F.  
 
4.3.3 Depression and Anxiety  
The Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS) [42] is a self-report questionnaire that 
assesses for the presence of anxiety and depression symptoms. It has been found to be reliable 
for the medical outpatient population [42]. Participants are asked to rate symptoms that have 
been  present  over  the  past  week  on  a  scale  from  0  to  3,  and  total  scores  for  anxiety  and 
depression are calculated by summing each item.  For both the anxiety and depression scales,      
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raw scores between 8-10 identify mild cases, 11-15 moderate cases and 16 or above, severe 
cases [42].   
 
4.3.4 Physiological Measure 
Heart  rate  was  measured  using  a  Garmin  Forerunner  50  Heart  Rate  Monitor 
(https://buy.garmin.com/shop/shop.do?cID=142&pID=10527) at 5 second intervals throughout 
the  interview.  Mean  heart  rate  was  calculated  for  each  assessment  measure  separately.  A 
baseline for heart rate was calculated using data collected at the beginning of the interview 
when  the  participant  was completing  the  consent forms,  when  the  traumatic event  was not 
discussed.  
 
4.3.5 TBI Measures 
TBI Severity 
TBI severity was estimated using retrospective questioning of Post-traumatic Amnesia (PTA). 
PTA is defined as the return of continuous memory [43] and can be established by questioning 
the participant about their memory of events following return to consciousness [44]. Russell and 
Nathan [43] classified severity in terms of number of days of PTA: mild = <24 hours, moderate 
= 1-24 hours; severe = 1-7 days; very severe = 8-28 days; extremely severe = >29days. PTA 
was used as a measure of severity as opposed to other measures, such as the Glasgow Coma 
Scale (GCS) score, because such information was not available for all participants. In addition, 
PTA is considered a more reliable measure of severity and one that better predicts outcome [45]. 
 
Memory for traumatic event  
The Traumatic Memory Inventory (TMI: unpublished paper obtained directly from the author) 
[46] is a structured interview that measures sensory, affective and narrative memory for the 
event (see Appendix 2.4 & 2.5). The TMI assesses memory at three different time frames: initial 
post-trauma memory, memory at the time when PTSD symptoms were most severe, and current 
memory.  In this study, current memory was assessed as retrospective recall of memory may not      
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reliably distinguish between these three time frames [47]. A participant will receive a score of 0 
if they are unable to reproduce any memory for the event. They will score one point for each 
memory that is recalled visually, as a physical sensation, as smells, as sounds, and as emotions. 
One point is also awarded if the memory is integrated, and narrative. The total score ranges 
from 0 to 7. The TMI also assesses for the presence of intrusive symptoms but given that these 
are accounted for in the PDS, this information will not be detailed in the current study.  
 
Disability following TBI 
The Glasgow Outcome Scale-Extended (GOS-E) [45] is a clinician rated scale that assesses 
functional and social disability following TBI. A total score from 0 (dead) to 8 (good recovery) 
is given based on the participants ability to engage in leisure activities, return to work, self care 
and remaining symptoms of TBI. 
 
4.4 Procedure 
Participants attended for one individual interview which lasted approximately 1.75 hours. The 
heart rate monitor was worn throughout the interview and started along with the stopwatch. 
Times at the beginning and end of each assessment measure were recorded. Consent forms were 
completed  initially  followed  by  collection  of  demographic  information.  The  assessment 
measures  were then administered  in  the  following order:  HADS,  WTAR,  Digit  Cancelling, 
Digit Symbol, Hayling, Stroop, Logical Memory (immediate), PTA assessment, PDS, CAPS, 
Logical Memory (delayed), GOS-E and TMI. A break of 15 minutes was given during the 
Stroop task. The procedure was piloted on a non-TBI individual (a colleague of the researcher) 
to ensure the timings and heart rate monitor were reliable. 
 
4.5 Data Analysis Plan 
Data  was  analysed  using  SPSS  v15.0.  Kolmogorov-Smirnov  tests  were  conducted  on  each 
variable  to  check  whether  the  data  were  normally  distributed.  Demographic  and  injury 
information  and  scores  on  cognitive  measures  were  initially  considered  descriptively.      
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Hypotheses  1  was  investigated  using  linear  regression  analysis  consisting  of  two  models. 
Preliminary analyses were conducted to ensure no violation of the assumptions of normality, 
linearity, multicollinearity and homoscedasticity. In model 1, PDS score and reaction time were 
entered.  In  model  2,  age,  time  since  trauma  (months  since  injury),  scores  on  measures  of 
depression, anxiety and cognition were added. This analysis was repeated for each word type. 
Hypothesis 2 was investigated by correlating (Spearman’s Rank) PDS scores and mean heart 
rate during administration of trauma measures with the Stroop task. For technical reasons it was 
not possible to establish mean heart rate for each word type. Hypothesis 3 was to be investigated 
using Spearman correlations if evidence to support Hypothesis 1 was found. 
 
5. Results 
5.1 Demographic and Injury Information 
Demographic information is displayed in Table 2.1.  Two participants opted out of the study 
during the interview due to literacy problems and distress caused by completing the Stroop task. 
In total, data from 41 participants were included in the analyses (26 discharged patients, 5 
outpatients and ten individuals attending Headway).  Thirty-two males (78%) and nine females 
(22%) participated.  
Insert Table 2.1 
 
Retrospective  questioning  of  PTA  estimated  that  14  participants  had  suffered  an  extremely 
severe (34%), 11 a very severe (27%), and 16 a severe TBI (39%). Causes of TBI were road 
traffic accident (49%), fall (34%) and assault (17%).  For road traffic accidents, eight were the 
driver (20%), six were a passenger (15%) and six were a pedestrian (15%).  
 
5.2 Clinical Caseness 
Fourteen participants achieved PTSD ‘caseness’ (34.1%) on the PDS by fulfilling criteria B-F 
(PDS symptom number). Of these, six sustained a severe, three a very severe, and five an 
extremely severe TBI.  Nine participants (21.9%) fulfilled ‘caseness’ on the PDS according to      
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symptom severity (PDS symptom severity). Of these, four sustained a severe, two a very severe 
and  three  an  extremely  severe  TBI.  Three  participants  fulfilled  criteria  for  caseness  on  the 
CAPS (7.3%) and all had sustained a severe TBI. All who reached PTSD ‘caseness’ on the 
CAPS were ‘cases’ on the PDS.   All participants completed the HADS; fourteen (34%) were 
abnormally anxious (29% mild, 50% moderate, 21% severe) and ten depressed (80% mild, 20% 
moderate).  
 
5.3 Assessment Measures 
Insert Table 2.2 
 
Table 2.2 displays the descriptive data for scores on cognitive measures and questionnaires.  
Scaled scores on the Hayling ranged from 1-9, with two participants scoring 1 (impaired), one 
scoring  2  (abnormal),  five  scoring  3  (poor),  one  scoring  4  (low  average),  five  scoring  5 
(moderate average), eighteen scoring 6 (average), four scoring 7 (high average), three scoring 8 
(good) and two scoring 9 (superior).  Clinician ratings on the GOS-E ranged from 4-8, with 
seven  participants  rated  as  4  (Upper  severe  disability),  six  rated  as  5  (Lower  moderate 
disability), six rated as 6 (Upper moderate disability), nine rated as 7 (Lower good recovery) 
and thirteen rated as 8 (Upper good recovery). The mean severity score on the PDS was 11.88 
(SD 9.67), range 0-31. The mean CAPS total score was 16.80 (SD 17.25), range 0-65. TMI 
scores ranged from 0-6, mean 2.76 (SD 1.76) with three individuals having no memory of the 
trauma (one had a severe, one very severe and one an extremely severe TBI).  
 
5.4 Hypothesis Testing 
5.4.1 Hypothesis One  
“People  with  a  higher  frequency  or  severity  of  PTSD  symptoms  have  an 
attentional bias to trauma related stimuli” 
 
Insert Figure 2.1      
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Mean reaction times to each word type are displayed in figure 2.1. Reaction times for each word 
type  had  non-significant  Kolmogorov-Smirnov  values  allowing  for  parametric  tests  to  be 
conducted.  Reaction time to trauma words significantly correlated with the reaction time to 
negative  (r  =  0.994,  p<0.01),  neutral  (r  =  0.997,  p<0.01),  and  positive  words  (r  =  0.992, 
p<0.01).  A  one  way  within  subjects  repeated  measures  ANOVA  revealed  no  significant 
difference in reaction time on trauma, negative, neutral or positive words [Wilks’ Lambda = 
0.851, F(3,38) = 2.22, p = 0.101, multivariate partial eta squared = 0.149]. Confidence intervals 
were adjusted due to multiple comparisons using a Bonferroni test.    
 
Insert Figure 2.2 
The distribution of PDS scores are displayed in figure 2.2. In order to consider whether ‘partial 
PTSD’ could explain the findings, correlations between reaction time for each word type and 
PTSD severity measures were undertaken. If ‘partial PTSD’ was a phenomenon, greater PTSD 
symptom severity scores would significantly correlate with reaction times to trauma words.  No 
significant correlation (one-tailed) between PDS symptom severity score and reaction time to 
trauma (r=0.127, p=0.215), negative (r=0.159, p=0.160), neutral (r=0.130, p=0.209) or positive 
words (r=0.125, p=0.219) was found.  
Scores  on  a  structured  clinical  interview  (CAPS),  in  which  the  clinician  adjudged  PTSD 
symptoms,  significantly  correlated  with  anxiety  (r=0.697,  p<0.001)  and  depression  scores 
(r=472, p=0.001). The correlation between the CAPS total score and reaction time to trauma 
words was of borderline significance (r=0.255, p=0.054). Significant correlations were found 
between  CAPS  scores  and  reaction times  to  negative  (r=0.281,  p=0.038),  neutral  (r=0.271, 
p=0.043) and positive words (r=0.268, p=0.045).  However, all of these correlations became 
non-significant when the correlation was controlled for depression scores (p>.05).  
 
Insert Table 2.3      
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Results  of  linear  regression  modelling  (see  table  2.3)  suggest  no  significant  relationships 
between PTSD symptom severity (PDS score) and reaction time for trauma (β=0.127, p=0.430), 
negative (β=0.159, p=0.320), neutral (β=0.130, p=0.418) or positive words (β=0.160, p=0.328) 
when the model was unadjusted (Model 1). Specifically, PDS scores explained 12.5% of the 
variance [F(1,39) = 0.637, p=0.430] in reaction time for trauma words, 15.9% of the variance in 
reaction time for negative words [F(1,39) = 1.014, p=0.320], 13% of the variance in reaction 
time for neutral words [F(1,39) = 0.669, p=0.418] and 12.5% of the variance in reaction time for 
positive  words  [F(1,39)  =  0.617,  p=0.437].  When  the  model  was  adjusted  for  cognitive 
variables, time since injury, age, and mood and depression scores (Model 2) the non-significant 
relationship between PDS symptom severity scores and reaction time for trauma (β=-0.251 , 
p=0.245)  negative (β=-0.230,  p=0.285)  neutral  (β=-0.252  p=0.235) and positive  words (β=-
0.248, p=0.259) remained. Therefore, no attentional bias to threat stimuli (trauma words) was 
evident. 
Insert Table 2.4 
As PTSD symptom severities were derived from a self –report questionnaire (the PDS), linear 
regression  modelling  was  repeated  using  PTSD  symptom  scores  derived  from  a  structured 
clinical interview (CAPS scores). Results are displayed in table 2.4. There was no significant 
relationships between CAPS score and reaction time for trauma (β=0.255, p=0.107), negative 
(β=0.281, p=0.076), neutral (β=0.271, p=0.086) or positive words (β=0.268, p=0.090) when the 
model was unadjusted (Model 1). Specifically, CAPS scores explained 25.5% of the variance 
[F(1,39) = 2.721, p=0.107] in reaction time for trauma words, 28.1% of the variance in reaction 
time for negative words [F(1,39) = 3.333, p=0.076], 27.1% of the variance in reaction time for 
neutral words [F(1,39) = 3.100, p=0.086] and 26.8% of the variance in reaction time for positive 
words [F(1,39) = 3.024, p=0.090]. When the model was adjusted for cognitive variables, time 
since injury, age, and mood and depression scores (Model 2) the non-significant relationship 
between CAPS scores and reaction time for trauma (β=-0.195 , p=0.387), negative (β=-0.198, 
p=0.375), neutral (β=-0.177 p=0.426) and positive words (β=-0.136, p=0.554) remained.       
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5.4.2 Hypothesis Two 
“Increased physiological arousal is associated with greater attentional bias to trauma related 
stimuli” 
 
Insert Figure 2.3 
Analysis of heart rate over the course of the interview was carried out to establish the overall 
trend.    Mean  heart  rate  significantly  decreased  between  baseline  and  TMI  administration 
(t=8.66,  df=40,  p=0.000)  for  the  entire  sample  (see  figure  2.3).  The  relationship  between 
baseline heart rate and PTSD symptom severity scores was examined to establish whether those 
reporting greater PTSD symptom severities had higher baseline heart rates.  Baseline heart rate 
was not associated with PDS symptom severity scores (r=-0.059, p=0.714) or CAPS total score 
(r=0.070, p=0.664).  
It was not possible to determine mean heart rate for each word type because the 720 stimulus 
words  in  the  Stroop  task  were  presented  randomly.  To  investigate  whether  those  reporting 
greater PTSD symptom severities had higher mean heart rates on measures in which the trauma 
was recalled, PTSD symptom severities (PDS) were correlated with the following measures: (1) 
mean heart rate during the completion of the PDS (2) mean heart rate during administration of 
the CAPS (criterion A: when details of the traumatic event were discussed in detail), (3) mean 
heart rate during the assessment of PTA and (4) mean heart rate during completion of the Stroop 
task. Results indicated that there was no significant correlation between PDS scores and (1) 
mean heart rate during completion of the PDS (rho = -0.92, p=0.566), (2) mean heart rate during 
administration of CAPS A (rho = -0.117, p=0.467), (3) mean heart during assessment of PTA 
(rho = -0.155, p=0.334) and (4) mean heart rate during completion of the Stroop task (rho = -
0.102, p=0.524).   
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5.4.3 Hypothesis Three 
“Hypothesis One is associated with increased physiological arousal (heart rate)”. 
No  attentional  bias  to  threat  stimuli  was  detected.  Given  that  Hypothesis  Three  relies  on 
Hypothesis One being accepted, this final hypothesis was not investigated. In addition, analysis 
conducted in section 5.4.1 indicated that there were no significant differences in reaction time 
between word types. Furthermore, no significant relationship was found between mean heart 
rate on measures where the trauma is discussed and recalled and PTSD symptom severity. 
 
5.5 Exploratory Analysis 
5.5.1 Attentional bias and participants ‘diagnosed’ with PTSD 
For the fourteen participants ‘diagnosed’ with PTSD using the PDS, no significant correlation 
(one-tailed) was found between the PTSD symptom severities (PDS score) and reaction time for 
trauma (r = 0.154, p=0.300), negative (r = 0.167, p=0.284), neutral (r = 0.143, p=0.313) or 
positive words (r = .167, p=0.284).  Similarly, no significant correlation was found between 
CAPS score and reaction time for trauma (r = 0.161, p=0.291), negative (r = 0.146, p=0.310), 
neutral (r = 0.177, p=0.273) or positive words (r = 0.200, p=0.246).  
 
To investigate whether individuals ‘diagnosed’ with PTSD according to PDS symptom number 
took longer to respond to trauma words than other words, a within group one way repeated 
measures ANOVA was conducted. This revealed a significant main effect for word type [Wilks’ 
Lambda  =  0.462,  F(3,11)  =  4.267,  p=0.032,  multivariate  partial  eta  squared  =  0.538]. 
Participants  took  longer  to  colour-name  negative  words  compared  to  trauma  words  only 
(p=0.022).  There  were  no  other  significant  differences  between  word  types  for  this  group. 
Confidence intervals were adjusted due to multiple comparisons using a Bonferroni test.    
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6. Discussion 
The aim of this study was to investigate if an attentional bias to trauma stimuli was related to 
greater PTSD symptom reporting, and consequently, if ‘partial PTSD’ could explain why PTSD 
is  misdiagnosed  in  people  with  TBI.    PTSD  symptom  severity  scores  did  not  significantly 
correlate with reaction time to trauma words and increased PTSD symptom severities was not 
associated with reaction time for any word type. Therefore, no attentional bias to threat stimuli 
(i.e.  trauma  words)  or  any  other  word  type  was  apparent.  Therefore,  self-report  of  PTSD 
symptoms was not explained by the presence of ‘partial’ PTSD, and consequently, attentional 
bias to threat stimuli does not explain why participants met PTSD diagnostic criteria on a self-
report measure of PTSD but not according to a structured clinical interview. In summary, no 
attentional  bias  to  trauma  stimuli  was  detected  in  individuals  with  a  TBI  reporting  PTSD 
symptoms. 
 
Previous studies have suggested that individuals who have sustained a TBI with resultant PTA 
may focus their attention on information of particular salience to them, due to a desire to fill the 
memory gap [48]. Indeed, they appear to be curious about the gap in memory caused by PTA 
[20] and report symptoms of PTSD but without the associated fear response. The modified 
Stroop task operates at an implicit and explicit level [32] and works on the premise that for 
individuals  with  PTSD,  the  threatening/trauma  information  presented  will  evoke  a  fear 
response, by triggering trauma-related cognitive ‘fear’ structures [19].  Consequently, the fear 
response disrupts ongoing cognitive tasks and attention is preferentially allocated to processing 
the fear-relevant information. As such, individuals displaying a fear response take longer to 
colour-name trauma words compared to other non-threatening words. In the current study, it 
may  be  that  individuals  did  not  display  an  attentional  bias  to  trauma  words  because  PTA 
prevented them from storing significant amounts of information from the traumatic event for 
them to be able to have a fear response. Perhaps a fear response is integral to an attentional bias 
and curiosity itself is not sufficient to produce an attentional bias.  
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In this current study, severe-extremely severe TBI may offer some, but not complete protection 
against the development of PTSD, and this finding is consistent with previous conclusions [10] 
Indeed, one study [49] found that only 6% of participants with ‘no memory’ of the head injury 
developed PTSD compared to 23% of participants with a ‘good memory’.  
 
Due to the expected small number of people meeting PTSD ‘caseness’ on the structured clinical 
interview and the apparent absence of ‘partial PTSD’, it was not possible, nor within the scope 
of this study to definitively state what mechanism caused these individuals to develop PTSD.  It 
is of interest however, that all three participants meeting PTSD ‘caseness’ on the structured 
clinical interview, had some memory for the traumatic event.  Perhaps these individuals added 
to, and embellished their ‘little memory’ and created ‘pseudomemories’ based on what they 
believed happened to them in order to form complete memories [16]. Indeed rumination over 
the traumatic event, in which the event is elaborated to include a catastrophic outcome, has been 
associated  with  poorer  outcome  [50].  Another  possible  explanation  for  the  development  of 
PTSD following (severe-extremely severe) TBI considers that the recovery period following a 
TBI  can  be  perceived  as  a  traumatic  event,  for  example,  experiencing  painful  medical 
procedures whilst emerging from PTA [10]. Indeed, persistent medical problems have been 
implicated as a predictor of PTSD one year post-injury [50]. In the current study however, the 
Stroop task did not contain words related to the post-injury recovery period, leaving it difficult 
to conclude whether or not PTSD can develop in the TBI population as a result of post-injury 
traumatic experiences during the recovery period. 
 
The main finding of no significant relationship between PTSD symptom severity scores and 
reaction time to trauma stimuli on a Stroop task are inconsistent with a recent study [34] which 
investigated whether or not implicit memory was the mechanism for the development of acute 
stress disorder (ASD) in patients who suffered a closed head injury. Acute stress disorder (ASD) 
is an anxiety disorder characterized by a cluster of dissociative and anxiety symptoms that occur 
within a month of a traumatic stressor. ASD, like PTSD, begins with exposure to an extremely      
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traumatic, horrifying, or terrifying event. Unlike PTSD, however, ASD emerges sooner and 
abates  more  quickly.  However,  if  left  untreated,  it  can  progress  to  PTSD  [1].  This  study 
compared  performance  on  an  emotional  Stroop  task  between  road  traffic  accident  (RTA) 
victims with brain injury, without brain injury and controls. Individuals were recruited from a 
hospital within one month post-trauma. The results suggested that both RTA victims with and 
without brain injury demonstrated an attentional bias to RTA-related words within one month of 
experiencing the trauma. The results between this published study, and the current study may be 
inconsistent because of the difference in brain injury severity, as measured by PTA, and time 
since trauma.   
 
An interesting finding from explorative analysis is that individuals with PTSD, ‘diagnosed’ 
according  to  self-report  symptom  number,  did  display  an  attentional  bias  towards  negative 
words. Those without ‘PTSD’ did not demonstrate this bias. This phenomenon seems to be 
consistent  with  the  ‘emotionality  hypothesis’  which  states  that  the  magnitude  of  a  words 
personal significance  determines  its  capacity  to  delay  colour-naming  in  a  Stroop  task  [51]. 
Therefore, the negative words may have been emotionally significant to the individuals with 
‘PTSD’. The negative words included in the Stroop task may have triggered thoughts about how 
participants view themselves.  The literature suggests [52] that individuals who have sustained a 
TBI mourn over parts of their lives which have been altered. This loss of sense of self may take 
different forms, including loss of self-comparison, loss of self-knowledge, and loss of self in the 
views of others [53].  This, along with the reported co-morbidity of depression and PTSD [54], 
may explain why participants with ‘PTSD’ had an attentional bias for negative words.  
 
In  the  current  study,  only  those  participants  with ‘mild’  depression  met  ‘PTSD’  diagnostic 
criteria.  That  is,  of  the  fourteen  individuals  ‘diagnosed’  with  PTSD  according  to  symptom 
number, five had mild depression. Of the three ‘diagnosed’ with PTSD according to a structured 
clinical interview, two had mild depression.  In order to clarify if the attentional bias to negative 
words was a PTSD phenomenon, or a feature of depression, scores on the PTSD structured      
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clinical interview (CAPS) were correlated with reaction time for each word type. The results 
demonstrated that the significant correlations found disappeared when depression scores were 
controlled  for.  This  finding,  along  with  the  significant  associations  between  scores  on  the 
structured  clinical  interview  and  measures  of  depression  and  anxiety,  suggest  that  slower 
reaction times to negative words are apparent when high levels of mental health problems, like 
depression are present. This finding is consistent with a substantial body of evidence [e.g. 55] 
reporting that individuals with depression demonstrate a significant Stroop interference effect 
for negative words.  
 
6.2 Physiological Response 
Consistent with a previous study [22], the results of this current study demonstrated a general 
decline in heart rate over time. Given that heart rate is known to increase in response to anxiety 
[28], it is possible that participants were anxious about taking part in the study and consequently 
demonstrated increased heart rate at the beginning of the interview. Thus, the decline in heart 
rate observed over the course of the interview may indicate a reduction in anxiety.  
 
Previous  studies  investigating  physiological  responses  in  non-TBI  PTSD  populations  have 
demonstrated that heart rate increases during the recall of traumatic events [e.g. 56].  As such, in 
this current study, heart rate was expected to increase when individuals self-reporting greater 
PTSD symptom severities were required to think about and recall details of their traumatic 
event, if ‘partial PTSD’ was present. No increase in heart rate was demonstrated in participants 
meeting PTSD diagnostic criteria on the self-report questionnaire (PDS) when they completed 
the attentional bias task, the self-report questionnaire for PTSD (i.e. the PDS), or when they 
were interviewed in  detail  about the  traumatic  event  which caused their  head  injury.    It  is 
suggested therefore that the findings in this current study are consistent with previous studies 
that posit that individuals with a TBI orientate their attention to trauma-related information but 
without the associated fear and subsequent physiological response, due to a desire to integrate 
their unknown experience in order to evaluate future threat [22].       
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6.3 Limitations  
The study has a number of limitations that need to be acknowledged. Firstly, the anticipated 
sample size, as recommended by the power calculation was not achieved. Secondly, although 
demographically the sample was fairly representative of the population of people with TBI in 
the community, participants did have severe to extremely severe head injuries [57]. However, 
this bias is useful in this study given the controversy surrounding whether or not PTSD can 
occur after severe TBI.  Thirdly, the measure of attentional bias was created by the author 
following a brief pilot study completed by trainee clinical psychologists. It may have been 
helpful to conduct this pilot study on a clinical sample but there was insufficient time to do this. 
Also, the Stroop task was designed in such a way that the mean heart rate for each word type 
could not be established. This would have been helpful in investigating the impact of trauma 
words  on  heart  rate.  Fourthly,  participants  in  the  study  were  not  instructed  to  rate  the 
emotionality of each word presented during the modified Stroop task. This would have been 
helpful in furthering our understanding of this notion that individuals are curious about what 
happened to them during the traumatic event. And finally, future studies may benefit from 
adding stimulus words related to the process of recovery following TBI, e.g. surgery and coma, 
in order investigate whether or not the recovery period following TBI in which the individual is 
emerging from PTA is itself considered as a traumatic experience and as such, reflects fear or 
horror as described in Criterion A of DSM-IV diagnostic criteria [1].  
 
6.4 Conclusions & Directions for Future Research 
The aim of this study was to investigate whether an attentional bias to trauma-related stimuli 
was associated with greater PTSD symptom reporting. An attentional bias to trauma-related 
stimuli as measured using a Stroop task, was not detected. ‘Partial PTSD’ therefore did not 
explain why some individuals in this sample self-reported greater PTSD symptoms. That is, 
individuals self-reporting PTSD symptoms were not definitively reporting PTSD symptoms. It 
is more likely that the ‘PTSD’ symptoms they self-reported were attributable to head injury 
symptoms.  Post-injury  recovery  events,  such  as  medical  procedures,  and  adjustment  to      
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disability with associated losses, may be experienced as traumatic and be implicated in the 
development of PTSD. This hypothesis warrants further investigation as it was not within the 
scope of this current study to assess the issue of adjustment to disability (as assessed by the 
GOS-E) following head injury and if there is a relationship with greater self-report of PTSD 
symptoms.   
 
As demonstrated in previous studies, PTSD can be misidentified depending on the diagnostic 
tool used. In line with previous studies [20, 22], the number of individuals with a TBI meeting 
PTSD ‘caseness’ is higher when using self-report measures of PTSD than using a structured 
clinical interview.  The findings support the use of clinician administered assessment tools in 
order to reliably establish whether or not PTSD is present in individuals with severe-extremely 
TBI. It is unclear whether or not measures of attentional bias are sensitive to the presence of 
PTSD, when PTSD is measured using a structured clinical interview. This warrants further 
research.  
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Figure 2.1: Mean reaction time for each word type (n41) 
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Figure 2.2: Distribution of PDS scores 
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Figure 2.3: Mean Heart Rate (bpm) for each assessment measure (n41) 
 81 
 
Table 2.1: Demographic Information (n41) 
  Mean (SD)  Range 
Age (years)  42.56 (12.72)  18-76 
 
Time since head injury (months)  *69 
 
21-396 months 
PTA  20.71 days (20.61days)  1-87 days 
 
Gender (male/female) 
 
32/9  - 
 
  YES  NO 
 
Previous Trauma  7 (17%)  34 (83%) 
 
Previous TBI  11 (27%)  30 (73%) 
 
Currently Employed  12 (30%)  29 (70%) 
 
 
N  % of Sample 
 
16 
 
39 
11 
 
27 
14  34 
TBI Severity 
 
Severe  (PTA 1-7days) 
 
Very Severe (PTA 8-28 days) 
 
Extremely  severe  (PTA 
>29days)     
 
 
 
20 
 
49 
8  20 
 
6  15 
 
6  15 
 
14  34 
 
 
TBI cause 
 
RTA (total) 
 
RTA (driver) 
 
RTA (passenger) 
 
RTA (pedestrian) 
 
Fall 
 
Assault 
7  17 
 
*Median 
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Table 2.2: Cognitive Measure and Questionnaire Results 
  Mean (SD)  Range 
 
Estimated Verbal IQ  102.63 (9.99)  76-115 
 
Estimated Performance IQ  103.83 (9.14)  80-115 
 
Estimated Full Scale IQ   102.49 (9.93)  75-115 
 
Digit Symbol (raw score)  64.93 (17.93)  22-98 
 
Digit Cancelling (raw score)  63.63 (18.11)  18-90 
 
Logical Memory (Immediate)  21.80 (9.23)  6-46 
 
Logical Memory (Delayed)  16.98 (10.01)  0-40 
 
Hayling (total scaled score)  5.51 (1.89)  1-9 
 
Anxiety (HADS)  6.61 (4.92)  0-18 
 
Depression (HADS)  4.83 (3.55)  0-13 
 
CAPS symptom number  16.80 (17.25)  0-65 
 
PDS symptom severity score  11.88 (9.67)  0-31 
 
Traumatic Memory Inventory  2.76 (1.76)  0-6 
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Table 2.3: Results of linear regression (PDS and reaction time) for total sample 
 
Word type  Regression Variables for 
Predictor (PDS) 
Model 1 
PDS 
Model 2 
(PDS, Age, Months 
since injury, anxiety, 
depression, Verbal 
IQ, Hayling, Logical 
Memory, Digit 
symbol. 
β  0.127  -0.251 
95% Confidence intervals  -5.20 - 11.98  -18.28-4.85 
Trauma 
p value  0.430  0.245 
  Variance  Inflation  Factor 
(VIF)* 
1.000  2.643 
       
β  0.159  -0.230 
95% Confidence intervals  -4.26 – 12.71  -17.54-5.33 
Negative 
p value  0.320  0.285 
  Variance  Inflation  Factor 
(VIF)* 
1.000  2.643 
       
β  0.165  -0.252 
95% Confidence intervals  -5.26 – 12.41  -18.63-4.74 
Neutral 
p value  0.418  0.235 
  Variance  Inflation  Factor 
(VIF)* 
1.000  2.643 
       
β  0.125  -0.248 
95% Confidence intervals  -5.51 – 12.51  -19.32-5.39 
Positive 
p value  0.437  0.259 
  Variance  Inflation  Factor 
(VIF)* 
1.000  2.643 
*Collinearity statistic 
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Table 2.4: Results of linear regression (CAPS score and reaction time) for total sample. 
Word type  Regression Variables  Model 1 
CAPS 
Model 2 
(CAPS, Age, Months 
since injury, anxiety, 
depression, Verbal 
IQ, Hayling, Logical 
Memory, Digit 
symbol. 
 
β  0.255  -0.195 
95% Confidence intervals  -0.866 – 8.521  -9.714 – 3.869 
Trauma 
p value  0.107  0.387 
  Variance  Inflation  Factor 
(VIF)* 
1.000  2.845 
       
β  0.281  -0.198 
95% Confidence intervals  -0.450 – 8.794  -9.639 – 3.740 
Negative 
p value  0.076  0.375 
  Variance  Inflation  Factor 
(VIF)* 
1.000  2.845 
       
β  0.271  -0.177 
95% Confidence intervals  -0.622 – 8.992  -9.607 – 4.158 
Neutral 
p value  0.086  0.426 
  Variance  Inflation  Factor 
(VIF)* 
1.000  2.845 
       
β  0.268  -0.136 
95% Confidence intervals  -0.688 – 9.118  -9.433 – 5.151 
Positive 
p value  0.090  0.554 
  Variance  Inflation  Factor 
(VIF)* 
1.000  2.845 
*Collinearity statistic      
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Abstract 
 
The  learning  experience  described  provides  the  context  to  this  reflective  account.  It 
demonstrates how reflection-in-action can lead to further reflection on broader issues and help 
identify training needs. The experience itself emerged from a clinical interview in which I found 
myself  using  older  adult  stereotypes  to  facilitate  a  therapeutic  relationship  with  a  client 
attending a Memory Clinic. Using the Framework for Reflexive Practice (Rolfe et al, 2001), I 
was able to; explore the thoughts and feelings associated with this learning experience; reflect 
on how my clinical and professional competencies have developed over the course of training; 
reflect  on  my  attitudes  towards  older  adults;  and  acknowledge  the  role  of  supervision  in 
developing  a  new  understanding  of  the  learning  experience.  The  process  of  reflection  has 
allowed me to identify how I have developed to date and what actions I must take to continue 
this development in my next placement and as a qualified clinical psychologist.      
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Abstract 
 
The  learning  experience  described  provides  the  context  for  this  reflective  account.  It 
demonstrates how personal beliefs and values can impact on the development of what has been 
identified  as  a  service  need.    The  experience  itself  emerged  from  my  involvement  in  the 
development of a Sex Offenders Treatment Programme (SOTP) in which I found myself feeling 
antipathy towards sex offenders, and consequently, not wanting to be involved in the SOTP. 
Using Boud et al’s (1985) Model of Reflection, I was able to explore where my feelings were 
stemming from, reflect on what factors were influencing my beliefs and values, and appreciate 
the role of previous experiences in my understanding of the learning experience. The reflective 
process  allowed  me  to  understand  how  my  clinical  and  professional  competencies  have 
developed  over  time  and  acknowledge  the  role  of  supervision  in  developing  a  new 
understanding of the learning experience. The process of reflection has allowed me to identify 
how I have developed to date and what actions I must take to continue this development as a 
qualified clinical psychologist. 
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Appendix 1.1: Notes for contributors for submission to the Journal of Traumatic Stress 
 
Authors  must  submit  manuscripts  in  a  form  appropriate  to  blind  review  (i.e.,  identifying 
information should appear only on the title page). Manuscripts should use nonsexist language. 
Three  paper formats  are  accepted.  Regular  articles (no  longer than  6,000  words,  including 
references, figures, and tables) are theoretical articles, full research studies, and occasionally 
reviews. Purely descriptive articles are rarely accepted. Brief reports (2,500 words, including 
references and tables) are for case studies that cover a new area, preliminary data on a new 
problem or population, condensed findings from a study that does not merit a full article, or 
methodologically  oriented  papers  that  replicate  findings  in  new  populations  or  report 
preliminary data on new instruments. Commentaries (1,000 words or less) cover responses to 
previously published articles or, occasionally, essays on a professional or scientific topic of 
general interest. Response commentaries, submitted no later than 8 weeks after the original 
article is published (12 weeks if outside the U.S.), must be content−directed and use tactful 
language. The original author is given the opportunity to respond to accepted commentaries. 
 
Submission is a representation that the manuscript has not been published previously and is not 
currently  under  consideration  for  publication  elsewhere.  A  statement  transferring  copyright 
from the authors (or their employers, if they hold the copyright) to the International Society for 
Traumatic Stress Studies will be required before the manuscript can be accepted for publication. 
The Editor will supply the necessary forms for this transfer. Such a written transfer of copyright, 
which previously was assumed to be implicit in the act of submitting a manuscript, is necessary 
under the U.S.Copyright Law in order for the publisher to carry through the dissemination of 
research results and reviews as widely and effectively as possible. 
 
Type double−spaced on one side of 8½ × 11 inch or A4 white paper using generous margins on 
all sides and a font no smaller than 10−point, and submit the original and four copies (including 
copies of all illustrations and tables).      
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A title page is to be provided and should include the title of the article, author's name (no 
degrees),  author's  affiliation,  acknowledgments,  and suggested  running  head. The  affiliation 
should comprise the department, institution (usually university or company), city, and state (or 
nation) and should be typed as a footnote to the author's name. The suggested running head 
should be less than 80 characters (including spaces) and should comprise the article title or an 
abbreviated version thereof. 
Also include the word count, the complete mailing address, telephone and fax numbers, and 
e−mail address for the corresponding author during the review process, and, if different, a name 
and address to appear in the article footnotes for correspondence after publication. 
 
An abstract is to be provided, no longer than 120 words. A list of 4-5 key words is to be 
provided  directly  below  the  abstract.  Key  words  should  express  the  precise  content  of  the 
manuscript, as they are used for indexing purposes. 
 
Illustrations  (photographs,  drawings,  diagrams,  and  charts)  are  to  be  numbered  in  one 
consecutive  series  of  Arabic  numerals.  The  captions  for  illustrations  should  be  typed  on  a 
separate  sheet of  paper.  Photographs  should  be  large,  glossy  prints, showing  high  contrast. 
Drawings  should  be  prepared  with  India  ink.  Either  the  original  drawings  or  good  quality 
photographic prints are acceptable. Identify figures on the back with author's name and number 
of the illustration. Electronic artwork submitted on disk should be in the TIFF or EPS format 
(1200 dpi for line and 300 dpi for half−tones and grayscale art). Color art should be in the 
CYMK color space. Artwork should be on a separate disk from the text, and hard copy must 
accompany the disk. 
 
Tables should be numbered (with Arabic numerals) and referred to by number in the text. Each 
table should be typed on a separate sheet of paper. Center the title above the table, and type 
explanatory footnotes below the table. 
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List references alphabetically at the end of the paper and refer to them in the text by name and 
year in parentheses. In the text, all authors' names must be given for the first citation (unless six 
or more authors), while the first author's name, followed by et al., can be used in subsequent 
citations. References should include (in this order): last names and initials of all authors, year 
published, title of article, name of publication, volume number, and inclusive pages. The style 
and  punctuation  of  the  references  should  conform  to  strict  APA  style;  illustrated  by  the 
following examples (however, use indentation below): 
 
Journal Article 
Friedrich, W. N., Urquiza, A. J., & Beilke, R. L. (1986). Behavior problems in sexually abused 
young children. Journal of Pediatric Psychology, 11, 47−−57. 
 
Book 
Kelly,  J.  A.  (1983).  Treating  child−abusive  families:  Intervention  based  on  skills−training 
principles. New York: Plenum Press. 
 
Contribution to a Book 
Feindler,  E.  L.,  &  Fremouw,  W. J. (1983). Stress inoculation training for adolescent anger 
problems. In D. Meichenbaum & M. E. Jaremko (Eds.), Stress reduction and prevention (pp. 
451−−485). New York: Plenum Press. 
 
Footnotes  should  be  avoided.  When  their  use  is  absolutely  necessary,  footnotes  should  be 
numbered consecutively using Arabic numerals and should be typed at the bottom of the page to 
which they refer. Place a line above the footnote, so that it is set off from the text. Use the 
appropriate superscript numeral for citation in the text. 
 
 
      
93 
 
Appendix 1.2: DSM-IV Diagnostic Criteria for PTSD 
A.  The person has been exposed to a traumatic event in which both of the following were 
present: 
1.  the person experienced, witnessed, or was confronted with an event or events 
that involved actual or threatened death or serious injury, or a threat to the 
physical integrity of self or others; 
2.  the person’s response involved intense fear, helplessness, or horror. Note: In 
children, this may be expressed instead by disorganized or agitated behaviour. 
 
B.  The traumatic event is persistently re-experienced in one (or more) of the following 
ways: 
1.  recurrent  and  intrusive  distressing  recollections  of  the  event,  including 
images,  thoughts,  or  perceptions.  Note:  In  young  children, repetitive  play 
may occur in which themes or aspects of the trauma are expressed. 
2.  recurrent distressing dreams of the event. Note: In young children, there may 
be frightening dreams without recognizable content. 
3.  acting or feeling as if the traumatic event were recurring (includes a sense of 
reliving the experience, illusions hallucinations, and dissociative flashback 
episodes,  including  those  that  occur  on  awakening  or  when  intoxicated). 
Note: In young children, trauma-specific re-enactment may occur.  
4.  intense psychological distress at exposure to internal or external cues that 
symbolize  or  resemble  an  aspect  of  the  traumatic  event;  physiological 
reactivity on exposure to internal or external cues that symbolize or resemble 
an aspect of the traumatic event. 
 
C.  Persistent  avoidance  of  stimuli  associated  with  the  trauma  and  numbing  of  general 
responsiveness  (not  present  before  trauma),  as  indicated  by  three  (or  more)  of  the 
following:      
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1.  efforts  to  avoid  thought,  feelings,  or  conversations  associated  with  the 
trauma; 
2.  efforts to avoid activities, places, or people that arouse recollections of the 
trauma; 
3.  inability to recall an important aspect of the trauma; 
4.  markedly diminished interest or participation in significant activities; 
5.  feelings of detachment or estrangement from others; 
6.  restricted range of affect (e.g. unable to have loving feelings); 
7.  sense  of  a  foreshortened  future  (e.g.  does  not  expect  to  have  a  career, 
marriage, children, or a normal life span); 
D.  Persistent symptoms of increased arousal (not present before trauma) as indicated by 
two (or more) of the following: 
1.  difficulty falling or staying asleep; 
2.  irritability or outbursts of anger; 
3.  difficulty concentrating; 
4.  hypervigilence; 
5.  exaggerated startle response; 
 
E.  Duration of the disturbance (symptoms in Criteria B, C and D) is more than 1 month. 
F.  The  disturbance  causes  clinically  significant  distress  or  impairment  in  social, 
occupational, or other important areas of functioning.  
Specify if: 
·  Acute: if duration of symptoms is less than 3 months. 
·  Chronic: if duration of symptoms is 3 months or more. 
Specify if: 
·  With Delayed Onset: if onset of symptoms is at least 6 months after the stressor. 
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Appendix 1.3: Quality Criteria Rating Form 
Class of 
Validity 
Threat  Description  Threat or 
not enough 
information 
(0) 
No 
threat 
(1) 
Low statistical 
power 
Have they reported a power 
calculation prior to starting and got 
appropriate numbers? 
   
Violation of 
assumptions of 
statistics 
Are statistics assuming normal 
distribution without checking this 
and using parametric statistics? 
   
Inflated error rate  Are they more likely to have made 
a type one error (rejecting null 
when it is true) – is alpha higher 
than (P)0.05? 
   
Unreliability of 
dependent or 
independent 
variable measures 
Have they used a PTSD assessment 
tool with established reliability or 
have they provided reliability data? 
   
Unreliability of 
rater assessment 
Were the measures administered 
consistently: was the person who 
administered the measures 
reportedly competent to do so and 
was inter-rater reliability checked 
(if applicable)? 
   
Have the PTSD group been 
matched to controls (age, gender, 
IQ, education level)?  
 
   
Statistical 
conclusion 
validity 
Heterogeneity of 
participants 
To what extent is the sample 
representative of PTSD arising 
from a single event trauma? E.g. is 
it a veterans study? 
   
 
History 
 
Have they considered the events 
occurring before the testing – 
previous psychiatric history, head 
injury, effects of medication, , co-
morbid disorder? (need all 4 for a 
point, record which ones tests have 
considered) 
   
Instrumentation  Is there a clear explanation as to 
how attentional bias has been 
measured? 
   
Internal 
validity 
Selection  Is there any bias in how the control 
group were selected? i.e. all 
students/medical staff 
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The main potential 
confounders are 
identified and 
taken into account 
in the design and 
analysis 
Have they taken into account 
current co-morbidity e.g. substance 
misuse 
   
Inadequate pre 
operationalisation 
explication 
Have they clearly described what 
they mean by information 
processing/attentional bias and are 
the tests they used measures of it? 
   
Experimenter 
expectancies 
Are testers aware of the research 
hypothesis and could the construct 
be potentially manipulated? i.e. 
was the person who administered 
the attentional bias task blind to 
whom was in the PTSD and 
control groups? 
   
Construct 
validity 
Interaction of 
treatments 
Are the participants being exposed 
to multiple tests, which could 
potentially lead to inaccurate 
results? i.e. through fatigue. Have 
they put in a break, swapping order 
of tests, should not be testing for 
longer than approx. 40 minutes 
without break. Are there any 
learning and test repetition errors? 
   
 
Face 
Validity 
The clinical 
validity  
of the assessment 
tool 
Is the PTSD assessment tool able 
to detect and not detect people with 
and without PTSD? Or have they 
reported the specificity and 
sensitivity of the tool? 
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Interaction of 
selection and 
treatment 
Limited generalisability of effect to 
other samples – i.e. have they selected 
people who have opted in for PTSD 
treatment? 
    External 
validity 
Interaction of 
history and 
treatment 
Limited generalisability of effect to 
other time frames –  e.g. if a veteran 
study, was the control group exposed to 
same length of exposure as PTSD 
group? E.g. how long ago did trauma 
take place? 
   
Final Score        
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Appendix 1.4: Studies which met exclusion criteria 
Exclusion Criteria  Article 
Childhood trauma 
 
 
Attentional Bias not 
assessed 
Vythilingam, Blair, McCaffrey, Scaramozza, Jones, 
Nakic, et al., (2007) 
 
Ehring, Ehlers, & Glucksman. (2008) 
Elwood, Williams, Olatunji, & Lohr. (2007) 
Cottencin, Vaiva, Huron, Devos, Ducrocq, Jouvent et al. 
(2006) 
Bryant, Felmingham, Kemp, Barton, Peduto, Rennie, et 
al. (2005)  
Vasterling, Duke, Tomlin, Lowery, & Kaplan E. (2004) 
Miller, & Litz. (2004) 
Engelhard, Macklin, McNally, van den Hout, & Arntz. 
(2001) 
Field, Classen, Butler, Koopman, Zarcone, & Spiegel. 
(2001) 
Jenkins, Langlais, Delis, Cohen. (2000) 
Chemtob, Roitblat, Hamada, Muraoka, Carlson, Bauer. 
(1999) 
Golier, Yehuda, Cornblatt, Harvey, Gerber, & 
Levengood. (1997) 
Trandel, & McNally. (1987) 
Holmes, Brewin, & Hennessy. (2004) 
Buckley, Galovski, Blanchard, & Hickling. (2003) 
Amir, Coles, & Foa (2002) 
Davis, Adams, Uddo, Vasterling, et al. (1996) 
 
Neuropsychology of PTSD  Stewart, & White. (2008) 
Leskin, & White. (2007) 
Koso, & Hansen. (2006) 
Neylan, Lenoci, Rothlind, Metzler, Schuff, Du, et al. 
(2004) 
Crowell, Kieffer, Siders, & Vanderploeg. (2002) 
Stein, Kennedy, & Twamley. (2002) 
Vasterling, Duke, Brailey, Constans, Allain, & Sutker. 
(2002) 
Sachinvala, von Scotti, McGuire, Fairbanks, Bakst, & 
Brown. (2000) 
Kimble, Kaloupek, Kaufman, & Deldin. (2000) 
Vasterling, Brailey, Constans, & Sutker. (1998) 
Gilbertson, Gurvits, Lasko, & Pitman. (1997) 
McFarlane,Weber, & Clark. (1994) 
Twamley, Hami, & Stein. (2004) 
David, Farrin, Hull, Unwin, Wessely, & Wykes. (2002) 
Brandes, Ben-Schachar, Gilboa, Bonne, Freedman, & 
Shalev. (2002) 
Sutker, Vasterling, Brailey, Allain. (1995) 
Uddo, Vasterling, Brailey, & Sutker. (1993)      
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Intervention study  Devineni, Blanchard, Hickling, & Buckley. (2004) 
 
Dissertations  Harris, (2006) 
Young, (2003) 
Sawhney, (2003) 
Kaufman, (2002) 
Mathiesen, (2000) 
Buckley, (2000) 
Johnson, (1999) 
Lambourn-Kavcic, (1999) 
Davis, (1996) 
Russell, (1993) 
Kapsi, (1991) 
 
Include other 
psychiatric/physical 
problems 
 
Litz, Weathers, Monaco, Herman, Wulfsohn, Marx, et 
al., (1996) 
 
Review articles  Asmundson, Stapleton, & Taylor. (2004) 
McFarlane, Yehuda, & Clark. (2002) 
Buckley, Blanchard, & Neill. (2000) 
vanOyen, (1997) 
Mathews, & MacLeod. (2005) 
Horner, & Hamner. (2002) 
Golier, & Yehuda. (2002) 
Seaman, (2007) 
Brewin, & Holmes, (2003) 
McNally, (1998) 
Paunovic, (1998) 
Litz, Keane, & Terence, (1989) 
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Appendix 1.5: Reference list for excluded papers 
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Appendix 2.1 Notes for contributors for submission to the British Journal of Psychiatry 
 
Structure of manuscripts 
Papers 
A structured abstract not normally exceeding 150 words should be given at the beginning of the 
article,  incorporating  the  following  headings:  Background;  Aims;  Method;  Results; 
Conclusions; Declaration of interest. The abstract is a crucial part of the paper and authors are 
urged to devote some care to ensuring that all the important findings are within the word limit. 
 
Introductions should normally be no more than one paragraph; longer ones may be allowed for 
new and unusual subjects. This should be followed by Method, Results and Discussion sections. 
The  Discussion  should  always  include  limitations  of  the  paper  to  ensure  balance.  Use  of 
subheadings is encouraged, particularly in Discussion sections. A separate Conclusions section 
is not required. 
 
The article should normally be between 3000 and 5000 words in length (excluding references, 
tables and figure legends) and normally would not include more than 25 essential references 
beyond  those  describing  statistical  procedues,  psychometric  instruments  and  diagnostic 
guidelines used in the study. All large tables (exceeding half a Journal page) will be published 
only in the online version of the Journal (see Online data supplements, below). Authors are 
encouraged to present key data within smaller tables for print publication. This applies also to 
review articles and short reports. 
 
References 
Authors are responsible for checking all references for accuracy and relevance in advance of 
submission. Reference lists not in the correct style will be returned to the author for correction. 
From January 2008, all references should be numbered in the order in which they appear in the 
text and listed at the end of the article using the Vancouver style (see below), in which the 
names and initials of all authors are given after the appropriate reference number. If there are 
more than six authors, the first six should be named, followed by 'et al'. 
 
The authors' names are followed by the full title of the article; the journal title abbreviated (in 
italics) according to the style of Index Medicus; the year of publication; the volume number (in 
bold type); and the first and last page numbers. References to book or book chapters should give 
the titles of the book (and the chapter if selected), names of any authors, name of publisher, 
names of any editors, and year.  
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Examples are shown below. 
1 Kapusta ND, Etzersdorfer E, Krall C, Sonneck G. Firearm legislation reform in the European 
Union:  impact  on  firearm  availability,  firearm  suicide  and  homicide  rates  in  Austria.  Br  J 
Psychiatry 2007; 191: 253-7.  
 
2  Thornicroft  GJ.  Shunned:  Discrimination  Against  People  with  Mental  Illness.  Oxford 
University Press, 2006.  
 
3 Casey P. Alternatives to abortion and hard cases. In Swimming Against the Tide; Feminist 
Dissent on the Issue of Abortion (ed AB Kennedy): 86–95. Open Air Books, 1997.  
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6 Soni SD, Mallik A, Mbatia J, Shrimankar J. Late paraphrenia (letter). Br J Psychiatry 1988; 
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7 Viding E, Frick P, Plomin R. Aetiology of the relationship between callous-unemotional traits 
and conduct problems in childhood. Br J Psychiatry 2007; 190 (suppl 49): s33–8. 
 
Personal communications need written authorisation (email is acceptable); they should not be 
included in the reference list. Unpublished doctoral theses may be cited (please state department 
or faculty, university and degree). No other citation of unpublished work, including unpublished 
conference presentations, is permissible. 
 
Tables 
Tables should be numbered and have an appropriate heading. The tables should be mentioned in 
the  text  but  must  not  duplicate  information.  The  heading  of  the  table,  together  with  any 
footnotes or comments, should be self-explanatory. The desired position of the table in the 
manuscript should be indicated. Do not tabulate lists, which should be incorporated into the text, 
where, if necessary, they may be displayed. 
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Authors must obtain permission from the original publisher if they intend to use tables from 
other sources, and due acknowledgement should be made in a footnote to the table. 
 
Figures 
Figures should be clearly numbered and include an explanatory legend. Avoid cluttering figures 
with explanatory text, which is better incorporated succinctly in the legend. 3-D effects should 
generally be avoided. Lettering should be parallel to the axes. Units must be clearly indicated 
and should be presented in the form quantity (unit) (note: `litre' should be spelled out in full 
unless modified to ml, dl, etc.). All figures should be mentioned in the text and the desired 
position of the figure in the manuscript should be indicated. 
 
Authors must obtain permission from the original publisher if they intend to use figures from 
other sources, and due acknowledgement should be made in the legend. Colour figures may be 
reproduced if authors are able to cover the costs. 
 
Statistics 
Methods of statistical analysis should be described in language that is comprehensible to the 
numerate psychiatrist as well as the medical statistician. Particular attention should be paid to 
clear description of study designs and objectives, and evidence that the statistical procedures 
used were both appropriate for the hypotheses tested and correctly interpreted. The statistical 
analyses should be planned before data are collected and full explanations given for any post 
hoc analyses carried out. The value of test statistics used (e.g. t, F-ratio) should be given as well 
as their significance levels so that their derivation can be understood. Standard deviations and 
errors should not be reported as ± but should be specified and referred to in parentheses. 
 
Trends  should  not  be  reported  unless  they  have  been  supported  by  appropriate  statistical 
analyses for trends. 
 
The use of percentages to report results from small samples is discouraged, other than where 
this facilitates comparisons. The number of decimal places to which numbers are given should 
reflect the accuracy of the determination, and estimates of error should be given for statistics. 
 
A brief and useful introduction to the place of confidence intervals is given by Gardner & 
Altman (1990, British Journal of Psychiatry, 156, 472-474). Use of these is encouraged but not 
mandatory. 
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Authors are encouraged to include estimates of statistical power where appropriate. To report a 
difference as being statistically significant is generally insufficient, and comment should be 
made about the magnitude and direction of change. 
 
Randomised controlled trials 
The Journal recommends to authors the CONSORT guidelines (1996, Journal of the American 
Medical Association, 276, 637-639) and their basis (2001, Annals of Internal Medicine, 134, 
663-694) in relation to the reporting of randomised controlled clinical trials; also recommended 
is  their  extension  to  cluster  randomised  controlled  trials  (2004,  BMJ,  328,  702-708).  In 
particular, a flow chart illustrating the progress of participants through the trial (CONSORT 
diagram) must be included. 
 
Abbreviations, units and footnotes 
All abbreviations must be spelt out on first usage and only widely recognised abbreviations will 
be permitted. The generic names of drugs should be used. 
Generally, SI units should be used; where they are not, the SI equivalent should be included in 
parentheses. Units should not use indices: i.e. report g/ml, not gml
-1. 
 
The use of notes separate to the text should generally be avoided, whether they be footnotes or a 
separate section at the end of a paper. A footnote to the first page may, however, be included to 
give some general information concerning the paper. 
 
Materials, equipment and software 
The source of any compounds not yet available on general prescription should be indicated. The 
version number (or release date) and manufacturer of software used, and the platform on which 
it  is  operated  (PC,  Mac,  UNIX  etc.),  should  be  stated.  The  manufacturer,  manufacturer's 
location and product identification should be included when describing equipment central to a 
study (e.g. scanning equipment used in an imaging study). 
 
Proofs 
A proof will be sent to the corresponding author of an article. Offprints, which are prepared at 
the same time as the Journal is printed, should be ordered when the proof is returned to the 
Editor. Offprints are despatched up to 6 weeks after publication.  
 
Copyright 
On acceptance of the paper for publication, we will require all authors to assign copyright to the 
Royal  College  of  Psychiatrists.  You  retain  the  right  to  use  the  article  (provided  you      
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acknowledge the published original in standard bibliographic citation form) in the following 
ways, as long as you do not sell it (or give it away) in ways which would conflict directly with 
our business interests. You are free to use the article for teaching purposes within your own 
institution or, in whole or in part, as the basis of your own further publications or spoken 
presentations. In addition, you retain the right to provide a copy of the manuscript to a public 
archive (such as an institutional repository or PubMed Central) for public release no sooner than 
12 months after publication in the British Journal of Psychiatry (or from the date of publication, 
if the open access option is chosen, see below). Only the final peer-reviewed manuscript as 
accepted for publication (not earlier versions, or the final copy-edited version) may be deposited 
in this way. Any such manuscripts must contain the following wording on the first page: "This 
is an author-produced electronic version of an article accepted for publication in the British 
Journal  of  Psychiatry.  The  definitive  publisher-authenticated  version  is  available  online  at 
http://bjp.rcpsych.org."  
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Appendix 2.2: Recruitment Procedure  
Timeline 
 
July 2008:  Major  Research  Project  Proposal  approved  by  the  D.Clin  Psy 
programme at the University of Glasgow. 
August 2008:   Application for Ethical and Research & Development approval (NHS 
Lothian). 
September 2008:  Ethical  approval  and  Research  &  Development  approved  pending 
minor changes. 
November 2008:  Full ethical approval granted. 
December 2008:  Recruitment started. 
01 April 2009:  Application to NHS Greater Glasgow & Clyde and NHS Ayrshire & 
Arran ethical approval. 
05 June 2009:  Approval received from NHS Greater Glasgow & Clyde. 
24 July 2009:  Approval received from NHS Ayrshire & Arran 
 
 
Recruitment Process & Attrition 
 
 
 
258 discharged 
patients invited to 
take part by letter 
11 outpatients attending 
neuropsychology 
department invited to take 
part by letter 
Presentations made to 
two brain injury 
charities. 
·  1 participant excluded due to ongoing 
psychiatric illness 
·  1 potential participant deceased 
·  4 participants dropped out prior to 
interview 
·  7 potential participants did not attend 
45 replies received 
32 participants took part 
·  2 potential participants 
dropped out prior to 
interview  
·  9 potential participants 
did not attend 
22 replies received 
11 participants took 
part 
43 participants in 
total participated 
Two participants 
excluded 
Total sample n=41      
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Appendix 2.3: Development of modified Stroop task 
 
A pilot study, consisting of two parts, was conducted to create the emotional Stroop paradigm 
which was the measure of attentional bias. Part one of the pilot aimed to generate a pool of 
‘trauma’ words, and part two involved matching the selected trauma words to negative, neutral 
and positive words.  
 
Part 1 
Fourteen trainee clinical psychologists (trainees) were asked to list as many (1) Assault, (2) road 
traffic accident (RTA) and (3) ‘Fall’ words they could think of. Participants were given one 
minute for each word type. The words generated are listed below: 
 
ROAD TRAFFIC ACCIDENT  ASSAULT  FALL 
windscreen   gore  blood   bottled  pain   embarrassment 
seatbelt   guts  police  cut   hospital  break 
skid   brains  scream   assault  cut   unpredictable 
screech   impact  attacked  power  broken   shock 
smash   squashed  mugged   cruel  stairs   surprise 
crash   boom  knife   torture  step  hurt  
blood   fear  stabbed  tears  cut  scar 
unconscious  terror  punch   begging  blood   turn 
siren   noise  scarred  break  doctor  steep 
ambulance   tyres  frightened  hurt  ambulance  grave 
doctor  cut  run  jumped  hit  fright 
glass   thrown  violence   behind  smash  concussion 
death   launched  kicking  bottled  bang   floor 
dying  traffic   stitches  cut   slip   sore 
injured   lorry  gang   assault  crack  careful 
amnesia  bus  hit   power  thump  embarrassment 
blind  emergency  blindness  cruel  bruise   break 
rubber  police   stroke  torture  swollen  unpredictable 
petrol   break  teenager  tears  paralysed  shock 
ice  wreckage  robbery  begging  immobile  surprise 
speeding  insurance  fight   break  incapacitated  hurt  
driver  killed  threaten  hurt  drunk  scar 
hospital   gore  aggression   jumped  dizzy   turn 
accident   guts  shouting  behind  rehabilitation  steep 
airbag  brains  swearing  hurt  accident   grave 
whiplash  impact  beaten   jumped  clumsy  fright 
brake   squashed  unconscious  behind  cliff  concussion 
doors  boom  wounds  hurt  stairs   floor 
window    pain  jumped  balcony  sore 
wheel     head    heights  careful 
road     rape    unexpected   
corner    beating     head    
pedestrian    anger     injury    
collision    injury     icy   
motorway     head    walking   
safety    club     pavement    
fear    shoeing    scrape   
car     bruise    bones         
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shatter    broken    bumped   
collide    bleeding    trip    
gore    fear     stick   
 
Words generated by the trainees were added to using words from published studies. ‘Road 
traffic accident’ words were taken from the only known study of attentional bias in the TBI 
population (Coates, 2008). ‘Assault’ words were selected from a study (Mathews et al, 1989) 
that used ‘physical threat’ words.  Not all physical threat words were added if not deemed 
suitable  by  the  author  e.g.  ‘cancer’.  Words  were  not  added  if  they  overlapped  with  words 
created by the trainees. No known published study used ‘Fall’ words and therefore no words 
were added the list generated by the trainees.  
 
Part 2 
The same fourteen trainees were emailed the completed list of words (words they generated plus 
published words) and given the following instruction: 
 
Please rate the words below based on how strongly you think each 
word would produce and emotional response in an adult who has been 
hospitalised  as  a  result  of:    (1)  being  involved  in  Road  Traffic 
Accident, (2) been physically assaulted or (3) had a fall. 
 
Please rate each word on a scale 0-3. Please indicate your response by 
circling  a  number  for  each  word  (or  highlighting  if  completing 
electronically). 
 
Thirteen trainees completed the task.  Words were scored and ranked by the author according to 
the trainees’ responses. The top fifteen words for each category were selected and matched to 
published negative, positive and neutral words. All words were matched for syllable and word 
length. A total of 45 trauma, negative, neutral and positive words were programmed to create 
the Stroop task using Superlab (version 4.0).  The words are presented below.  
 
Number  Trauma  Negative  Neutral  Positive 
1  crash  dread  cream  whole 
2  wreckage  brooding  routines  peaceful 
3  smash  alone  point  clean 
4  trapped  tricked  scarves  praised 
5  collision  abandoned  intellect  vivacious 
6  motorway  ridiculed  currency  glorious 
7  killed  failed  height  pleased 
8  airbag  guilty  signal  secure 
9  whiplash  deprived  sandwich  inspired      
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10  brake  scorn  quote  charm 
11  fatal  upset  study  merry 
12  windscreen  friendless  thresholds  energised 
13  death  wrong  queen  trust 
14  siren  awful  handy  enjoy 
15  impact  dismal  button  joyful 
16  attack  stupid  window  lively 
17  stab  lost  same  calm 
18  punching  hopeless  fountain  tranquil 
19  victim  reject  nation  lovely 
20  beating  forlorn  shuffle  fortune 
21  hit  sad  pod  joy 
22  mugging  unloved  address  healthy 
23  knife  gloom  locks  sound 
24  bleeding  betrayed  painting  cheering 
25  screaming  destroyed  substance  surprised 
26  violence  deserted  tendency  jubilant 
27  kicking  mistake  outside  rejoice 
28  assault  useless  drawing  special 
29  scar  dull  leaf  neat 
30  gang  loss  bath  ease 
31  fall  fail  pear  good 
32  trip  wilt  turn  glad 
33  painful  despised  mushroom  greeting 
34  broken  lonely  cherry  beauty 
35  ambulance  tormented  balconies  efficient 
36  hospital  pathetic  alphabet  beautiful 
37  cracking  dreadful  wardrobe  applause 
38  stairs  stress  cruise  smiles 
39  concussion  depression  changeable  passionate 
40  accident  offended  holidays  brilliant 
41  step  fool  team  luck 
42  blood  guilt  coins  trust 
42  slip  blue  pour  free 
44  bruise  fooled  fringe  wealth 
45  swollen  traitors  balanced  prosper 
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Appendix 2.5 Permission from author to use Traumatic Memory Inventory 
From:    Joe Spinazzola 
To:    mzucker@jri.org l.reid.1@research.gla.ac.uk 
Cc:     
Date:    10/09/08  02:27 am 
Subject:    Fw: TMI 
Attachments:   
  
Hi Louise, 
  
Yes, this is one of our Center's measures, and you most certainly have our permission to use it. 
  
Keep us posted on what you find in your study! 
  
Thanks,  Joseph Spinazzola 
  
Joseph Spinazzola, Ph.D. 
Executive Director 
The Trauma Center at JRI 
1269 Beacon St. 
Brookline, MA 02446 
(617) 232-1303 ext. 215 
(617) 232-1280 (fax) 
www.traumacenter.org 
  
The Trauma Center is a Division of Justice Resource Institute,  
A member of the National Child Traumatic Stress Network  
and the Hamilton Fish Youth Violence Prevention Consortium,  
and an Affiliate of Boston University School of Medicine  
& the Boston Children's Foundation 
 
 
>>> Marla Zucker 10/6/2008 12:09 PM >>> 
Joe, 
All they need is permission to use the measure. Can you get back to them about this? 
Thanks, 
Marla 
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Appendix 2.6 
Major Research Proposal 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Traumatic Brain Injury, PTSD and Attentional bias: unravelling the misidentification of PTSD in 
people with a TBI. 
 
 
 
 
Louise M. Reid 
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1. Abstract 
Background 
The prevalence of PTSD after a TBI is subject to debate with rates of 0-56% being reported (McMillan, 2001). 
It has been proposed that this range is due to the overlap of symptoms seen in both TBI and PTSD, which 
consequently results in the misidentification of PTSD in people with a TBI (McMillan, 2001).  An attentional 
bias and anxiety when exposed to threat stimuli has been shown to exist in people with PTSD alone. No study 
has investigated whether an attentional bias exists in people with a TBI and PTSD symptoms.  
 
Aims 
The study aims to establish whether an attentional bias to trauma related words exists in people a TBI and 
PTSD  symptoms  and  to  investigate  the  relationship  between  physiological  arousal  and  attentional  bias  in 
people with a TBI and PTSD symptoms.  
 
Methods 
Participants aged 18+ admitted to hospital with a moderate/severe TBI at least 3 months prior to recruitment 
will  be  invited  to  take  part.    Participants  will  be  asked  to  attend  one  appointment  in  which  they  will  be 
interviewed  and  will  complete  a  number  of  cognitive  assessments  and  a  measure  of  mood.  During  the 
appointment, participants will be asked to wear a heart rate monitor. 
   
Application 
The purpose of the study is to better understand why PTSD is misidentified in people who have a TBI. It has 
been shown that people who have a sustained a TBI may display symptoms similar to PTSD, e.g. avoidance, 
and hence appear to have PTSD without meeting diagnostic criteria. Instead, it is the TBI that is causing such 
symptoms. Should an attentional bias exist with greater PTSD symptom severity, then using a measure of 
attentional bias may help clinicians to identify PTSD in people with a TBI.  
 
2. Introduction 
The prevalence of PTSD following traumatic brain injury (TBI) varies throughout the literature with a range of 
0-56% being reported (McMillan, 2001).  The first evidence for PTSD after TBI was published in the early 
1990s (McMillan, 1991) however other earlier studies suggested that PTSD did not (e.g. Mayou et al, 1993) 
and later could not (e.g. Sbordone et al, 1995) co-exist with TBI.  More recently research suggests that PTSD 
can occur after TBI (King,  2008). For example, Bryant  et al (2004) reported that patients can experience 
physiological arousal when exposed to trauma related stimuli even though they have no conscious memory of 
the trauma.  Thus fear conditioning can occur out-with the level of conscious awareness and contribute to the 
development of PTSD.  
 
Two  recent  studies  propose  complimentary  explanations  for  the  discrepancy  in  prevalence  rates  reported.  
Sumpter and McMillan (2005) suggested that PTSD was misdiagnosed in patients with a severe TBI when 
using self-report questionnaires compared to structured clinical interview. They found PTSD caseness to be 3% 
using a structured clinical interview.  In concordance with McMillan (2001), this misdiagnosis is attributed to      
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the similarity in symptoms seen in both PTSD and TBI alone.  For example, a person with a TBI may display 
“avoidance” symptoms according to a PTSD diagnostic questionnaire however, the person may be ‘avoiding’ a 
situation as a result of their injury (e.g. ‘avoiding’ driving because their licence has been revoked).  
 
This phenomenon by which people with a TBI can experience PTSD symptoms even without a conscious 
memory of the trauma can be conceptualised using Dual Representation Theory (Brewin et al, 1996). This 
neurocognitive model posits that conscious memory is stored in what is termed “verbally accessible memory”.  
The  information  stored  in  VAMs  can  be  consciously  accessed  by  an  individual  when  required.    Implicit 
(unconscious) processing is  also known to  take place in parallel to explicit (conscious) processing.   Such 
information  processed  in  this  fashion  is  termed  “situationally  accessible  memory”  and  can  be  accessed 
unintentionally by stimuli, in particular sensory stimuli that are associated with this memory.  Thus, patients 
with amnesia can present with PTSD symptoms due to implicit processing that is triggered by trauma-related 
sensory cues. 
 
The notion that trauma-related cues can trigger flashbacks is in keeping with the Cognitive Model of PTSD 
proposed by Ehlers and Clark (2000) as a framework for understanding the development and maintenance of 
PTSD. They proposed that hypervigilence to threat stimuli is a key maintaining factor in PTSD.  That is, 
individuals are on ‘high alert’ for potential danger and engage in behaviours such as scanning the environment.  
This hypervigilence can be considered in terms of an attentional bias to threat stimuli.  An attentional bias itself 
refers to a phenomenon in which an individual can redirect attentional resources to the most salient task with 
the resultant disruption to other ongoing cognitive activities (Mogg and Bradley, 1998). Many studies have 
reported that an attentional bias is present in patients with PTSD (e.g. Williams et al, 1996 & Beck et al, 2001).  
A recent study (Pineles et al, 2007) investigated whether this attentional bias is indeed acting as an interference 
to other ongoing cognitive tasks as suggested by Mogg and Bradley (1998), or whether the attentional bias 
facilitates detection of threat stimuli for individuals with PTSD.  It was found that attentional interference as 
opposed to attentional facilitation was present in patients with PTSD and is thus in keeping with Ehlers and 
Clark’s  (2000)  model.  Furthermore,  it  was  suggested  that  attentional  interference  may  be  associated  with 
difficulties experienced by patients with PTSD, for example, intrusions and avoidance. 
 
In non-PTSD populations it has been shown that attentional bias is associated with increased anxiety (Bar-Haim 
et al, 2007).  Mogg et al (1993) found that individuals with high trait anxiety displayed an emotional Stroop 
effect compared to low trait anxiety individuals. Anxiety is a psychophysiological state characterised by a 
number of physiological symptoms including muscle tension, twitching and shaking, restlessness, fatigue and 
heart palpitations (Clark, 1989). PTSD is an anxiety disorder with prominent psychophysiological symptoms 
including elevated heart rate and hyperarousal to threat stimuli (Blechert et al, 2007).  Therefore patients with 
PTSD are known to have an attentional bias for threat stimuli (e.g. Pineles et al, 2007) and physiological 
anxiety symptoms. 
 
The aim of this study is to provide further support for previous work that has acted to identify the reasons for a 
wide range of reported incidences of PTSD in patients with a TBI. It is suggested that for patients with a TBI,      
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PTSD should be considered as a continuum.  That is, some patients will have some PTSD symptoms but not 
meet diagnostic criteria and others will fulfil diagnostic criteria for PTSD. No study has investigated whether or 
not an attentional bias exists in TBI patients reporting PTSD symptoms. This study will specifically investigate 
whether or not an attentional bias is related to PTSD symptom severity in patients with a TBI and subsequently 
question whether attentional bias might be utilised as an indicator of PTSD for this population.  Physiological 
arousal (heart rate) will also be examined in relation to PTSD severity and attentional bias.  
 
3. Aims & Hypotheses 
3.1. Aims 
To establish whether an attentional bias exists in people with a TBI and PTSD symptoms. 
 
To investigate the relationship between physiological arousal (heart rate) and attentional bias in people with a 
TBI and PTSD symptoms. 
 
3.2. Hypotheses 
1.  People  with  a  higher  frequency  or  severity  of  PTSD  symptoms  have  an 
attentional bias to trauma related stimuli. 
2.  Increased physiological arousal is associated with greater attentional bias to trauma related stimuli. 
3.  H1 is associated with increased physiological arousal (heart rate). 
 
4. Plan of Investigation 
4.1 Participants 
Participants aged 18+ admitted to hospital with a moderate/severe TBI at least 3 months prior to recruitment (to 
fulfil DSM-IV criteria for PTSD) will be invited to take part.  TBI severity will be defined as Glasgow Coma 
Scale (GCS) less than 13 and documented loss of consciousness. Males and females will be included.   
 
4.2 Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria 
Participants with a TBI that occurred at least 3 months prior to recruitment and who are living independently 
and  are  able  to  consent  will  be  included.    Participants  receiving  psychiatric  treatment  for  PTSD  will  be 
excluded. Participants who are receiving psychiatric treatment for problems other than PTSD will be considered 
on a case by case basis.  Participants under the age of 18 years will be excluded. 
 
4.3 Recruitment Procedures 
Participants will be recruited from Edinburgh Headway and the Scottish Brain Injury Rehabilitation Centre at 
the Astley Ainslie Hospital in Edinburgh. Patients who are currently receiving treatment and those discharged 
from the head injury outpatient clinic will be invited to take part.  
A Consultant Clinical Neuropsychologist will be asked to approach patients who are receiving treatment and 
those who have been discharged from the Scottish Brain Injury Rehabilitation Centre with a letter detailing the 
purpose of the study. The letter will have a reply slip stating whether the individual wishes to hear more about 
the study.  The reply slip will be returned to the researcher and contact will be made if requested.      
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A talk will be given to the Edinburgh Headway group and an advertisement will be placed on the notice board 
inviting individuals to consider taking part in the study.  An email address, contact phone number and reply 
slips (with stamped addressed envelopes) will be provided for replies. 
 
4.4 Measures 
4.4.1 Physiological measures: 
1.  Heart rate – using the Polar Heart Rate monitor. 
 
4.4.2 Cognitive measures: 
1.  Wechsler  Test  of  Adult  Reading  (WTAR:  Wechsler,  2001)  –  to  assess  premorbid  intellectual 
functioning  
2.  Emotional Stroop (computerised) – to assess attentional bias 
3.  Digit Symbol substitution test [Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale-III (WAIS-III: Wechsler, 1997)] – 
to assess information processing speed 
4.  Logical memory [Wechsler Memory Scale-III (WMS-III: Wechsler, 1997)] – to assess declarative 
memory. 
5.  The Hayling (Hayling and Brixton Test, Burgess & Shallice, 1997) – to assess executive function. 
 
4.4.3. PTSD severity and caseness measures: 
1.  Post-traumatic Diagnostic Scale (PDS: Foa et al, 1997) – self report 
2.  Clinician Administered PTSD Scale (CAPS: Blake et al, 1995) – a structured clinical interview that 
includes a measure of previous trauma history.  This measure will highlight if there are any conscious 
memories or more than one event. 
 
4.4.4 TBI measures: 
1.  Post-traumatic Amnesia (PTA) – collected via retrospective questioning to measure TBI severity. 
2.  Traumatic Memory Inventory [TMI: van der Kolk, 1990 (unpublished paper)] – a structured interview 
that measures sensory, affective and narrative memory for the event. 
3.  Glasgow Outcome Scale-Extended (GOS-E: Wilson et al, 1998) – a clinician rated scale that assesses 
functional and social disability following a TBI. 
 
4.4.5. Depression and Anxiety 
1.  Hospital Anxiety and Depression Scale (HADS) (Zigmond & Snaith, 1983) 
 
4.5 Design 
A single sample within subjects design will be employed. 
 
4.6 Research Procedures 
Participants will be invited to take part via the procedure described above.  One visit will be required for each 
participant.  Participants will be seen at the Astley Ainslie Hospital.        
137 
 
When a participant contacts the researcher to register interest, the researcher will telephone the participant and 
provide information about what will be required.  An appointment will be arranged and a letter confirming this 
time will be sent along with an information sheet to the participant. 
 
The appointment is expected to last approximately 1.5 hours.  During the appointment participants will first be 
given an opportunity to ask any questions before being asked to provide informed consent.  Next the heart rate 
monitor will be fitted and started at the same time as a digital stopwatch. The heart rate monitor will be worn 
throughout the interview and the time for the beginning and end of each test/scale will be recorded.  The 
tests/scales will then be administered in the following order: 
 
1.  HADS 
2.  PTA assessment 
3.  PDS 
4.  WTAR 
5.  LM I 
 
*BREAK 10mins* 
 
6.  Digit symbol substitution test 
7.  Hayling  
8.  Emotional Stroop 
9.  Logical Memory II 
10.  CAPS 
11.  GOS-E 
12.  TMI 
 
4.7 Justification of sample size 
Power was calculated for the primary hypothesis based on data from Bryant and Harvey (1997). Here, Bryant 
and  Harvey  (1997)  investigated  the  attentional  bias  towards  threat  stimuli  in  subjects  with  PTSD  and 
subclinical PTSD using a dot-probe paradigm and found that the PTSD group had an attentional bias compared 
to the subclinical PTSD group (cohen’s d = 0.46).  
 
Effect size for hypothesis two was calculated based on data from Bradley et al (1995) who predicted that people 
with Generalised Anxiety Disorder (GAD) would show greater colour-naming interference for negative words 
than neutral words compared with controls. Results suggested that people with GAD had greater colour-naming 
interference due to negative words compared with the control group and the effect size was large (d = 0.8).  
 
Power  for  hypothesis three  was calculated  from a paper investigating physiological responsiveness among 
survivors of motor vehicle accidents with chronic PTSD (Veazey et al, 2004).   The study compared heart rate 
reactivity between groups with chronic PTSD, subsyndromal PTSD and non-PTSD and found a significant      
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difference in heart rate reactivity between the chronic PTSD group and non-PTSD group, the effect size was 
medium (cohen’s d = 0.5).   
 
Specifying power = 0.8, alpha = 0.05 and f = 0.15, a sample of 68 participants will need to be recruited to 
reliably reject the null hypothesis when using linear regression for data analysis.  The data for the power 
calculation was computed using G*Power 3.0.  
 
4.8 Settings & Equipment 
All scales and tests will be administered at the Astley Ainslie Hospital. A stopwatch and a Polar Heart Rate 
monitor  (S610i)  will  be  required.  The  cognitive  tests  will  be  requested  from  the  University  of  Glasgow, 
Psychological Medicine department. 
 
4.9 Data Analysis 
Data will be analysed using SPSS v15.0. Kolmogorov-Smirnov analysis will be conducted for each variable to 
check whether the data are normally distributed.  This will allow a decision as to whether parametric or non-
parametric tests should be carried out.  Hypotheses 1 and 2 will be investigated using a linear regression model.  
For hypothesis 3, a correlation will be used to investigate whether there is a relationship between physiological 
arousal and attentional bias. If an association is found, an interaction term will be added to the regression 
model.  
 
5. Health and Safety Issues 
5.1 Researcher Safety Issues 
The researcher will be conducting appointments in a hospital setting the researchers field supervisor will be 
informed as to when and where the appointments are taking place.  All appointments will be conducted between 
9am and 5pm to correspond with working hours of staff to ensure that another member of staff will be on the 
premises when the appointments are being conducted. 
 
5.2 Participant Safety Issues 
The appointments will be conducted on NHS premises and the health and safety protocols of the premises will 
be  followed  at  all  times  to  ensure  the  safety  of  the  participant  if  an  emergency  were  to  occur  (e.g.  fire 
evacuation procedures).  
 
6. Ethical Issues 
Ethics  approval  will  be  sought  from  Edinburgh  LREC.    Recruitment  will  be  conducted  by  asking  the 
participants if they wish to be contacted.  Part of the study will require participants to recall the event that 
caused their TBI.  This may be distressing for the participant and they will be afforded the opportunity to 
discuss their distress after the session, or if preferred, they will be given the chance to terminate the session.  
Such an event is unlikely and has not occurred in a previous trainee project of a similar design (Smith et al, 
2007). Some participants may be identified as having PTSD as determined by the diagnostic scales used.  If a      
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participant is identified as having PTSD, abnormal depression or anxiety and would like help, their GP will be 
informed with the recommendation of a referral being made to the appropriate service.   
 
7. Financial Issues 
7.1 Equipment Costs, travel etc 
Participants  will  not  be  reimbursed  for  their  travel  to  their  appointment.  Costs  are  for  questionnaires  and 
stationery. 
 
8. Timetable 
·  July-September 08: Application for ethical approval 
·  September-April 09: Data collection 
·  April-July 09: Data analysis and write-up. 
·  August 09: Submit portfolio 
 
9. Practical Applications 
The aim of this study is to investigate whether an attentional bias to threat stimuli is contributing to the reported 
large range of PTSD in patients with a TBI. The findings of the study will help clinicians better understand 
whether or not a patient does indeed have PTSD, or whether they are experiencing head injury symptoms. The 
study will help to understand why some patients with a TBI present on self-report questionnaires as having 
PTSD when they do not have the associated psychophysiological symptoms e.g. anxiety or meet diagnostic 
criteria when interviewed by a clinician.  It is hypothesised that an attentional bias will be associated with 
PTSD symptom severity in patients with a TBI and that this will help distinguish whether or not a person does 
have PTSD or whether they are just interested in knowing what happened during an amnesic gap. Overall, 
clinicians will be able to test patients with a TBI for an attentional bias to help them to understand what a 
patient is experiencing and allow them to provide the appropriate intervention and care package. 
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